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

REPUBLIC OF POLAND

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Ministry for Foreign Affairs

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

CONCERNING

POLISH - GERMAN

AND

POLISH - SOVIET RELATIONS

1933-1939

THE

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FOREWORD

THE official documents presented in this volume cover Poland's relations with her two great neighbours, Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, during the six years prior to the outbreak of war. This period was chosen simply because during those years Poland's relations with these two countries were not based only on peace treaties, but also on other political agreements designed to develop and strengthen those relations. The documents selected deal solely with these two aspects of Polish international policy, and nothing is included which does not have a direct bearing on this subject.

It is not intended here to suggest ready-made conclusions to the reader; but it may be worth while drawing attention to certain essential features of the relations in question:

1. Neither in Polish-German nor in Polish-Soviet relations were there any commitments aimed directly or indirectly against third Parties.

2. By her continual endeavour to remain on good neighbourly terms with both Germany and the U.S.S.R., Poland for many years averted the possibility of a conflict between these two Powers. In other words, Poland never consented to any sacrifice of her understanding with either of her neighbours in favour of plans or suggestions put forward by the other, such as the many proposals made by Germany.

3. Over several years Chancellor Hitler and the German Government made declarations to Poland which, judged by international standards, could only be regarded as a permanent basis for harmonious relations in every respect. The method of resort to violation of solemn assurances has never been so completely disclosed as in Germany's conduct towards Poland. Similarly, the Soviet aggression against Poland on September 17, 1939, is characteristic in its violation of sworn pledges and cynical disregard of Poland's peaceful behaviour towards the U.S.S.R.

At the present moment, when the civilized world is fighting to destroy a terrible evil which is causing so much human suffering, it is undoubtedly necessary to throw light on the methods adopted by the leaders of the German Reich and the Soviet Union. This publication of official Polish diplomatic documents is intended to serve that purpose.

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LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE DOCUMENTS, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS

POLAND

Edward Smigly-Rydz	*Inspector-General of Armed Forces, Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of Poland.*
Józef Beck	*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*
August Zaleski	*Minister for Foreign Affairs (from September 30, 1939).*
Count Jan Szembek	*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*
Miroslaw Arciszewski	*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*
Count Michal Lubieński	*Chef de Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs.*
Sir Howard William Kennard	*British Ambassador.*
Clifford John Norton	*British Chargé d'Affaires.*
Léon Noël	*French Ambassador.*
Ladislas Szathmary	*Slovakian Minister.*
Hans Adolf von Moltke	*German Ambassador.*
Johann von Wühlisch	*German Chargé d'Affaires.*
Mikolai Szaronov	*Soviet Ambassador.*

GREAT BRITAIN

Neville Chamberlain	*Prime Minister.*
Viscount Halifax	*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*
Count Edward Raczyński	*Polish Ambassador.*

FRANCE

Edouard Daladier	*President of the Council, Minister for National Defence and Minister for War.*
Georges Bonnet	*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*
Juljusz Lukasiewicz	*Polish Ambassador.*

GERMANY

Hermann Goering	*Field-Marshal. Prime Minister for Prussia, etc., etc.*
Baron von Neurath	*Minister for Foreign Affairs (until February* 4, 1938).
Joachim von Ribbentrop	*Minister for Foreign Affairs (from February* 4, 1938).
Baron von Weizsäcker	*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*
M. Woermann	*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*
Hans Frank	*Reich Minister.*
Alfred Wysocki	*Polish Minister* (1931-33).
Józef Lipski	*Polish Ambassador* (1933-39).
Prince Stefan Lubomirski	*Polish Chargé d'Affaires.*
Sir Nevile Henderson	*British Ambassador.*
Robert Coulondre	*French Ambassador.*
Bernardo Attolico	*Italian Ambassador.*
Awid Richert	*Swedish Minister.*

U.S.S.R.

Mikhail Kalinin	*Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of U.S.S.R.*
Vacheslav Molotov	*Chairman of Council of People's Commissars, Commissar for Foreign Affairs (from May* 1939).
Anastasi Mikoyan	*Vice-Chairman of Council of People's Commissars, Commissar for Foreign Trade.*
Maxim Litvinov	*Commissar for Foreign Affairs (until May* 1939).
Vladimir Potemkin	*Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs.*
M. Krestinski	*Former Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs.*
Waclaw Grzybowski	*Polish Ambassador.*
Jerzy Matusiński	*Counsellor of the Polish Embassy, Acting Polish Consul-General at Kiev.*
Sir William Seeds	*British Ambassador.*
Augusto Rosso	*Italian Ambassador.*
Count von der Schulenburg	*German Ambassador.*

FREE CITY OF DANZIG

Artur Greiser . . .	*President of the Senate.*
Albert Foerster . . .	*Gauleiter, National - Socialist Party.*
Marjan Chodacki . . .	*Polish Commissioner General.*
Zygmunt Zawadowski . .	*Polish Vice - Commissioner General.*
Henryk Sucharski . . .	*Polish Commander of Westerplatte.*

BELGIUM

Michal Mościcki . . .	*Polish Minister.*

NETHERLANDS

Waclaw Babiński . . .	*Polish Minister.*

Part One

Polish-German Relations

INTRODUCTION

THE Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934, came into force in circumstances which seemed to promise success for the policy it initiated. The Germans had passed through an upheaval which can without exaggeration be called revolutionary. The National-Socialist régime, which had brought with it new ideas and new men, had been in power for twelve months. Although the conception underlying this régime was no artificial growth in Germany, but resulted logically from all the historical development of German thought and politics, none the less, in the domain of internal policy it was so contrary to the conceptions underlying the Weimar Republic, it involved such a complete transformation of German life, it was so utterly foreign to the rest of Europe, that there seemed a possibility that the Hitler régime might adopt and apply entirely new ideas in the domain of foreign policy also. There seemed a possibility that the National-Socialist revolution might force German opinion to accept the idea of a *rapprochement* with Poland, though this had been impossible under the Weimar Republic.

The Hitler régime transferred the power in Germany to men who had not come from Prussia, the land of traditional hatred for Poland. Chancellor Hitler is an Austrian by origin, Field-Marshal Goering is a Bavarian, Minister Hess is from a German family settled in Egypt, Minister Goebbels is a Rhinelander. There was some justification for expecting that these men would be able to rise above the Prussian hostile attitude to Poland, and would return to the tradition of other German States, certain of which, eighteenth-century Saxony for example, had had periods of friendly relations with Poland.

The absolute power wielded by Chancellor Hitler, on whom depended the destinies of Germany, was also some guarantee that he would be able to continue the policy he himself had initiated.

Chancellor Hitler's rejection of imperialism at other nations' expense (only apparent, as events later proved) and the adoption of the slogan that the Third Reich was interested only in the fate of Germans and of territories inhabited by a German majority, seemed to provide a foundation for good relations with Poland. For, although Poland's frontiers included territories which, before 1918, had been part of Germany, at least ninety per cent of the population of these areas was Polish.

The adoption of the fight against Communism and the Comintern as a cardinal tenet of National Socialism also seemed to guarantee stability to the policy of *rapprochement* with Poland; any return to the Rapallo policy seemed out of the question, as it would have meant the end of Nazi ideology and would have been a serious blow to the Fuehrer's honour.

It has also to be borne in mind that the Polish-German Declaration gave the Polish side an opportunity to break down the policy of

isolating Poland which successive German Governments had deliberately pursued.

In a speech made shortly after the Locarno Pact, Gustav Stresemann, who symbolizes the entire foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, declared that, contrary to the aim pursued by Great Britain and France, which countries had desired to create a basis for the reconstruction of Europe in collaboration with Germany, the Locarno Pact was a step towards the isolation of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The spirit of pre-Hitler Germany's Eastern policy cannot be summed up better than in M. Stresemann's own words:

"I turn to speak of our Eastern frontiers. Both the Czech and the Polish Foreign Ministers, M. Benesz and M. Skrzyński, wished to collaborate in preparing the Treaty of Locarno, and brought with them plans for a treaty of arbitration with their countries, which we did not accept for discussion. They were chiefly anxious to obtain a pact of non-aggression, that is to say, a pact which would have seriously engaged us to abstain from all initiative. That engagement we have undertaken in the West, but we have refused it for the East. Membership of the League of Nations does not exclude war, any more than anything else. I would be very grateful if all those who talk of the League of Nations would read its Covenant at least once. It is extraordinarily interesting in regard both to what it says and to what it does not say. *The League of Nations allows war if agreement is unattainable on political questions.*"

Developing further the secret thoughts of the Weimar Germans, in another part of the same speech M. Stresemann disclosed the German intentions in the West, which presumably were to follow the achievement of German aims in the East:

"Let us examine the various problems which were considered at Locarno. First, that of Alsace-Lorraine. Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Locarno specify what it is that the Powers renounce. They renounce war, violence and invasion. But that was not the original version. There were, in fact, three versions. The first was the draft pact which France and Great Britain themselves drew up. Gaus had it revised in London in a sense more favourable to Germany, and thus we got the second version. In the first text, the preamble said that the purpose of the agreement was to maintain the *status quo* in the West in perpetuity. At Locarno we arrived at a third version, after gaining our point that the words 'to maintain the *status quo*' should be changed to 'to assure the peace.' It is unfortunate that, owing to the confidential nature of those negotiations, we cannot openly compare the texts; but the obvious result of this alteration is that we have not agreed to any moral renunciation; our idea, which every sensible person will approve, was simply that it would be stupid to dream *to-day* of a war with France."

Chancellor Hitler himself attempted to continue this policy of isolating Poland as the first stage in German expansion. On the one hand he concluded the Four-Power Pact with the sole object of turning it to his own purposes and using it to separate Western and Eastern Europe. On the other, he proceeded to exchange documents

ratifying the protocol which extended the validity of the German-Soviet agreement of friendship and neutrality signed at Berlin in 1926.

The Polish Government, like the Governments of the other States who, down till 1938 inclusive, were prepared to co-operate with the Hitler Reich, acted on the assumption that they must neglect nothing which might preserve Europe from war.

During the period of more than five years which separated the signature of the Polish-German Declaration from its denunciation by Chancellor Hitler, the Polish Government did everything possible to maintain a loyal attitude towards the German Reich and to respect the obligations they had undertaken. During the anti-German crusades of the Soviet Foreign Commissar, M. Litvinov, which to-day presumably may not be mentioned in Moscow, the Polish Government did nothing that might worsen the situation or give the impression that they participated in this anti-German activity.

In Danzig, as to which Chancellor Hitler repeatedly gave explicit and solemn assurances, the Polish Government respected the German character of the majority of the population. The National-Socialist Senate was never troubled by Polish interference in the internal affairs of the Free City. The Polish Government confined their activities in Danzig to the maintenance of the Polish rights established in international treaties. So far as the internal political life of the Free City was concerned, it was an independent State. In this sphere the Senate had unlimited freedom of action, and the German population had the same possibilities of fostering their national spirit as the population of Germany.

Although the Polish minority in Germany was continually subject to chicanery and even denied its right to confess its Polish origin, the Polish Government never resorted to a policy of reciprocity, and never treated the German minority in Poland as Germany treated the Polish minority within her borders. The German minority in Poland, some 741,000 persons scattered over several provinces and not exceeding ten per cent of the population in any one of them, was allowed complete freedom of development of its economic and cultural life within the limits of Polish legislation, which made no discrimination whatever in regard to national minorities. In Upper Silesia the position of the German minority was additionally guaranteed until July 15, 1937, by the Geneva Convention. Moreover, in the hope of improving the conditions of the Polish minority in Germany and in the desire to eliminate everything that might worsen Polish-German relations, the Polish Government agreed to a German proposal and, on November 5, 1937, published simultaneously with the German Government a declaration laying down principles of conduct to be applied to the two national minorities.

Thus the German minority in Poland enjoyed a position such as hardly any other national minority possessed in Europe. Numerous schools, freedom of association, a well-developed economic life, and participation in local government and legislative bodies—these were the main spheres in which the German minority enjoyed complete liberty. Yet this minority, indirectly controlled by German elements

from the Reich, allowed itself to be drawn into activities aimed against the Polish State. The illegal journeys of members of the German minority to Germany to receive Party and military training, the organization of militant groups and diversionist incidents, of which numerous judicial trials furnished proofs, were bound to cause a natural reaction on the part of the Polish Press and public. The Polish Government not only did nothing to encourage that reaction but, on the contrary, desiring to avoid friction in their relations with Germany, made every effort to calm public opinion. The Government's caution was carried to such lengths that every draft law or regulation which might even indirectly affect the German minority was submitted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for its opinion.

Despite everything, war broke out between Poland and Germany. Despite everything, Chancellor Hitler decided to pay the highest price Nazi Germany could pay for the invasion of Poland: he renounced his anti-Communist ideology and, at the cost of great political sacrifices, won the collaboration of Soviet Russia. Despite everything, the Reich decided to risk even a European conflict and staked all Germany's existence on one card in order to impose its will on Poland.

Why?

It would be a mistake to seek an explanation of this tragic decision only in the Hitler régime. Yet undoubtedly the development of that régime in recent years made it easier for this historical decision to be taken, so it is worth while recalling the character of this evolution:

1. In 1939 Chancellor Hitler abandoned his tactical thesis that German claims were restricted to territories with a German majority and that Germany respected the freedom of other nations. In its place appeared claims based on the theory of living-space, revealing a German imperialism insatiable in its appetites and menacing all the world. In order to justify the application of the living-space theory to Continental countries, Chancellor Hitler not only invoked the condition of affairs which had existed during the second Reich, but even appealed to the times of the Holy Roman Empire.

2. The entire State and social organism of Germany was concentrated on preparation for war, which was bound to lead either to an actual outbreak of war, or to the financial and economic bankruptcy of the régime.

3. In consequence of the foregoing factor, German economic life was based on the principle of autarky, which made impossible free economic collaboration with other States, and so rendered difficult any slackening of tension in international politics.

4. The dynamism of the régime, in order to maintain its popularity with the masses, needed continual successes. The more difficult and oppressive the conditions of the average Reich citizen, the greater was the need of successes in the international sphere, in order to justify the sacrifice of the individual to the State.

5. The personal changes effected on February 4, 1938, in the chief commands of the German Army and in the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs were the result of Chancellor Hitler's desire to rid his entourage of persons who might conceivably advise against taking a

decision involving the risk of an armed conflict. The result of these changes was resort to military pressure on any State against which Germany made claims, in order to compel acceptance of her demands.

Yet even this does not fully explain the German decision, which had its roots deep in history. Without a knowledge of German history and the German mentality it is impossible to understand either National Socialism or, still more, Chancellor Hitler's decision.

German mentality, which is so distinct and different from that of other European nations, has the attribute that it is attracted by force and by resolute will, and is not repelled by brutality and ruthlessness. Throughout German history the German nation has allowed itself to be subjugated to personifications of ruthless force, who have carried the German masses behind them and led them on to the conquest of so-called living space. Where other nations would resist, the German nation appears to rejoice in an unquestioning obedience to leaders who subordinate the individual to the State in order to transform that State into an instrument of war and conquest. Tacitus said that the profession of a German is war. Mirabeau, in his turn, declared that Prussia's national industry was war. And the eminent Swiss historian Gonzague de Reynold summed up this German characteristic in the sentences: "Germany without a leader is given over to internal anarchy and foreign domination; Germany with leaders is given over to dictatorship and conquest." If the German nation is condemned by its very mentality to this tragic dilemma, the question arises whether Germany will ever be in a condition to become "a fully self-governing nation," which the Covenant of the League of Nations mentions as the sole type of State that can be a member of the international commonwealth. Is it true that, left to themselves, the German people would be unable either to defend their internal freedom or to resist leaders drawing them on to war and conquests? Unfortunately, German history gives an unequivocal answer to this question.

This spirit of ruthless force, the result of innate features of the German character plus the historical development of the German nation, with the Southern Germans retiring before the advance of the Northern Germans, is usually called Prussianism, although undoubtedly it is found earlier than the rise of the Prussian State. Without delving into Germany's ancient history, to illustrate Polish-German relations one need only mention that the present-day methods of the German Reich recall those of the Teutonic Knights. The history of this Order is intermingled with the history of the German eastward expansion of medieval days, effected by resort to methods which are identical in every respect with those adopted by contemporary Germany. Settling in the land now known as Eastern Prussia, the Teutonic Knights won living space for colonists brought from the German Reich, mercilessly exterminating the native population, who were related to the Lithuanians. Then with fire and sword they carved their way to territorial union with the German Reich through Polish Pomorze, thus creating the problem nowadays called the "Polish Corridor." One of the steps towards this union was the massacre of the Polish population of Danzig in 1308 and the settlement of Germans

from the Reich in their place; from that date the Danzig population became German. The tradition of the Teutonic Knights was inherited by the State of Prussia, which, as Gonzague de Reynold justly remarks, was a State without a nation, and therefore a State capable of considering itself an end in itself. The first Prince of Prussia was the last Grand Master of the Order, Albert von Hohenzollern, who thus symbolized the continuity of tradition from the Order to the new State of Prussia. The spirit of the Teutonic Knights became the spirit of Prussia, the spirit which Chancellor Hitler continually invokes, declaring with truth that the Hitler régime is vitalized by the 'spirit of Potsdam.'

In the history of Prussia there are numerous instances of resort to the same methods which are witnessed to-day. The annals of Polish-German relations record the fact that in 1790 Frederick William, King of Prussia, made an alliance with Poland, only to join with Russia in the second partition of Poland three years later. The analogy with 1934 and 1939 is striking.

The Prussian spirit is so strong and so attractive to the German mentality that revolutionary Nazi Germany is just as much dominated by it as was the Conservative Reich of Bismarck and Wilhelm II. People coming from German lands other than Prussia—Hitler, Goering, Hess, Goebbels and other leaders of present-day Germany —were unable with National-Socialist doctrines to provide Germany with anything but a revival of Prussian policy on a scale commensurate with the power of a united Reich.

Only by reference to this historical and psychological background is it possible to understand why the Polish policy of *rapprochement* with Germany, like similar attempts made by other States, was without results. Such a policy could be successful only when applied to a nation respecting right and freedom not only internally but externally. Meantime, it has once more been demonstrated that, if left to itself, the German nation frivolously sacrifices all its great cultural heritage on the altar of State omnipotence, with conquest as the one aim and force as the sole moral criterion.

In this light the struggle with Poland is seen as an inevitable necessity. Hegemony over Europe, which is the ultimate aim of Prussianism, is not possible without freedom of action in Eastern Europe. Disappointed in his hopes of winning Poland over to collaboration with Germany against Eastern Europe, and then against the whole of Europe, Chancellor Hitler was bound to crush Polish resistance by force.

In this course Germany found a natural partner in Russia. For it must be remembered that Germany and Russia are alike in their unconcern for freedom and right, and that collaboration between the two nations has been a natural phenomenon in their history. For ages Germany has made her way eastward, and has assured herself security on her Eastern frontier by the economic and cultural penetration of Russia, with whom she has traditionally maintained friendly relations. The history of the two countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provides ample confirmation of this. Later relations

between the German Reich and Russia continued to be friendly, for Russia did not oppose German expansion, while Germany had considerable influence on the internal economic and cultural life of Russia, where the State administration was largely dominated by men of German origin. Although, at the end of the nineteenth century, Russia temporarily took the path of collaboration with the West, Germany's cultural and economic penetration continued, and the course of the Russo-German War of 1914 to 1917 was necessarily affected by this circumstance. After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and especially after Rapallo, the traditional Russo-German co-operation was revived, to be ended only by Chancellor Hitler. In August 1939 Germany and Russia returned to their age-old traditions. Once more both States decided to base their strength on a collaboration aimed against other peoples.

In the light of the history of Central and Eastern Europe Chancellor Hitler's decision becomes intelligible. Guided by the everlasting German instinct and the Prussian conception of the State as an end in itself, the Chancellor has taken the road of the Teutonic Knights, of Frederick the Great, of Bismarck, and Wilhelm II. Poland stood athwart that road. In order to remove her a decision of historic significance had to be taken. As in former days, as in 1914, the German nation proved itself insufficiently politically mature to resist the will of a man who in these present days incarnates the 'spirit of Potsdam.'

No. 1

M. Wysocki *to M. Beck*

Berlin, May 2, 1933.

In accordance with your instructions I requested, through the Foreign Office here, an interview with Chancellor Hitler. It took place at noon to-day in the presence of the Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, and lasted for forty minutes.

My statement to the Chancellor was approximately as follows:

The relations between the German Reich and Poland have unfortunately taken a turn in which the differences dividing the two countries prevent the official representatives of these States from reaching the understanding which normal neighbourly relations demand. Poland and Germany have always been in antagonistic camps. This state of affairs reacts on the state of public opinion, which in both countries is highly suspicious, easily alarmed, and continually excited by the Press, by speeches, or by actions of irresponsible elements. Polish public opinion, for example, is continually alarmed by the attitude of the National-Socialist Party in Danzig, whose Press and leaders are endeavouring to instil the conviction everywhere that the surrender of the Free City of Danzig to Germany is only a matter of time, especially since the Government of the Reich has been taken over by Adolf Hitler.

Speaking as the representative of Poland in Berlin, I must say that hitherto I have not found any confirmation of these threats in the personal pronouncements of the Chancellor. But I, as well as my Government and Polish public opinion, consider these threats highly dangerous not only to relations between Poland and the Free City of Danzig, but also to the continuance of peaceful relations between my country and the Reich.

I take this opportunity to draw the Chancellor's attention to Poland's vigilance with regard to all questions connected with her access to the sea and the rights she acquired in Danzig under the Treaty of Versailles. Our forefathers have already once made the mistake of inadequately supporting the development of their own mercantile marine and of neglecting Poland's rightful position in the Baltic. The present generation will not and cannot repeat this mistake, and every one of us, without exception, considers our access to the sea as a vital interest for Poland and is prepared to defend it to the last.

It would, therefore, be highly desirable that the Chancellor should declare, in any form he considers suitable, that neither he nor the Government of the Reich has any desire to encroach upon Poland's rights and interests in the Free City of Danzig. I am convinced that such a statement will have a reassuring effect on the anxious and highly excited public opinion of Poland, but also will be a warning to those German quarters who, sheltering behind the authority of the Chancellor, are often acting against us on their own responsibility.

M. Hitler answered me in a lengthy speech, the main points of which were as follow:

The Chancellor does not understand the reasons for the concern of public opinion in Poland. Neither he nor any of the members of his Government has said or done anything that would justify this concern. The Government of the Reich, under the leadership of the Chancellor, have not the least intention of violating existing treaties, and regard them as binding; they respect the obligations and rights which those treaties impose and confer upon the Reich. Germany, however, will not recognize that Poland has any rights in Danzig which would exceed the bounds of existing treaties.

The Chancellor is a pacifist, and he professes the belief that everyone who has seen the horrors of war at close quarters, and not merely in the pages of a novel, will always consider it a last extremity which is to be avoided. Besides, the results of a war can never be foreseen, even in the event of victory. The last European war satisfied nobody's claims and interests. France, Italy, England, the United States, are not satisfied with the results of the war, from which the German Reich emerged defeated. The aftermath of war is far more disastrous than its immediate ravages. Continual concern and anxiety for the political morrow are among the reasons why seven million Germans are deprived of work and purchasing power. If this unemployment did not exist, in normal political conditions Germany would easily absorb the surplus of agricultural products which Poland has for sale. The relations of the two countries would then be established on most reasonable, because natural, foundations. The Germans would sell their manufactured goods to Poland, buying her agricultural products in return.

The Chancellor is such a fervent nationalist that he understands Polish nationalism, and would never support any action that would deprive anyone of the right to speak and study in his own mother tongue. Mistakes in this sphere always have to be paid for, if not at once, then later on, even after a hundred and fifty years. The history of Germany itself supplies proof of this. The Chancellor does not recognize the right to force anyone to forget his own nationality, but he would like the same principle to be observed by others.

The Chancellor does not share the view which questions Poland's right to exist; on the contrary, he recognizes and understands that right. Poland, for her part, should also endeavour to understand the rights and interests of Germany. If their judgment of each other is marked by a certain moderation, many interests common to both States will become apparent.

The Chancellor recently examined statistical tables showing the number of births in Russia. The astonishing fertility of that nation caused him to reflect seriously on the dangers to Europe and, therefore, to Poland, which might arise from this fact. The Chancellor mentioned this to give me an example of his unprejudiced attitude towards our country.

The Chancellor spoke without a break, so that it was only at the end of our conversation that I was able to draw his attention to a number of recent happenings in Germany which fully justified the

concern of Polish public opinion. I observed that the relations of the two States were regarded in Germany only in a one-sided light and according to a one-sided presentation of facts. The German Government invariably sees only certain events in Poland, and is unwilling to admit that they are almost exclusively the result of relevant causes in Germany. For instance, the German Press and the German Foreign Office were indignant at the recent demonstrations of the Insurgents' Association in Upper Silesia, although these demonstrations were only the direct result of the barbarous attack on three Poles in Breslau because they had spoken Polish in public. When anti-German demonstrations take place or have taken place in Poland, they are regarded here as unjustified outbursts of hatred of Germany, whereas they are a natural reply to the manhandling and ill-treatment of several scores of Polish citizens in Germany who, in spite of the six notes which I have presented to the German Foreign Office, have not received any satisfaction or compensation.

I said further that I was aware that the Chancellor was greatly occupied, and I did not, therefore, wish to weary him by citing dozens of incidents which are constantly occurring on German territory, and are exclusively directed against Polish citizens or the Polish element among German citizens. To put a stop to this dangerous state of affairs, it appeared to me highly desirable that a communiqué be issued confirming the peaceful intentions of the Reich Chancellor towards Poland.

In reply, the Chancellor turned to Baron von Neurath and agreed to issue such a communiqué.

No. 2

COMMUNIQUÉ *issued by the Wolff Agency on an Interview between Chancellor Hitler and M. Wysocki*

May 3, 1933.

THE Polish Minister in Berlin, M. Wysocki, has called on the Chancellor of the Reich. The conversation, at which the German Foreign Minister was present, dealt with outstanding political questions affecting the relations between Germany and Poland. The Chancellor laid stress on the firm intention of the German Government to maintain their attitude and their actions strictly within the limits of the existing treaties. The Chancellor expressed the wish that both countries should examine and treat their common interests dispassionately.

No. 3

EXTRACTS *from Chancellor Hitler's Speech to the Reichstag*

May 17, 1933

"No fresh European war would be capable of putting something better in the place of the present unsatisfactory conditions. On the

contrary, the use of force, no matter by whom, in Europe, would be unable to create either from the political or from the economic aspect a more favourable situation than that which exists to-day. Even in the event of a decisive success of a new solution by violence to European affairs it would have as final result only an increase in the instability of Europe and therefore, one way or another, it would sow the seed of new future conflicts and new complications. The consequence would be new war, new sacrifices, new insecurity and new economic distress. But if such a madness without end were to come upon us it would lead to the collapse of all the political and social order of to-day. A Europe sinking into Communist chaos would provoke a crisis of an extent impossible to appreciate and of a length that could not be foreseen."

"The National Government of the Reich desire very seriously to avoid, by their sincere and active collaboration, any such unpacific turn of events. There also is the profound meaning of the revolution which has been accomplished by Germany. . . ."

"Speaking at this moment consciously as a German National-Socialist, I desire to proclaim, in the name of the National Government, and of the entire national revolution, that in this young Germany we are justly animated by a profound comprehension of the analogous sentiments and opinions and the well-founded vital claims of other peoples. The generation of this young Germany, which so far in its life has known only the distress, the misery and sorrow of its own people, has suffered too much from this madness to desire to act in the same way in regard to other peoples. Our National-Socialism is a principle which, being a general conception, imposes on us the obligations of principle and general obligations also. Attached by a boundless love and loyalty to our own people, we respect also the national rights of other peoples in virtue of the same state of spirit, and from the bottom of our hearts we wish to live with them in peace and good friendship.

"That is why we no longer recognize the principle of Germanization. The mentality of the last century, which thought it possible perhaps to make Germans of Poles and French, is foreign to us. For this reason also we are passionately opposed to any converse tendency. We consider the nations who surround us as facts. The French, the Poles, etc., are our neighbours, and we know that there is no imaginable historical event that could change this reality. It would have been a blessing for the world if, in the Treaty of Versailles, there had equally been regard for these realities in so far as Germany is concerned. For the object of a truly durable treaty must be not at all to open the wounds or to keep open those which have been inflicted, but to close them. If European problems had been treated reasonably, it would have been possible at once and without difficulty, so far as the East is concerned, to find a solution which would certainly have satisfied both the understandable demands of Poland and the natural rights of Germany. The Treaty of Versailles has not found that solution. None

the less, no German Government will itself break an agreement which cannot be suppressed unless it is replaced by a better. . . ."

"The German people will exist, just as the French people will exist, and—as history teaches us—as will the Polish people. What is the success of a transient oppression of a people of 65 millions of population, before the force of this irrefutable fact? No State can have more comprehension for the young national States recently created than the Germany of the national revolution, born of a similar will. She demands nothing for herself that she is not ready to grant to others. . . ."

"Germany is ready to take part in any solemn pact of non-aggression, for Germany has no thought of attack, but thinks solely of her security.

"We have no more ardent desire than to contribute to that which would definitely heal the wounds of the war and of the Treaty of Versailles. To this end, Germany wishes to take no other road than that which is recognized as legitimate by the Treaties themselves. The German Government desire to come pacifically to an understanding with the other nations on all the difficult problems. It knows that any military action in Europe, even if it completely succeeded, would, so far as the benefits it would bring are concerned, be out of all proportion to the sacrifices it would require."

No. 4

M. Wysocki *to M. Beck*

Berlin, July 13, 1933.

In accordance with your instructions, I obtained an interview with Chancellor Hitler at noon to-day. Our talk lasted for forty-five minutes, and it was apparent that the Chancellor sought to give it a peaceful and friendly tone.

The Chancellor thanked me first of all for a certain measure of confidence shown to his Party and the Government, which, so long as he was at their head, could not have any aggressive designs against any State, nor therefore against Poland. The Chancellor further affirmed Poland's historical right to existence and development, and expressed the hope that we, on our part, would recognize the same rights in Germany's case. The days are past, he continued, when whole provinces were forced to accept this or that nationality. Such tactics had proved quite unavailing, for instance in the case of Alsace and Lorraine, and also in that of Poland during the hundred and fifty years of her partition. The Chancellor did not believe that war could solve disputes, which in most cases are solved by life itself. He was also of the opinion that the authors of the Treaty of Versailles had created the so-called Corridor in order to set an enduring abyss between Germany and Poland, two countries endowed with many conditions for living in neighbourly peace and harmony.

The Chancellor also told me he had given orders in Danzig that quarrels with Poland were to be avoided, and he was prepared to believe that the atmosphere created there would give the best of results.

M. Hitler also extensively discussed the situation in Russia, and the necessity for all European countries to co-operate in combating the economic crisis and its serious consequences in Germany.

"If," he concluded, "over five million German workers return to work and thereby gain increased purchasing power, Germany will, as formerly, be compelled to buy foodstuffs in those places where they are cheapest—that is, from her nearest neighbours, including Poland."

The Chancellor thanked me personally for my understanding of his attitude, and expressed regret that I was leaving Berlin.

No. 5

M. Lipski *to M. Beck*

Berlin, October 17, 1933.

Baron von Neurath received me to-day. He said that I was assuming my position in more favourable conditions than my predecessor. He assured me of his and his Government's warmest goodwill. He referred to the conversations with you at Geneva, and stressed the usefulness of such meetings. In discussing the points raised during that talk, Baron von Neurath dwelt on the necessity for appropriate treatment of all incidents and of eliminating them at the source by mutual understanding. Referring to the question of economic negotiations, Baron von Neurath emphasized his efforts to improve relations in that sphere, adding that this view is shared by the Reich Minister for Economy.

As to a Press *détente*, by a gradual lifting of the ban on newspapers, Baron von Neurath asked that, in view of the fact that the parties had in principle reached an agreement on the question, I should handle these matters on their merits with the competent authorities.

Baron von Neurath made no allusion to the present international situation.

No. 6

M. Lipski *to M. Beck*

Berlin, November 15, 1933.

Chancellor Hitler received me to-day at 11 a.m. M. von Neurath, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was present.

Giving effect to the instructions I had received, I remarked that ten days previously I had been called to Warsaw to present my report to Marshal Pilsudski. The Marshal had received me in the presence of M. Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, after taking cognizance of

my report, had charged me in his name to confirm to the Chancellor that the security of Poland was founded on two elements, namely: direct bilateral relations between Poland and other countries, in this case Polish-German relations, and collaboration with States through the League of Nations. The Marshal had defined this second form of security as a kind of reinsurance. This resulted from the circumstance that the States who were members of the League of Nations were bound by the terms of the League Covenant, by the provision of procedure in the event of conflict, etc. . . . Now, the Reich Government's latest decisions, in consequence of which Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations, had deprived Poland of this second element of security. These decisions of the Reich Government had provoked considerable nervousness in international opinion, as well as some excitement. In these conditions, the Marshal was obliged to examine the situation in so far as he was responsible for the security of his country. He did not wish to cloud the atmosphere between the two countries by the adoption of measures having in view the strengthening of Polish security. Before doing that, the Marshal desired to raise in all loyalty with the Chancellor, the question whether he did not see any possibility of compensating the loss of this element of security, in direct Polish-German relations.

In reply, the Chancellor stated as follows:

I am anxious first and foremost to define to you what is my attitude in principle towards your country. I take Poland into account as a reality which nothing would be able to change or cause to disappear. It was, perhaps, the error of preceding German Governments that they did not sufficiently understand this reality. Poland is a reality for Germany, just as Germany is for Poland. The two nations are obliged to live side by side. The life of nations is not measured by ten or fifteen years, but by hundreds and thousands of years.

Our relations had not been established on an ideal basis, especially as the result of the Treaty of Versailles, which was calculated to render them difficult. The Chancellor affirmed none the less, very emphatically, that he had no intention whatever of effecting any change by resort to war. The Chancellor was anxious for good relations with Poland, and a favourable atmosphere, so that the common life of the two nations would take a normal course.

Any war would only result in bringing Communism to Europe, the Communism which is a terrible danger, and against which the Chancellor never ceased to fight. Poland is an outpost (*Vorposten*) against Asia. The destruction of Poland would be a misfortune for the States which would consequently become neighbours of Asia. The other States should realize Poland's rôle as an outpost.

The Chancellor himself was a nationalist, and he had no wish to denationalize anyone. What he demanded for his country was that it should cease to be treated as a second-rate Power. On that point he was adamant. Denationalization was futile. The best testimony to this was Poland, which had risen again despite the methods of denationalization applied to her by the partitioning Powers.

What could be achieved by a Polish-German war? Even if

Germany were victorious, it would leave a spark for a new war of revenge on the part of Poland. Wars had never achieved anything except destruction. He, the Chancellor, had himself been at the war. He was not one of the cowards. He had seen the horrors of war and its consequences. What benefit had England gained from the war? None; she had only come out of it weaker. The same applied to all the other States, except, perhaps, those which had recovered their independence. War would bring barbarity on our civilization.

The Chancellor and his Government had no aggressive intention in regard to any State. That applied equally to France. It was true that Germans inhabited Alsace, but were they worth the sacrifice of a million men? Besides, to retake Alsace would be equivalent to provoking irredentism in Germany and the germs of new conflicts. Only the Saar problem called for regulation. For, so far as this question was concerned, there was a foundation for German demands even in treaties. It was on this basis that the Chancellor demanded a solution to the problem.

The Chancellor declared that, just as in regard to France, he had no aggressive intentions whatever in regard to Poland. He wished the relations between these States to be established in a friendly and peaceable fashion. The Chancellor went on to speak of the tremendous problems of internal policy which called for regulation. He mentioned unemployment, a problem which might not be solved even over a number of years. In fact, the solution of this problem demanded the utmost calm and called for collaboration among the States. The Chancellor remarked that the revolution in Germany had taken place without bloodshed, with but few exceptions. Perhaps, only Fascism had been equally successful in taking over power without bloodshed. He did not wish the internal policy of his Government ever to be stained with blood. That would be contrary to all his ideology.

The Chancellor spoke rapidly and poured out a flood of ideas, through which his desire to establish good relations with Poland continually emerged; he explained that all aggression was contrary to his policy, and that a war would be a catastrophe for all; he spoke of the fear of Communism, and finally turned to the declaration I had made to him in Marshal Pilsudski's name.

He was grateful for the Marshal's initiative, which aimed at a strengthening of security through Polish-German relations, a security which had been weakened by Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. He observed that in his view it was necessary first and foremost to exclude the very idea of the possibility of war from Polish-German relations. After this first declaration, the Chancellor returned to the subject of the disastrous effects of war, pointing out how harmful and useless it was. He took up again the idea of excluding war from Polish-German relations, observing that it would be possible to put this idea in treaty form. In answer to the Marshal's question, the Chancellor requested me to inform him of this suggestion.

The Chancellor continued: Poland could consider herself happy to be governed by so great a personality as Marshal Pilsudski. But what did one know of the future? All men were mortal. That applied to

Poland just as much as to the Reich, in the event of his being removed from the scene. To speculate upon the internal dissensions which might arise in both countries in such a case, would be committing a great error. The Chancellor returned yet again to his idea of excluding even the possibility of war in Polish-German relations, remarking that this would infallibly contribute to a *détente* in their mutual relations.

In reply, I observed that the pacific ideas expressed by the Chancellor would certainly find a fitting response on the part of Marshal Pilsudski and the Polish Government. In order to reassure public opinion, I asked whether it would not be useful—and I insisted that at the moment I was speaking on my own responsibility—to make known these pacific tendencies. The Chancellor seized upon this idea, and turned to M. von Neurath and recommended him to draw up a relevant communiqué, the text of which would be agreed with me. At this point I observed that such a communiqué should not create the appearance of a purely momentary security, which would have quite the contrary effect on public opinion to that desired. The Chancellor shared my view.

On taking leave of the Chancellor, I assured him once more of my best intentions, and asked him to have confidence in me. The Chancellor observed that my predecessor had always been loyal in every respect in his relations with the German Government.

On my departure, M. von Neurath said that so far as the communiqué was concerned, he would himself advise me this same day, probably in the afternoon.

No. 7

COMMUNIQUÉ *issued by the Wolff Agency on an Interview between Chancellor Hitler and M. Lipski*

November 15, 1933.

THE Chancellor of the German Reich this morning received a first visit from the Polish Minister, in the presence of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Discussion of German-Polish relations revealed the complete agreement of both Governments in their intention to deal with the questions affecting both countries by way of direct negotiation, and further to renounce all application of force in their mutual relations, with a view to strengthening European peace.

No. 8

EXTRACT *from Chancellor Hitler's Speech at Lemgo (Lippe Detmolt)*

January 14, 1934.

"IT is not our intention to interfere with the right of any nation, neither do we wish to restrict the vital possibilities of any people nor to enslave, oppress or subjugate them."

No. 9

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ *issued on the signature of the Polish-German Agreement, January* 26, 1934

January 27, 1934.

As announced in Warsaw and Berlin by official communiqués dated November 15 last,[1] it was then agreed in a conversation between the Polish Minister in Berlin and the Chancellor of the Reich that the Polish Government and the Government of the Reich concurred in their intention to deal with matters pertaining to their two countries by means of direct negotiation and to renounce all use of force in their mutual relations, in order to consolidate peace in Europe.

Thereafter negotiations in the spirit of this conversation took place between the Polish Government and the Government of the Reich with a view to reaching an understanding as to the future development of their mutual relations.

These negotiations have now been concluded. The Polish Minister in Berlin and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich signed a Declaration in the German Foreign Office yesterday morning.

No. 10

TEXT *of Polish-German Declaration, January* 26, 1934

THE Polish Government and the German Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between State and State. They have, therefore, decided in the present Declaration to lay down the principles for the future development of these relations.

The two Governments base their action on the fact that the maintenance and guarantee of a lasting peace between their countries is an essential pre-requisite for the general peace of Europe.

They have therefore decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, and propose to define more exactly the application of these principles in so far as the relations between Germany and Poland are concerned.

Each of the two Governments, therefore, lays it down that the international obligations undertaken by it towards a third party do not hinder the peaceful development of their mutual relations, do not conflict with the present Declaration, and are not affected by this Declaration. They establish, moreover, that this Declaration does not extend to those questions which under international law are to be regarded exclusively as the internal concern of either of the two States.

Both Governments announce their intention to settle directly all questions of whatever nature which concern their mutual relations.

Should any disputes arise between them and agreement thereon not be reached by direct negotiation, they will, in each particular case,

[1] No. 7.

on the basis of mutual agreement, seek a solution by other peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying, if necessary, those methods of procedure in which provision is made for such cases in other agreements in force between them. In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.

The guarantee of peace created by these principles will facilitate the great task of both Governments of finding a solution for problems of political, economic and social kinds, based on a just and fair adjustment of the interests of both parties.

Both Governments are convinced that the relations between their countries will in this manner develop fruitfully, and will lead to the establishment of a neighbourly relationship which will contribute to the well-being not only of both their countries, but of the other peoples of Europe as well.

The present declaration shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Warsaw as soon as possible.

The declaration is valid for a period of ten years, reckoned from the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

If the declaration is not denounced by one of the two Governments six months before the expiration of this period, it will continue in force, but can then be denounced by either Government at any time on notice of six months being given. Made in duplicate in the German and Polish languages.

Berlin, January 26, 1934.

For the German Government:
FREIHERR VON NEURATH.
For the Polish Government:
JÓZEF LIPSKI.

No. 11

M. Beck *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions Abroad*
Warsaw, January 26, 1934.

The non-aggression agreement signed to-day with the Reich contains as main principle the provision that force shall not be applied in mutual relations between Poland and Germany, and refers to the Kellogg Pact. The Agreement distinctly stresses the inviolability of earlier obligations. It refers exclusively to questions directly concerning both States, and is an act of great political importance. The Allied States, France and Rumania, were given preliminary notice of the negotiations being conducted with a view to concluding an agreement. M. Litvinov also received general information beforehand. The signing of the Declaration should prove advantageous in the sphere of international collaboration, for instance as regards disarmament. The text will be published to-morrow morning. No aims or intentions other than those clearly stated in its text should be read into the Agreement.

No. 12

EXTRACTS *from Chancellor Hitler's Speech to the Reichstag January* 30, 1934.

"THE racial idea of National Socialism and the racial conscience on which it is based do not lead in the least to contempt of other peoples, nor to considering them as inferior. It allows one to know exactly the problem to be faced, that of the sole useful method which will allow of the conservation and perpetuation of our people's life. In consequence, it leads necessarily to natural respect for the life and character of other peoples. Thus it removes the temptation in foreign policy to enslave foreign populations, in order to be able to dominate or even to assimilate them, to number them in one's own nation, compelling them to use a foreign language. This new idea obliges us to show a great and fanatical devotion to the life, and therefore to the honour and the liberty of our own people, and also to the respect of others' honour and liberty. That is why this idea can constitute a far better basis for efforts leading towards genuine world appeasement than a classification of nations solely according to their power, their division into victors and vanquished, into peoples possessing rights and peoples enslaved and without rights. . . ."

"Sincere advocates of the true policy of reconciliation, we believe that we thus bring the best contribution to a genuine peace among the peoples. We have made this thought the principle of all our action in the domain of foreign policy.

"The new German Empire presents itself to the peoples, animated by one sole desire: to live in peace and friendly relations with them.

"We are convinced that it ought again to be possible in this world to speak of questions on which there is international disagreement without wishing to resort immediately to violence. . . ."

"That also is why we welcome favourably the efforts in view to stabilize the situation in Eastern Europe by a system of pacts, provided that these efforts are inspired less by tactical considerations than by the desire to consolidate the peace. For this reason, and in response to these intentions, the Reich Government has made efforts since its first year to arrive at new and better relations with the State of Poland.

"When I took power in Germany on January 30, I had the impression that relations between the two States were far from satisfactory.

"Divergences existed which had arisen out of the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, but there was also a mutual irritation which resulted from those clauses, and there was a danger of seeing such hostility born as would, if it lasted, have been transformed into an hereditary hatred.

"Such an evolution, apart from the latent dangers which it contained, would have constituted an eternal obstacle to fruitful collaboration between the two peoples. Germans and Poles must reconcile themselves to the fact of each other's existence. A thousand

years of history have not been able to eliminate this state of things, and it will go on existing after us. Therefore it is more rational to give it such a form as will ensure the greatest benefit possible.

"It seemed to me also necessary to show by a definite example that the divergences existing between the two peoples must not prevent our finding a form of relations more useful to peace and to their prosperity than the political and, therefore, economic paralysis which necessarily results from a state of mutual distrust.

"It seemed to me also right in such a case to treat frankly and sincerely the problems which affect the two countries, without continually entrusting this task to others. No matter what divergences may exist between the two countries in the future, to attempt to settle them by military action would have such mournful results that they could not be compensated by any gain whatsoever.

"Therefore, the German Government is happy to find in the Chief of the actual Polish State, Marshal Pilsudski, the same large-minded conception, and so to be able to fix this conception in a treaty which will not only be of service equally to the German people and the Polish people, but will also constitute a great contribution to the maintenance of the general peace. The German Government is also ready to organize economic relations with Poland of such a nature as to ensure that a period of sterile abstention shall be followed by an epoch of fruitful collaboration.

"The fact that, during this same year, it has been possible for the National-Socialist Government of Danzig to arrive at an analogous elucidation of relations with the Polish State, its neighbour—this fact fills us with especial joy."

No. 13

M. Lipski *to M. Beck*

Berlin, January 24, 1935.

On January 22 the annual banquet given to the heads of Diplomatic Missions accredited to Berlin was duly held at the Reichkanzlei. Afterwards Chancellor Hitler talked with some of the ambassadors present, including myself. The conversation turned on the subject of Polish-German relations in connection with the anniversary of the signing, on the 26th of this month, of the Non-Aggression Agreement. In very cordial terms the Chancellor stressed the importance of the *rapprochement* between the two nations.

Discussing the subject, he expressed the opinion that the theory of Polish-German hereditary enmity was very unsound. In the history of our two countries, he said, there had been periods of co-operation against the mutual danger threatening from the East. We had had also dynastic alliances. At that stage I mentioned the visit of the Mayor of Dresden, M. Zörner, to Warsaw and Cracow, and the cordial reception he had been given there. Continuing, the Chancellor expressed the opinion that after eight or nine years undoubtedly quite different relations would exist between the two

States, when both nations had come to know each other better and the old prejudices had disappeared. He mentioned, however, that naturally there were certain elements in Germany hostile to Poland. There were, undoubtedly, people who, as he said, did not wish his Government to be successful in its foreign policy. No doubt there were similar elements in Poland.

Subsequently, the Chancellor discussed at length the Russian question and the danger threatening from the East.

He pointed out that, according to the information of his military authorities and Intelligence Service, Russia had made great progress with her military preparations. The moment might come when both our countries would be compelled to defend ourselves against aggression from the East. In his opinion, the policy of former German Governments, and in particular of the Reichswehr, which had aimed at uniting with Russia against Poland, was the greatest of political mistakes. He himself had had a sharp difference of opinion on the subject with General Schleicher, who had wanted to befriend Russia at Poland's expense. He had told the General that such a policy, even if it resulted in territorial gains at Poland's expense, would lead to an intensification of the greatest danger of all to Germany, i.e., from the Soviets. He himself knew Bolshevism well and had fought it from the very beginning, and he recalled his struggle against Communism in Bavaria.

No. 14

EXTRACT *from interview with Chancellor Hitler for the "Gazeta Polska"* *January* 26, 1935.

"NATIONAL Socialist policy is based on National Socialist philosophy. Its racial theory fundamentally rejects denationalization and regards any forcible annexation of a foreign civilization as a source of weakness rather than of strength for its own race. Our policy of respect for foreign peoples who are our neighbours, corresponds in the highest degree with the philosophy of our movement and consequently with our innermost conviction. In this respect we do not intend to continue the mistakes which have been committed in past centuries. An expression of this desire is the attempt to re-fashion the relations of the German people with the Polish nation. The practical experience of the last century has shown, furthermore, that the really worthy elements do not submit at all or very reluctantly and very slowly to any denationalization. In most cases, only the wavering ones are won over, and they represent mostly elements of inferior value. The advantage of conquering them could in no case be weighed in the balance against the accompanying sufferings and dangers. I therefore consider a mutual protection of races as one of the most worthy aims to be pursued by a wise statesmanship. It is evident, however, that such a policy can be successfully carried out only on the basis of mutual understanding. . . ."

"I have to repeat again and again: Germany wants to live in peace

with all her neighbours, and she is prepared to agree with magnanimity to all that is necessary for this end. . . ."

"I am very glad to be able to look back now on one year of refashioned Polish-German relations and to point out how fruitful this development has proved. We succeeded in accomplishing betimes a most important historical correction. This was the correction of the erroneous doctrine that between the two nations there had always been an hereditary enmity which, therefore, would have to remain for ever. On the contrary, I believe that in spite of all the difficulties which weigh heavily on the two nations, they are bound to co-operate genuinely in the interest of a joint preservation of European civilization. The National Socialist régime in Germany will neglect nothing calculated to foster this co-operation and gradually to convert it into a lasting friendship. To-day's anniversary allows me to believe more than ever before in the fulfilment of such a desire."

No. 15

EXTRACT *from Count Szembek's Minute of his conversation with M. Goering*

Warsaw, January 31, 1935.

M. GOERING began frankly to enlarge on the question of the lines along which Germany's attitude to Poland should develop. He opened by stating that theoretically one could imagine a new partition of Poland by means of German-Russian collaboration. Practically, however, it would be impossible to attain that end, partly because of the strength and dynamic power of Poland, partly because partitioning would create a common German-Russian frontier, and this would be highly dangerous to Germany. That is why a strong Poland was needed by Germany, to form a common barrier against Russia. This idea of Polish-German relations was understood only by Chancellor Hitler. Before him, in Stresemann's time and even earlier, the governing circles of the Reich had a quite different conception as to the solution of the Polish-German problem. M. Goering quoted the fact that when powers were being transferred to Chancellor Hitler by General Schleicher at the beginning of 1933, the latter explained to Hitler what should be the main lines of Germany's policy in relation to Poland. His idea was to come to an understanding with France and Russia and, with the latter's help, to proceed to the elimination of Poland. Chancellor Hitler, as M. Goering said, did not utter one word during this exposition. Only after he had left General Schleicher did he say to M. Goering: *"Und ich werde das gegenteil machen."*[1]

Further discussing Polish-German relations, M. Goering pointed out that Poland formed a link between the Baltic and the Black Sea, and that great opportunities were open to her on the Ukrainian side.

[1] "And I will do just the opposite."

M. Goering asserted that Hitlerism in Germany was not a transient phenomenon, but a system which would remain in force for ever. Chancellor Hitler himself would choose his successor—in this direction the Constitution of the Reich would be amended. Hence German policy towards Poland, initiated by the Declaration of January 1934 was not planned for a period of ten years but for ever, and there should not be the slightest fear in Poland that on the German side it would not be continued in future.

No. 16

COUNT SZEMBEK'S *Note on M. Goering's visit to Poland*
Warsaw, February 10, 1935.

I DISCUSSED M. Goering's visit to Poland with M. Lipski to-day. The Ambassador stated that M. Goering was very outspoken in his conversations in Bialowieza and Warsaw. Especially while talking to generals he outlined far-reaching plans, almost suggesting an Anti-Russian Alliance and a joint attack on Russia. He gave it to be understood that the Ukraine would become a Polish sphere of influence and North-Western Russia would be Germany's.

In view of these confidences the Ambassador was afraid that M. Goering might, when visiting Marshal Pilsudski, make over-definite proposals in regard to the Russian question. For this reason also, before the call at the Belvedere Palace M. Lipski advised the German Ambassador of the necessity for M. Goering to observe some reserve in his conversation with the Marshal. This "intervention" had, undoubtedly, a good effect. Nevertheless, M. Goering in his conversation with the Marshal did touch on the military Russian question, hinting at a joint Polish-German attack on Russia and pointing out the advantages to Poland in the Ukraine in such an event. The Marshal in reply *tat gestutz*,[1] as M. Goering later put it, and gave it to be understood, that despite all this it was impossible to stand continually at the ready on such a long line as Polish-Soviet frontier.

No. 17

M. LIPSKI *to M. Beck*
Berlin, April 25, 1935.

I WAS invited by M. Goering to visit his hunting pavilion at Schorfheide on Thursday, the 25th inst.

I remained several hours, and M. Goering expressed the desire to have an extended talk on political matters with me. He told me of his conversation with Chancellor Hitler on the preceding Saturday. The Chancellor had asked him to pay special attention to Polish-German relations, independently of official channels. He gave me to understand that he was not meddling with official functions, but he thought that

[1]Stiffened.

in matters of such gravity it was advisable to exchange views now and then with German personalities who had not been responsible for the Reich policy in regard to Poland carried on by previous governments. Speaking of the Chancellor's policy towards Poland, M. Goering stressed the fact that this policy was not governed by any considerations of a tactical nature but sprang from a very deep perception of this problem. In this regard the Chancellor would not allow deviations or changes of course.

M. Goering also stressed the fact that on the basis of many reports received through his intelligence service, he realized that in many quarters there was considerable activity against good Polish-German relations. He mentioned that M. Mussolini, evidently fearing the alleged possibility of German aggression against Austria, was endeavouring to counteract Germany's policy in all fields. He did not spare his criticism in regard to Italian policy, and he hinted that he was not unaware of Rome's assiduous attentions to the Polish Government. Though he tried to treat this subject in rather general terms, nevertheless he betrayed some nervousness.

In M. Goering's reasoning there was, as usual, a strong anti-Russian bias, whether in regard to the Soviets or to any other possible Russian régime.

No. 18

EXTRACTS *from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech* *May* 21, 1935.

"IF present-day Germany is in favour of peace, it is neither through weakness, nor through cowardice. She is for peace, by the very reason of the National-Socialist conception of the people and of the State. National Socialism considers that the violent assimilation by one people of another foreign to its nature, is not only a political aim impossible of achievement, but involves dangers to the internal unity of the assimilating people, and so, in the long run, to its own strength. That is why National-Socialist doctrine dogmatically rejects the idea of assimilation of nationalities. In consequence, the bourgeois belief in the possibility of 'Germanization' also goes by the board. That is why we have neither the desire nor the intention of robbing the elements of the foreign population of their national character, their language or their culture, in order to impose on them others which are German and foreign to them. We issue no instructions to Germanize names which are not German; on the contrary, we do not even wish to do so. Consequently, our racial doctrine regards any war undertaken to subjugate and dominate a foreign people as an event which, sooner or later, will modify and weaken the internal structure of the victor State, and thus will make of it ultimately a vanquished State.

"We no longer believe that in Europe during an epoch dominated by the nationality principle it is still possible to deprive peoples, whose national character is firmly fixed, of their national character. During

the last 150 years there have been enough examples to put us on our guard.

"In any future war, apart perhaps from a transient weakening of their enemies, the national European States will not be able to obtain anything but insignificant rectifications of their ethnical frontiers, which would bear no proportion to the sacrifices demanded. The permanent state of war which such intentions would provoke among the various peoples would perhaps seem useful to certain political and economic interests, but for the peoples themselves it would entail only burdens and misfortunes. The blood which has been poured out in the continent of Europe in the past three centuries is in no way proportionate to the result of those events viewed from the national aspect. In the last resort, France has remained France, Germany has remained Germany, Poland has remained Poland, Italy has remained Italy, and so on. All the apparently profound political modifications which dynastic egotism, political passion and patriotic blindness have achieved at the cost of torrents of blood have only superficially affected the peoples, viewed nationally, and they have hardly modified their profoundly impressed ethnic frontiers. If these countries had devoted even a small part of their sacrifices to wiser ends, the success would certainly have been greater and more enduring.

"If I express this opinion quite frankly as a National-Socialist it is because there is something else which I have realized: all war sacrifices the élite of the nation first and foremost. On the other hand, as there is no longer any unoccupied land in Europe, victory, while altering in no way the fundamental misery of Europe, can do no more than achieve at the most a numerical increase in the population of a State. . . ."

"If National-Socialist Germany desires peace, it is from a profound doctrinal conviction. She desires it also because she has understood this simple and elementary fact: no war could put an end to the general misery of Europe, it could only add to that misery. . . ."

"When anyone tells me that this is only a desire of the Government, I must make the following answer: it is sufficient for the rulers and those who govern to desire peace; the peoples themselves have never wished for war. . . ."

"Germany has need of peace, and she desires peace."

"Regardless of the past, Germany concluded with Poland an anti-aggression pact as yet another contribution of the highest value to European peace; Germany will blindly observe this pact and has only the one desire that it should be continually renewed and that it should be the source of an ever-growing friendship in Polish-German relations.

"With the understanding and the heartfelt friendship of true Nationalists, we recognize the Polish State as the home of a great, nationally-conscious people."

No. 19

M. Lipski *to M. Beck*

Berlin, May 23, 1935.

On the 22nd inst. I was received by Chancellor Hitler, whom I thanked in the name of the President of the Republic and the Polish Government for the demonstrations of sympathy manifested by himself, Government circles and the German people on the occasion of our national mourning for the death of Marshal Pilsudski.

The Chancellor replied by pointing out how deeply he was moved by the death of the Marshal; he had always been attracted by the Marshal's personality, and his desire had been to meet the leader of the Polish nation. M. Hitler had even thought of meeting Marshal Pilsudski in a train on the Polish-German frontier, but he had feared that such a meeting would cause perhaps too sensational an effect on world opinion.

In the course of further conversation he stated that the Marshal was one of the few exceptional statesmen who understood the realities of the international situation, and could direct his country's policy in accordance with those realities.

Subsequently M. Hitler dwelt upon his policy towards Poland. He declared that, to begin with, he revoked the former negative Rapallo policy towards Poland, represented by the Reichswehr with Gröner and Schleicher at its head. Even before he had achieved power he was trying to persuade Schleicher to have nothing to do with the Soviets, but in vain. The very fact that Schleicher had helped to build up the Soviet military power was ample justification for the end that befell him. He added that there were many other and worse accusations against Schleicher, but that it was difficult to talk about them at present. Some day it might be possible to bring it all to light. One felt ashamed at the thought of it! It could be deduced from the Chancellor's words that General Schleicher's policy was not disinterested.

M. Hitler further stated that the Reichswehr then considered a militarily powerful Soviet Union a threat only to Poland, but not to Germany. This was a shortsighted policy. At that time the only man who had understood the Chancellor's viewpoint was General Blomberg. As Corps Commander in East Prussia he had understood the Eastern problems better than those sitting in the Reichswehr offices in Berlin. Similarly, General Reichenau, according to M. Hitler, had a thorough grasp of these questions.

In his Eastern policy the Chancellor took up the position that a *rapprochement* with Poland was more advantageous to Germany than uneasy relations with Russia. Russia is Asia, he said. Germany was faced with the problem of finding areas for economic expansion or space for its population. Poland had not and could not provide either. There was criticism of his attitude in regard to the question of the "Corridor," against which he maintained that in face of the greater problems the "Corridor" was of no importance whatever.

How could the Reich be prejudiced, provided good Polish-German

relations existed, by this short journey of a few dozen kilometres across Polish territory? In a few years, given the continuance of good relations, in Germany they would forget all about the "Corridor," and in Poland the question would cease to be acute.

He, the Chancellor, had an idea, premature to-day, but which might be possible of realization in some fifteen years' time, namely, the building of a special railway line and of a motor-road for transit through Pomorze.

Even if he were gone, the Reich's policy would not change, for he had impressed it upon all his collaborators. In the event of his death, possible at any time—some idiot might throw a bomb—he had two designated successors.

The Chancellor said that his policy was shared by the entire German community. He declared that, following his speech of yesterday, innumerable congratulatory messages were coming in from all quarters.

Who was still against his policy?

Some aristocrats, some sections of the clergy, and some of the former "Deutschnazionals," the last named only because he had removed them from power, for they had no arguments whatever against his programme. He considered M. Hugenberg a loyal man. On the other hand, his opponents on the Right were people like M. Oldenburg-Januschau.

Subsequently he discussed disarmament. He thought there should be certain limitations of armaments. In his opinion, military technique in certain respects was so far advanced that it rendered impossible its own application. As an example he adduced that before the end of the last war Germany invented incendiary bombs, but could not bring herself to make use of them, being afraid that the same weapon might be used against her. Modern inventions, as, for instance, incendiary bombs, made it possible to wipe out whole cities, to burn entire forests, etc. The struggle would result in complete ruin for both sides, and the eventual victor would find only a void which would entail disaster for himself. It was, therefore, in the interest of all States to ban the use of certain weapons.

No. 20

Official Communiqué *on M. Beck's visit to Berlin*

July 4, 1935.

The Polish Foreign Minister's two-day visit to Berlin afforded an opportunity for exhaustive conversations between the Reich Fuehrer and Chancellor, the Reich Government and M. Beck. In these conversations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of frankness, matters of special interest to Poland and Germany, as well as general European problems, were discussed. The conversations revealed a far-reaching agreement of views.

It was possible to affirm with satisfaction that the Polish-German Agreement of January 26, 1934, had in every respect proved its full

value, namely, not only in the relations between the two States, but also as a constructive element for safeguarding the peace of Europe. In this connection M. Beck emphasized that the declaration regarding Poland made by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor in his speech of May 21, and especially his expressed desire as to the enduring nature of the Polish-German Agreement, found a strong response in Poland, and that on the Polish side also there was a sincere desire for continued improvement in friendly neighbourly relations with Germany.

Both Governments, taking the neighbourly situation of the two States as the basis, will in the future also remain in close contact, and will devote all their energies to the cause of peace in Europe.

No. 21

M. Lipski *to M. Beck*

Berlin, December 18, 1935.

I was received by Chancellor Hitler at 12.45 p.m. to-day.

The Chancellor declared that he was resolutely opposed to drawing Russia into the West. As a National Socialist he saw a serious danger in Bolshevism, irrespective of other countries' views on this subject. Germany had had to pay for her *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia by a social revolution. He was afraid that other countries also would have to atone for it. He was in favour of European solidarity, but in his opinion this solidarity ended at the Polish-Soviet frontier. The most general of air pacts could embrace only those States which recognized the same ethical principles in international policy. How could there be any association with Soviet Russia, which proclaimed world revolution?

No. 22

Extract *from Count Szembek's Minute of his conversation with M. Frank*

Warsaw, February 12, 1936.

M. Frank opened the conversation by declaring: "Poland, Germany and France must march together." Then, developing this idea, he stressed that in this regard Poland had great fields of activity.

Polish-French-German collaboration was the only way to an effective struggle against the barbarism which would come from the East. The Russian nation had to be pitied for being lost in the confusion of Bolshevism, but against it "we must defend ourselves with all our strength, since it aimed at destroying everything which had been most sacred to us for a thousand years."

Speaking of the Polish-German *rapprochement*, M. Frank stated that "Poland and Germany together were a force which it would be difficult to resist in Europe, for it was a bloc comprising a solid mass of a hundred million people."

No. 23

EXTRACT *from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech*
March 7, 1936.

"I WOULD like the German people to learn to see in other nations historical realities which a visionary may well desire to wish away, but which cannot be wished away. I should like them to realize that it is unreasonable to try and bring these historical realities into opposition to the demands of their vital interests and to their understandable claims to live. I would therefore like the German people to understand the inner motives of National Socialist foreign policy, which finds it painful that the outlet to the sea of a people of 35 millions is situated on territory formerly belonging to the Reich, but which recognizes that it is impossible and therefore unreasonable to deny a State of such a size as this any outlet to the sea at all.

"We have in Europe no territorial claims to put forward. Above all, we know that in Europe it is not possible to solve by war the tensions which result either from erroneous territorial provisions or from disproportion between the number of a population and the space which they occupy."

No. 24

COUNT SZEMBEK'S *Minute of his conversation with Chancellor Hitler*
Berlin, August 12, 1936.

RAISING the Danzig questions, I stressed that they had now passed into a phase of certain difficulties.

The Chancellor interrupted me, saying that he would like to give me a number of explanations on this subject. When he assumed power in 1933, Polish-Danzig relations were in the worst possible state. He then ordered his people that they should at all costs come to an understanding with Poland. The decisions of the Versailles Treaty might be the cause of dissatisfaction and regret, but none the less the facts which had arisen must be taken into account. The Danzig question was negligible in comparison with the magnitude of those problems which pointed to the necessity of harmonizing German and Polish policy.

When he ordered his people in Danzig not to quarrel any more with Poland, he was violently attacked not only by German Nationalists, but also by Socialists and Communists, and that in Danzig as well as in the Reich itself. He was accused of betraying Germanism. He, however, ignored these attacks, and did not retreat one single step from his chosen policy of the necessity for an understanding with Poland. This idea was a guiding light to him even at the moment of assuming power, and in the course of its realization he was given great support by "meines alten Herren," Marshal Hindenburg. Perhaps because he had come from those parts, Hindenburg had felt sympathy for the idea and had fully supported the Chancellor's policy.

The National-Socialist régime would act in Danzig entirely by way of an understanding with Poland and respect for all her rights. He affirmed this most categorically. Polish rights in the Free City, which he knew and understood, could not suffer the least detriment. The present statutory position need not be violated.

The Chancellor reiterated his statement that Polish rights in Danzig could not be violated in any case. To this I remarked that we were interested to know what the future of Polish-Danzig relations would be, and what guarantees we would have of the maintenance of our rights in the Free City in the event of an overthrow of the present statute and of the League of Nations in Danzig. The Chancellor replied that there was no question of that. In all his policy he was governed by the principle of signing nothing and promising nothing, if he had any doubt whether he could realize it in practice. From the moment, however, when he assumed some obligation or concluded a certain friendship, there was no power on earth which could make him break his pledged word. With respect to Poland, he followed this principle absolutely. Both Poland and Germany were, at that moment, faced with problems of such gravity and importance that their whole attention should be devoted to them. Therefore, this was not the time to discuss certain problems, which, though truly important, were, after all, of secondary importance by comparison with those others.

No. 25

COUNT SZEMBEK'S *Minute of his conversation with M. von Ribbentrop Berlin, August* 14, 1936.

TOUCHING on the Danzig problem, I pointed out our rights and interests in the Free City and emphasized that we must watch over them. M. von Ribbentrop replied that nobody wanted to violate the statute of the Free City or the position of the League of Nations in Danzig. He several times stressed emphatically that the Danzig question should not influence in any way the great line of common policy which both Governments, Polish and German, wished to continue.

Then he extensively discussed the necessity for Polish-German collaboration. Both Poland and Germany were faced with a serious danger arising from the fact that the Soviets had not renounced the conception of world revolution. Moscow could not renounce this conception, and Stalin was bound to carry on a corresponding policy, otherwise there would be a breakdown of the whole Bolshevik system, which aimed at levelling down and destroying all the achievements of Western civilization and culture. Chancellor Hitler could not make any compromise in relation to Russia, because the slightest deviation from his own present policy must open the way for the reign of Bolshevism in Germany. M. von Ribbentrop considered that Poland was menaced by the danger of Bolshevism equally with Germany, and

that the only way of counteracting this danger was the prevention of the catastrophe by crushing at their roots even the smallest signs of Communism.

Finally, M. von Ribbentrop stated that the necessity for German-Polish collaboration already met with general understanding in Germany, even among those who at first had disapproved of it. He adduced himself as an example, stressing that at first he had held a negative attitude to the policy of an understanding with Poland, while to-day he was fully convinced and was one of its most ardent supporters.

No. 26

M. Beck's *Minute of his conversation with M. von Moltke*
Warsaw, November 18, 1936.

The German Ambassador opened the conversation by stating that the agitation of public opinion in both our countries and the views expressed in the Press gave an impression of irritation which did not correspond to the real position of Polish-German relations.

I answered that we also had to recognize the existence of German Press attacks, which previously we had not had to consider. I added that I was also under the impression that the tone of the Press polemics so noticeable recently was not a normal phenomenon, in view of the efforts which had been made to put relations between our two countries on a good neighbourly basis. I ascribed this to a considerable degree to the Danzig question, with which he was well acquainted, and which, as I had warned him, was a particularly sensitive spot for the Polish public. Yet recent events in Danzig had given many grounds for much agitation. I thought it rather paradoxical that the activities of the Free City's Administration should determine the atmosphere between the two countries, which had jointly decided to follow a peaceful policy.

M. von Moltke told me that the previous day he had been received by the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Chancellor had authorized him to declare most positively that the principles and factors which had led to the Polish-German understanding still held their full meaning and value. The Polish-German Agreement, in the Chancellor's opinion, should be automatically extended, so as to form a permanent basis for Polish-German relations. Similarly, Polish rights in Danzig should be respected. "You know the Chancellor. With his usual animation he nevertheless complained of the line of conduct adopted by Mr. Lester as the High Commissioner, and the impossible state of affairs which arose from intervention in the smallest details of Danzig administration was bound to cause irritation." None the less, the Chancellor thought that the principles of the statute of the Free City should be maintained, and if the High Commissioner adopted a more judicious attitude to his mission, a quite tolerable and lasting *modus vivendi* could exist.

The Ambassador added that from Baron von Neurath also he had

received similar assurances as to the attitude of the German Government.

Also, as far as Germany's attitude towards Poland was concerned, the Chancellor had authorized the Ambassador to make a similar declaration to Marshal Smigly-Rydz, because of his eminent position in Polish political life. He added that his visit was not for the purpose of negotiations or proposals, but only for presenting this declaration, which must lead to a clarification of the atmosphere.

I answered that I would consult the Marshal. But I could assure him in advance that a statement of this kind would certainly be most welcome. I also thanked the Ambassador for his declaration, which I regarded as a desirable basis for quiet and objective study of the problem which caused the greatest difficulties, i.e., that of Danzig.

I had undertaken the perhaps thankless mission of investigating the Danzig question on the basis of the League Mandate. I thought, however, that the Polish Government, which was not influenced by doctrines and had no desire to create difficulties, could find a solution. A cardinal condition was the goodwill of the Senate, which would have to contribute their share to the success of this mission.

The Ambassador stated that it happened to be unfortunate that President Greiser was away from Danzig at present, since formally it would be easier for the Polish Government to negotiate with Danzig. The German Government could exercise influence on the Senate at appropriate moments, but the Senate was formally the medium for negotiations.

I agreed with this attitude. In the further long conversation I detected a certain nervousness on the part of the Ambassador lest Poland should desire to exploit the situation to extend her rights considerably at the Senate's expense, which would lead to new difficulties. The Ambassador said that there was a certain apprehension on this score in Danzig. I answered that it was a matter of maintaining the equilibrium of the *status quo,* but as the Senate, by *faits accomplis* had already prejudged certain questions to its own advantage, Polish interests demanded new guarantees.

Judging the conversation as a whole, I had reason to believe that pressure would certainly be brought to bear on Danzig from the German side, provided we did not place them in a too difficult position by putting forward demands either compromising the activities of the Nazi Senate or extending, not the practical, but the theoretical Treaty Rights of Poland.

No. 27

M. Lipski *to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

Berlin, January 11, 1937.

In his talk with me to-day, on the occasion of the presentation of New Year greetings, Chancellor Hitler expressed the conviction that Danzig affairs would be settled satisfactorily, and he reiterated his basic thesis on this matter, i.e., that the growth of National-

Socialism in Danzig would be a guarantee of peace and good relations with Poland.

He stressed the importance of the Polish-German Agreement, which he defined as the basis of peace in that part of Europe, and said that it would be universally recognized as such in the future.

No. 28

EXTRACTS *from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech*
January 30, 1937.

"BY a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall our agreement with Poland, which has worked out to the advantage of both sides. . . ."

"To link Germany any further by treaties with the present Bolshevist Russia would be for us entirely valueless. It is not conceivable that National-Socialist Germans could ever render any help in protecting Bolshevism, nor would we ourselves wish to accept any help from a Bolshevist State. For, I am afraid, any nation which receives such help will perish through it. . . ."

"True statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them. The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to my own fellow-citizens I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become a reality. . . ."

"The German Reich with its strong army will protect her own security and her own honour. But, fully convinced that there is for Europe no greater good than peace, the German Reich will always be a responsible and conscious promoter of the European peace idea. . . ."

No. 29

EXTRACT *from Minute of Marshal Smigly-Rydz's conversation with M. Goering*
Warsaw, February 16, 1937.

THE conversation took place in the presence of Ambassador von Moltke and Count Szembek.

M. Goering announced that he had been instructed by Chancellor Hitler to emphasize that he (Hitler) was more than ever determined to continue the policy of *rapprochement* with Poland. It was obvious that this policy, which was desired by both Governments, could not yet be completely impressed upon the public opinion of both countries. Traces of former prejudices still existed in the mentalities of both

peoples. Years of enmity between the two States had left their mark on the formation of opinion in both countries, leaving certain memories and resentments. In this sphere some uncertainties still existed. The task of both Governments was to influence public opinion so as to dispel this state of mind. In this belief, Chancellor Hitler had taken the opportunity in his speech of January 30, a speech of historic significance, to tell the German nation what Poland was, and had instructed them as to the attitude they were to adopt to the Polish problem.

The pursuit of a policy of Polish-German *rapprochement* was within the bounds of possibility. On the German side there was no desire whatever to deprive Poland of any part of her territory. Germany was completely reconciled to her present territorial status. Germany would not attack Poland and had no intention of seizing the Polish "Corridor." "We do not want the 'Corridor.' I say that sincerely and categorically; we do not need the 'Corridor.'" He could not give proof of this; it was a question whether his word was believed or not. Just as Germany trusted and believed that Poland had no intention of seizing East Prussia and the rest of Silesia, so Poland could believe that Germany had no intention of depriving her of any of her rights and possessions. For that matter, it was quite obvious that a strong Poland with access to the sea, a Poland with whom Germany could agree her policy, was incomparably more necessary and useful to the Reich than a weak and mutilated Poland. For Germany realized that an isolated Poland would be much easier to subdue, and then the whole Russian avalanche would strike directly against the German frontier.

Before Chancellor Hitler came to power, German policy had made many serious mistakes. The dangerous policy of Rapallo had been followed in relation to Russia. As the result of this policy Germany helped Russia in military matters, armed her, sent her instructors, assisted her to build up her war industry. The old Reichswehr had had many advocates of *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia, but an end was put to this by the elimination of all such elements from the German Army. It is true that General Schleicher had said that he wanted to fight Communism internally, but externally he had sought contacts with the Soviets. These were serious mistakes which must never be repeated. M. Hitler had completely reversed the policy, and had laid down the principle, against which there was no appeal, that all contacts with Communism were prohibited. He had explicitly stressed his attitude when Marshal Tukhachevski had passed through Berlin. Not only did he not receive him personally, but he had not allowed anyone from military circles to have any contact with him.

It should not be forgotten that the new Germany had come into existence in the same way as the new Poland. Germany would never return to a pro-Russian policy. For it should always be remembered that there was one great danger coming through Russia from the East, and menacing both Germany and Poland alike. This danger existed not only in the form of a Bolshevik and Communized Russia, but of Russia generally, in any form, be it Monarchist or Liberal. In this respect the interests of Poland and Germany were entirely

one. In the German view, Poland could conduct a truly independent policy on a large scale only if she had to deal with a friendly disposed Reich, while Germany could develop in peace only if she did not have a hostile Poland beside her. In these circumstances Poland could count on the help of Germany, who saw far more advantage than disadvantage to herself in the pursuit of a policy of friendship with Poland.

From this outline of Polish-German relations it resulted that the Polish-French Alliance was in no way a menace to the Reich. At the time of the Declaration of January 1934, Germany was precisely informed as to the content and the importance of that alliance. They knew that it possessed a strictly defensive character, i.e., that it would come into force only in the event of a German attack on France or Poland. In this regard they were perfectly untroubled, for they had no aggressive intentions whatever in regard either to Poland or to France.

In Berlin, he went on, they had no illusions that Stalin was not planning to let loose world revolution. They possessed information that although the Soviets had withdrawn from revolutionary activity in South America, and, after the conclusion of the German-Japanese Pact, in the Far East, they had increased their propaganda in Poland, Rumania, the Baltic States and Austria.

All the foregoing pointed to the necessity of aligning Polish and German policy. On this assumption it would be desirable to determine how far a policy of collaboration could be worked out. He considered that it would be desirable to influence the public opinion of both countries. Further, any misunderstandings which might arise must be discussed quite frankly. Finally, cultural contacts must be made and strengthened. When mutual relations were completely regularized, then it might be possible to consider facilitating German transit to East Prussia.

In regard to Danzig, he was glad to say that since the advent of the Hitler régime in the Free City, bi-lateral Polish-Danzig conversations had been a positive factor in their neighbourly collaboration.

No. 30

COUNT SZEMBEK'S *Minute of his conversation with M. Goering Berlin, November* 4, 1937.

M. GOERING stated that he was hoping for positive results in Polish-German relations from the declaration on Minorities. The Minorities question was the only unsatisfactory element in the relations between the two countries. But so long as the Polish Government knew (and everybody in Poland realized it as well) that the Third Reich was not nursing the least idea of aggressive intentions against Poland and regarded her territorial integrity as inviolable, and as Germany was convinced that the Polish attitude was the same, in these conditions the policy initiated by two great statesmen would develop and be strengthened further in the future.

I told M. Goering that, nevertheless, incidents in Danzig were having a strong effect on public opinion in Poland, and that M. Foerster's latest pronouncements could not pass unnoticed by us. M. Goering replied that he did not quite understand "why you are disturbed about this Danzig question, when our aims lie elsewhere." M. Foerster, whom he had recently called to Berlin, had received quite clear and definite instructions that wherever questions of Polish rights in the Free City arose, rights which the Third Reich accepted in their entirety, they were not to be violated in any way. He admitted that, sometimes, M. Foerster went too far in his actions and declarations, but he, personally, could not be "continually standing behind this young man and watching him." However, such incidents should not be allowed to influence the great line of policy initiated in 1934. Danzig could not be a hindrance here, and he declared with all his authority (*"Ich stehe dafür ein"*) that nothing would happen in Danzig against Poland, and that Foerster had quite definite instructions in this sense.

M. Goering stressed that the foregoing statements were in complete harmony with the views of the Chancellor, who without doubt would talk to Ambassador Lipski in the same spirit the following day.

Returning to his declaration that the Danzig question could have no influence on the great line of policy initiated in 1934, M. Goering emphasized that the political aims of Germany and Poland did not clash. At this point he repeated the statement he had made to Marshal Smigly-Rydz on a former occasion, that the Third Reich would not collaborate either with the Soviets or with Russia in general, irrespective of her internal régime. He reiterated what he had said so many times before, that Germany needed a strong Poland. Poland surely should be pleased to have complete peace on her western frontier, just as it was very important for Germany to be assured of peace on her eastern frontier.

No. 31

M. Beck *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions Abroad*

Warsaw, November 5, 1937.

To-day, there will be published simultaneously in Warsaw and Berlin Governmental Declarations concerning the Treatment of Polish and German Minorities in the territories of both countries.

These Declarations arise from the spirit of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934, and are the result of an agreement between the two governments, but they constitute sovereign acts in the sphere of home affairs.

They apply the principle of reciprocity, emphasizing the duty of absolute loyalty on the part of Minorities as a condition of enjoying the protection which is the exclusive attribute of sovereignty.

An official German communiqué on the reception of the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, M. Lipski, will be published at the same time. This communiqué will contain the suggestion that Danzig

affairs should not jeopardise relations between Poland and Germany. Danzig affairs have been mentioned in it, as any improvement in the situation—in whatever sphere—between Poland and Germany is not possible without reference to Danzig.

No. 32

IDENTIC DECLARATION *by the Polish and German Governments on the subject of the Treatment of Minorities*

November 5, 1937.

IN a friendly exchange of views, the German and Polish Governments have had an opportunity of discussing the position of the German Minority in Poland and the Polish Minority in Germany. They are in complete agreement that the treatment of these minorities is a matter of great importance for the further development of friendly neighbourly relations between Germany and Poland, and that in both countries the well-being of the minority is better protected when it is certain that the same principles will be observed in the other country. For this reason the two Governments declare with satisfaction that their two States, each within the limits of its own sovereignty, regard as essential the following guiding principles:

(1) Mutual respect for German and Polish nationality naturally should exclude any attempt to assimilate the minority by force, to question the character of the minority, or to hinder the individual's right to claim membership in a minority. In particular, neither Government will put any pressure on young members of the minority to estrange them from the ethnic group to which they belong.

(2) Members of the minority have a right to the free use of their mother tongue in speech and writing, in their personal and economic relations, in the Press, and in public meetings. The use of their mother tongue and national customs, either in private or public life, shall not entail any disadvantages for them.

(3) The right of members of the minority to unite in associations of a cultural or economic nature is guaranteed.

(4) The minority may establish and maintain schools employing its own language. In the religious sphere members of the minority are granted the right to use their mother tongue in their church organizations and in the practice of their religion. There will be no interference by the authorities with existing institutions in the sphere of confession or of charitable activity.

(5) The members of a minority may not, solely on account of such membership, suffer any obstruction or disadvantage in the choice or in the exercise of their profession or commercial activity. In the economic sphere members of a minority shall enjoy the same rights as the nationals of the State, especially in the possession or acquisition of property.

The above principles can in no way affect the duty of the minorities to give complete loyalty to the State to which they belong. They

have been inspired by a desire to guarantee to minorities just conditions of life and a harmonious collaboration with the nationals of the State in which they live—a state of affairs which will contribute to the progressive strengthening of the friendly and good-neighbourly relations between Poland and Germany.

No. 33

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ *on the Polish Ambassador's audience with the Reich Chancellor*

November 5, 1937.

THE Reich Chancellor received the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, M. Lipski, to-day. In his conversation with the Ambassador the Fuehrer-Chancellor gave expression to his satisfaction that it had been possible to reach an understanding on a matter of special importance for Polish-German relations, i.e., the Minorities question. Thus it had been proved that the Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934, and the principle of direct negotiation therein provided for, was still demonstrating its value.

In the course of the conversation it was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig question.

No. 34

M. LIPSKI *to M. Beck*

Berlin, November 5, 1937.

I WAS received by Chancellor Hitler to-day at 12.15 p.m. M. von Neurath, Reich Foreign Minister, was also present.

The Chancellor began by expressing his great satisfaction at the achievement of the Declaration on Minorities.

For my part I stated that in spite of difficulties of a political nature, both internal and external, the Polish Government accepted the Chancellor's suggestion of a Minorities Declaration in an effort to improve German-Polish relations in this regard. The President of the Republic, Marshal Smigly-Rydz, and M. Beck had approached the subject from a broad viewpoint. If, during conversations on the subject of Minorities we had raised the necessity of improving the situation in regard to Danzig, it was in the hope of obtaining a general appeasement.

For his part the Chancellor defined his own attitude, doing so with great precision. He formulated the following points:

(1) There would be no changes in the legal and political position in Danzig (*an der rechts politischen Lage Danzigs wird nichts geandert werden*).

(2) The rights of the Polish population in Danzig would be respected.

(3) The rights of Poland in Danzig would not be impaired. The Chancellor declared emphatically that his Agreement with Poland would be respected also so far as Danzig was concerned. Any word he gave was and would be kept. A surprise step was out of the question. The Chancellor's only desire was that the German population of Danzig should choose its own form of Government, most appropriate to Germans. Such a solution would be the best guarantee against possible complications, for then incidents would not be created by particular political parties. The Chancellor asked me to communicate the above statement to my Government, and he expressed the particular desire that it should be made known to Marshal Smigly-Rydz.

I took cognizance of the above declaration. In the course of further conversation on the subject I pointed out that we were abstaining from any interference in the life of the German population in Danzig, and rejecting all offers coming from the Opposition in Danzig. I mentioned that our rights and interests in connection with the existence of the Free City, had been defined in the Polish-Danzig Convention of 1920 and subsequent agreements. Further, quite generally, and as my personal opinion, I added that Danzig should constitute a point where Polish and German interests could collaborate. I recalled the important part Danzig had played in the past in trade with the Kingdom of Poland and even far beyond her territories.

At this juncture Chancellor Hitler twice emphatically remarked: *"Danzig ist mit Polen verbunden."* ("Danzig is bound up with Poland.")

No. 35

DECLARATION *by Chancellor Hitler to the Representatives of the Polish Minority on the occasion of the Signing of the Minorities Agreement November* 5, 1937.

THE identic German-Polish Declaration regarding the protection of the respective racial groups which has been made public to-day by both States, should improve and strengthen the friendly relations between the two peoples. The practical execution of the principles contained in this Declaration can materially contribute to the attainment of this aim.

The efforts of the Government of the Reich are directed towards assuring that the Polish racial group may live side by side, in harmony and peace, with the German national people.

I declare that the determination of the Government of the Reich to provide bread and work for every citizen of the Reich also extends to, and is applied to, the members of the Polish racial group. During the period of great unemployment and want to which the members of the German racial groups in Europe are still frequently exposed, the Polish racial group is participating to the full in the economic recovery of the Reich. Similar progress has been made in the cultural activity of the Polish racial group, as is shown by your many organizations

and the recent establishment of another Polish high school in Germany. The Poles in Germany must, however, continually bear in mind that, in return for the guarantee of their special rights, the loyal fulfilment of the duties owed to the State, and obedience to its laws, are equally expected of them.

The protection of the German racial group in Poland, especially in regard to their right to work and to remain on the soil from which they descend, will also contribute to the protection of the Polish racial group in Germany.

The principal aim of the Pact which I concluded with the great Polish Chief of State, Marshal Józef Pilsudski, will by this reciprocal German-Polish Declaration regarding the minorities question, be brought nearer to its complete fulfilment.

No. 36

M. Beck's *Minute of his conversation with Chancellor Hitler Berlin, January* 14, 1938.

The conversation took place in the presence of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Neurath, and the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, M. Lipski.

During the conversation the Chancellor several times mentioned Polish-German affairs. He welcomed my visit to Berlin and repeatedly emphasized that the happy development of Polish-German relations was one of the rare positive factors in the present inflamed international situation. He affirmed his unshakable resolve to follow the path he had chosen. Discussing his general theses, the Chancellor confirmed his point of view that territorial adjustments would be out of all proportion to the sacrifices necessary to bring them about, and were, therefore, of no importance whatever.

In regard to the Danzig question, the Chancellor said literally that on November 5, 1937, he made a declaration on the subject to our Ambassador. He wanted to repeat that declaration now. His conception of it was that Polish rights in Danzig would be in no way violated, and further, that the Free City's legal status would not be affected in any way. In this respect also, the Chancellor added, Polish-German relations were of primary importance to him and were decisive. His only desire was that the German population there should choose its own form of government most appropriate for it, which as a result would conduce to the maintenance of peace. The Chancellor firmly stated that the declaration he had made was binding upon him. He further mentioned that the question was not dependent on the fate of the League of Nations.

In addition, the Chancellor dwelt at length on his attitude to Communism, indicating very decidedly that his negative attitude was immovable. In this connection he mentioned certain views which existed as to the possibility of an evolution in Russia in a national sense. Such opinions had been shared by the Reichswehr also. They

had considered that Soviet military elements would be in a position to continue to impose their opinions. The contrary had occurred, and present-day Russia was in a complete state of Communism, while the generals were dead.

No. 37

EXTRACTS *from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech*
February 20, 1938.

"WITH one State only did we not want any connection or any closer relations—with Soviet Russia. . . ."

"Any attempts to spread Bolshevism, irrespective of where they occurred, would have our abhorrence and, if they threaten us—our enmity. . . ."

"In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the State with which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a *détente,* but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement in relations. I know perfectly well that this is above all attributable to the circumstance that at the time there was no Western parliamentarian in Warsaw, but a Polish Marshal, who as an eminent personality realized the significance, so important to Europe, of such a German-Polish *détente.* This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that, since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this State, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has to-day, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly co-operation.

Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us—peace.

No. 38

EXTRACT *from Minute of a conversation between Marshal Smigly-Rydz and M. Goering*
Warsaw, February 23, 1938.

THE conversation took place in the presence of Count Szembek. M. Goering stated that Chancellor Hitler had instructed him to say how gratified the Chancellor felt that in his last Reichstag speech he

had been able to refer to relations with Poland. Those relations found expression in a clear and reasonable policy. The Chancellor was also glad that Polish-Danzig relations were on the road to improvement, and was anxious to emphasize that Polish rights in the Free City would not be violated. He had already given expression to these views on previous occasions. In his last speech he had only again defined his attitude. He was firmly and irrevocably resolved to carry on this policy in the future.

M. Goering devoted the next part of the conversation to the Soviet Army. After reviewing its present condition, he expressed the opinion that from the point of view of equipment, and also of human material, it stood at a very low level. He gave the Marshal to understand that in his opinion, in the event of war, it would not be difficult to inflict a military defeat on the Soviets. He stressed that politically the Soviets were, however, a permanent and very serious danger, and in this respect Polish and German interests completely harmonized. For these two States formed a "bulwark" against Bolshevism. In Germany they perfectly realized that if Poland were defeated in a conflict between Poland and the Soviets, then in a sense the automatic result of this fact would be the swift Bolshevization of Germany.

The conversation then passed to the subject of the Soviet executions and the consequent disorganization of the Soviet Army and diplomatic service.

M. Goering stated that Chancellor Hitler had arranged for the last Soviet Ambassador, M. Yureniev, to present his credentials at Berchtesgaden instead of at Berlin in order to avoid rendering him any military honours. The Chancellor did not want a single German soldier to present arms to a Soviet Ambassador. He had forbidden invitations for official functions to be sent to any members of the Soviet Embassy, and, if a further Soviet Ambassador were appointed to Berlin, he had decided to demand a guarantee that he would remain at his post for at least one year.

No. 39

EXTRACT *from Mr. Ward Price's interview with Chancellor Hitler March* 14, 1938.

". . . I AM a realist. Look at my relations with Poland. I am quite ready to admit that Poland—a country of 33,000,000 inhabitants —needs an outlet to the sea.

"It is a bitter thing to us that this has to be obtained at the expense of a corridor through German territory, but we realize what it means for the Poles.

"There are Germans living under Polish government and Poles living under German government.

"If the two countries quarrelled, each would oppress its minorities. It was far better to settle our differences by agreement. . . ."

No. 40

EXTRACT *from M. Lipski's Minute of his conversation with M. von Ribbentrop*
Nuremberg, September 10, 1938.

M. VON RIBBENTROP emphasized the necessity for good Polish-German relations; this was his own conviction, which had regard to the common interests linking both States. His personal view was confirmed by the line adopted by the Chancellor. As long, therefore, as the Chancellor desired to maintain him in his present post, he would work positively for the development of Polish-German relations.

Granted this general assumption, minor issues disturbing Polish-German relations must be settled in a friendly spirit.

No. 41

EXTRACT *from Chancellor Hitler's Speech at Nuremberg*
September 14, 1938.

"IN Poland a great patriot and a great statesman was ready to make an accord with Germany; we immediately proceeded to action and completed an agreement which was of greater importance to the peace of Europe than all the chattering in the temple of the League of Nations at Geneva."

No. 42

EXTRACTS *from Chancellor Hitler's Speech in the Sportpalast*
September 26, 1938.

"WE have no interest in oppressing other nations. We desire to be happy in our own way and let the others be happy in their own ways. . . ."

"The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I would not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled not a democracy, but a man; and with him I succeeded, in precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years to begin with, entirely removed the danger of conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must live together, and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way to understanding, then, had to be found; it has been found; and it will be continually extended further. Certainly things were difficult in this area. The nationalities and small national

groups frequently quarrelled among themselves. But the main fact is that the two Governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more value than all the chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva."

No. 43

EXTRACT *from Chancellor Hitler's Speech at Saarbruecken*
October 9, 1938.

"As a strong State we are prepared at any time for a policy of understanding with our neighbours. We have no demands on them. All we want is peace."

No. 44

M. LIPSKI *to M. Beck*
Berlin, October 25, 1938.

IN a conversation on October 24, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (*Gesamtlösung*) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers. As a possible sphere for future co-operation between the two countries, the German Foreign Minister specified joint action in colonial matters and the emigration of Jews from Poland, and a joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact. M. von Ribbentrop asked me to communicate his suggestions to you. He would like to discuss these matters with you, with my participation.

In my reply I referred him to the Chancellor's declaration on the Danzig question, made to me on November 5, 1937, and repeated to you in Berlin on January 14, 1938.

I also pointed to the importance of Danzig as a port to Poland, and repeated the Polish Government's principle of non-interference in the internal life of the German population in the Free City, where complete self-government is established.

Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you.

After the conversation M. von Ribbentrop invited me again to call on him and, mentioning the issue of the union of Sub-

Carpathian Ruthenia with Hungary, put to me the question whether I was raising it with the German Government as a Polish postulate. He added that, if the Polish Government agreed to the German conception regarding Danzig and the Motor Road, the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia could be solved in accordance with Poland's attitude to the matter. I answered that my only task was to inform the German Government of Poland's attitude in regard to Hungary's postulate in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, as Poland had also done to the Italian Government.

No. 45

M. Beck's *instructions to M. Lipski*
Warsaw, October 31, 1938.

In connection with your indication of the Reich Government's desire to achieve a general agreement which would finally stabilize Polish-German relations in accordance with the principle of a good and friendly co-existence, as expressed by M. von Ribbentrop in his conversation at Berchtesgaden on the 24th inst., please inform the governing circles of the Reich of our following views:

(1) Although, to our sincere satisfaction, the last crisis did not lead to a general European military conflict, in the eyes of the Polish Government the value of good Polish-German relations in a general stabilization of peace is not only of undiminished importance, but, in face of the dominating general political chaos, has gained in weight and cogency.

(2) In the sphere of Polish-German neighbourly relations, in spite of local difficulties, great progress has been made, since it has not escaped our notice that the Reich Chancellor's declarations in regard to us, made in his public statements, contain increasingly precise and unequivocal formulas.

(3) The Polish-German Agreement of 1934 has stood the test of the greatest political upheaval post-war Europe has so far experienced. In these circumstances, it is only logical to emphasize this achievement, by impressing the publics of both countries with the fact that the said Agreement was not of a transient and tactical nature. On the contrary, it expresses the firm resolution to repair mistakes of past history, which has been so abundant in strife and conflict without advantage to either of our nations.

(4) In the opinion of the Polish Government the subject of any future understanding concluded with the object of permanently maintaining good neighbourly relations would have to be the following:

(*a*) A certain extension in the period and form of the 1934 Declaration, as the basis of relations between the two States.

(*b*) Such a settlement of the problem of the Danzig Free City as would prevent, in future, the continually recurring difficulties of a technical and psychological nature which arise from friction in this sphere. The question of the Free City is urgent because in the state of affairs hitherto prevailing, with the League of Nations

reserving very far-reaching prerogatives to itself, but not able to fulfil its task in a manner beneficial to the Free City and to Polish interests, the need arises for the Polish and Reich Governments to approach the problem in a spirit of frankness.

(5) On the Polish side the fact will always remain that so important a State as Poland has access to the sea which is reduced to the minimum possible, and this at a time when the Republic's sea commerce and its mercantile marine are naturally developing on a very wide scale. The construction of Gdynia port considerably enlarged Poland's possibilities, but the position of the Free City at the mouth of the Vistula (which, especially since the creation of the Polish Central Industrial Area, is an increasingly important communication way) confers quite special importance on the Free City from the aspect of Polish maritime interests. A very large number of further basins can still be excavated at Gdynia, but it would be impossible to find any substitute for the natural port situated at the mouth of the main Polish waterway. On the other hand, the exploitation of any port under normal economic conditions is only possible when it is situated within the Customs area of the country which forms its hinterland. For this reason, in past ages the Free City of Danzig, while enjoying local autonomy because of the nature of its population, was even under Polish sovereignty. It should be added that the Danzig delegation to the Congress of Vienna had, as its chief task, the maintenance of its connection with whatever type of Polish State might arise as the result of the deliberations of that Congress. These historical considerations are meant only as illustration and commentary. Present-day realities provide clear arguments for a definition of the bounds of Polish interests in relation to the Free City.

(6) In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish Government the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland. In the present state of affairs the existing Statute and agreements guarantee Poland:

(*a*) Unrestricted access to the sea by waterway and railway.

(*b*) The ownership of the railways serving the port at Danzig and the port at Gdynia.

(*c*) The inclusion of the Free City in the Polish Customs area.

(*d*) The rights of the Polish minority.

Other rights derive from these four cardinal conditions. The Statute contains yet another fifth condition which, despite several declarations of the Danzig Senate, the last being made in 1932, has never been fulfilled. The failure to fulfil this condition reacts most unfavourably upon the economic position of the Free City.

(7) Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and

desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich, the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This Agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects. Even in 1933, after the conversations had been opened which led to the conclusion of the 1934 Declaration, Marshal Pilsudski raised the Danzig question as a sure criterion for estimating the German Reich's intentions towards Poland. This was made known both through diplomatic channels and also, so far as I remember, in a conversation between Marshal Pilsudski and Dr. Goebbels. I expressly consider that this point of view is binding upon Poland.

(8) In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future.

No. 46

M. Lipski *to M. Beck*

Berlin, November 19, 1938.

I was received by M. von Ribbentrop to-day at 12.30 p.m.

In accordance with your instructions of October 31[1] I informed M. von Ribbentrop that I had acquainted you with his suggestion made at Berchtesgaden, regarding a Polish-German Agreement which would finally stabilize mutual relations between the two countries, and that you had requested me to communicate our attitude in answer.

To give greater weight to my arguments I availed myself of my written instructions, and exactly and emphatically communicated their contents to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. von Ribbentrop listened attentively to my exposé without discussing particular points.

I noticed that he was impressed by my statement that any tendency to incorporate the Free City in the Reich must inevitably lead to a conflict, not only of a local character, but also jeopardizing Polish-German relations in their entirety. I concluded my exposition by quoting Marshal Pilsudski's opinion that the Danzig question would constitute a criterion for evaluating Germany's relations to Poland, adding a number of other explanations of a general nature.

[1] No. 45.

In his reply M. von Ribbentrop stated that the Reich desired to maintain the best possible relations with Poland, just as they did with Italy, and assured me that all his emphasis was in this direction. In a very friendly tone he stated that it was his desire to hold conversations with Poland, not in the diplomatic manner, but entirely as between friends, frankly and openly.

M. von Ribbentrop emphasized that he would like you to know that Germany conceived of relations with Poland on a very broad political plane, and that he had no intention of simply raising one question after another with Poland. He added that negotiations with Poland were of quite a different character from those with M. Benesz for Czechoslovakia. In the course of this argumentation he declared that you for years had been pursuing a definite and consistent course in Polish foreign affairs. I replied that if the Reich conceived of its policy towards Poland on broad lines, then I had no fear as to our relations. M. von Ribbentrop said that in any case he had more than once confirmed this in his conversations with me.

M. von Ribbentrop then explained how the suggestion he had communicated to me at Berchtesgaden had arisen: taking as basis the Chancellor's conviction as to the necessity for maintaining the best of relations with Poland, which was a fundamental principle in Reich policy, he had been trying to find a solution which would completely stabilize the situation. He had talked only indefinitely with the Chancellor on the subject, and, on the basis that Danzig was a German city, had himself put forward his suggestions. (It is worthy of note that M. von Ribbentrop discreetly gave it to be understood that he was responsible for the initiative in this matter, leaving the Chancellor out of it.)

He returned again and again to his explanation that his sole desire was to achieve stabilized relations, and that he had sought for a solution for this reason. He alluded to the interview you gave to the Hearst representative, which he understood as the adoption of a negative attitude on the matter, and he revealed some disappointment that this had been done in a public statement.[1] I said nothing to this. He also mentioned that he would gladly have a talk with you.

We discussed the Danzig question itself in general terms only. When he reverted to my statement that any tendency to incorporate

[1] Mr. Hillman: "There are rumours that negotiations are going on between Poland and Germany regarding the surrender of Danzig to Germany and the creation of a neutral Corridor, or else the right of transit across Polish Pomorze, to link up Germany and East Prussia."

"We are not conducting any negotiations on this matter," M. Beck replied. "Polish and Danzig relations are satisfactory. The majority of the Danzig population is German, and has the opportunity of expressing its national character within the limits of the Free City's Constitution. Chancellor Hitler's basic idea was freedom for the German population in its idealistic evolution, safe from interference on the part of governments or elements hostile to Germany. The internal life of the population of Danzig has never been interfered with by the Polish Government, whose interests in that port are vital, but of a quite different nature."

(Extract from an interview given by M. Beck to the representative of the Hearst Press, Mr. Hillman, in October 1938.)

Danzig in the Reich would lead to a certain conflict in Polish-German relations, I reaffirmed it most decisively. I added that the Danzig question was most irritating for our public opinion, the more so since we have made such great concessions to Danzig in respect of freedom of development for the German population, and choice of their own form of government. I did not fail to mention the irritation caused by the activities of Chauvinistic party elements, and mentioned M. Foerster. With reference to our conception of the matter, I quoted Chancellor Hitler's words in his Reichstag speech of February 21, 1938, when, speaking of Danzig, he said: "Der Polnische Staat respektiert die National-Verhältnisse in dieser Stadt und diese Stadt und Deutschland respektieren die Polnischen Rechte."[1]

With regard to our suggestion of a Polish-German agreement guaranteeing the existence of the Free City, M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he could not express an opinion, and that he must study further and reflect still more on this whole problem in the light of my statement. Incidentally, he mentioned that apparently new irritation had arisen in Danzig in connection with post-boxes, and asked me to raise the matter in Warsaw.

In the course of the conversation M. von Ribbentrop asked me what our attitude was with respect to the motor-road. I replied that my discussions in Warsaw had been primarily concerned with the Danzig question, so I could not give him any definite answer on this point. I simply expressed my personal belief that it might be possible to find a solution.

No. 47

M. Beck's *Minute of his conversation with M. von Moltke*
Warsaw, November 22, 1938.

In the name of M. von Ribbentrop the Ambassador emphasized once more that the German Foreign Minister considered Polish-German relations a problem of high policy, and as a positive factor which had stood the test and saved the peace. The Ambassador had been empowered to state that his Minister continued to attach the highest importance to good Polish-German relations.

M. Lipski had heard from the Minister himself that this high policy could not be brought to an end merely because of minor disputes. M. von Ribbentrop had paid great attention to M. Lipski's statement, and had taken due cognisance of his declaration on Danzig. He considered that it would be possible to find a solution to this problem on a somewhat different plane. For his part, the Ambassador stated that he had always warned M. von Ribbentrop that Danzig was a problem in regard to which the Polish attitude was adamant, and that Poland would never consent to a drastic solution. The Ambassador was glad that after his Minister's conversation with M. Lipski the former thoroughly realized this.

[1] "The Polish State respects the national character in that City, and the City and Germany in turn respect the Polish Rights."

I stated that owing to the excitement this question was again causing, the only way out would be through *eine offene aussprache,*[1] and that was why M. Lipski had been so outspoken.

The German Ambassador was very pleased with this conversation, and already saw a reaction to it. Germany had been under the influence of false information. He also emphasized that in such a question the Government was resolved to act only in accordance with the general principles underlying its policy towards Poland.

No. 48

MINUTE *of M. Beck's conversation with Chancellor Hitler Berchtesgaden, January* 5, 1939.

THE conversation took place in the presence of M. von Ribbentrop, M. von Moltke, M. Lipski and Count Michal Lubieński.

The Chancellor began by asking M. Beck whether he had any special questions to ask, as he was quite ready to be at his service with any explanations. In replying, M. Beck mentioned the Danzig situation and the Danube problem.

The Chancellor explained at length how the arbitration at Vienna had come about, laying the blame on the Hungarian Government's tactics for Budapest's failure to give effect to the postulate regarding Carpathian Ruthenia.

The Chancellor pointed out that in regard to Poland he always and invariably tried to follow the policy initiated by the Declaration of 1934. In his opinion the community of interests between Germany and Poland, so far as Russia was concerned, was complete. For the Reich, Russia, whether Tsarist or Bolshevist, was equally dangerous. The latter was perhaps a greater danger because of Communist propaganda, but the former was more dangerous in the military and even more the imperialistic sense. For these reasons, a strong Poland was an absolute necessity for Germany. At this point the Chancellor remarked that every Polish division engaged against Russia was a corresponding saving of a German division.

The Chancellor further declared that he was interested in the Ukraine from the economic viewpoint, but he had no interest in it politically.

The Chancellor then discussed the Danzig question, and emphasized that, as it was a German city, sooner or later it must return to the Reich. He stated that, in his opinion, by way of mutual agreement it would be possible to find some way out and achieve a form of guarantee to the legitimate interests of both Poland and Germany. If an agreement was reached on this question, all difficulties between the two States could quite definitely be settled and cleared out of the way. He emphasized that he was ready in that case to give an assurance, similar to that which he had given France with respect to Alsace and

[1]Frank speaking.

Lorraine, and to Italy with respect to the Brenner. Finally, he drew attention, without stressing the matter, to the necessity for greater freedom of communication between Germany and East Prussia.

M. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.

In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term *"Körperschaft,"* which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no *faits accomplis* in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government.

No. 49

EXTRACT *from Minute of M. Beck's conversation with M. von Ribbentrop*

Munich, January 6, 1939.

M. BECK asked M. von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, to-day for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.

In answer M. von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned.

No. 50

M. VON RIBBENTROP'S *Speech at the Banquet given in his honour by M. Beck*

Warsaw, January 25, 1939.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

In my own and my wife's name I ask you to accept our sincerest thanks for your friendly words of greeting. I am honoured and pleased by the fact that, in return for a visit you made some time ago to the German Government, I can now stay in your beautiful capital as a guest of the Polish Government. The Polish Government have given me and my wife a reception which once more testifies to the proverbial Polish hospitality.

The fact that my visit coincides with the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Polish-German Agreement dated January 26, 1934, also gives me special pleasure. Our meeting on this very day is a proof that the historic gesture for peace of our two great national leaders, Marshal Józef Pilsudski and the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, has stood the test of time. The Agreement then concluded has proved its great value in face of all the complications and tensions of the last five years.

Both before and after the death of the creator of the new Polish State, and especially amid the fever of events of the past year, it was a sure foundation for German-Polish relations, and thus was not only of advantage to both our countries, but also contributed to the maintenance of European peace, in correspondence with the general interests.

These happy experiences point also to the path both our countries should follow in the future. In accordance with the resolute will of the German National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing Agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations.

With this intention I raise my glass to the prosperity of the Polish nation, and in honour of His Excellency, the President of the Polish Republic, M. Ignace Mościcki.

No. 51

EXTRACTS *from Minute of M. von Ribbentrop's interviews with the President of the Republic and Marshal Smigly-Rydz*

Warsaw, January 26, 1939.

M. VON RIBBENTROP solemnly stated to the President of the Republic (in the form almost of an official declaration) on behalf of the Chancellor that Germany counted upon an enduring understanding with Poland, that this position was one of fundamental principle with the Chancellor, who was not a man to work for the transient conjuncture of events, and that between Germany and Poland there were no difficulties which could not be solved by his, Ribbentrop's, collaboration with M. Beck.

In an interview with Marshal Smigly-Rydz, M. von Ribbentrop spoke about Russia, asserting that she was growing weaker. At the same time he emphasized that nevertheless the U.S.S.R. was quite incalculable in her behaviour, and one could never foresee what she would be doing next.

No. 52

EXTRACT *from Minute of conversations between M. Beck and M. von Ribbentrop*

Warsaw, January 25-27, 1939.

THE main theme of conversations between M. Beck and M. von Ribbentrop was the Danzig question. M. Beck categorically rejected M. von Ribbentrop's postulate as to the extra-territoriality of a motor road across Pomorze.

On the Danzig question all that was achieved was a kind of Gentlemen's Agreement between the two Ministers, to the effect that if the League of Nations withdrew from Danzig a Polish-German Declaration would immediately be published, stating that until an understanding between Germany and Poland was reached on Danzig the *status quo* would be maintained there. Moreover, M. von Ribbentrop gave an assurance that there would be no *faits accomplis* in the Free City's territory.

No. 53

COUNT SZEMBEK'S *Minutes of his conversation with M. Beck*

Warsaw, February 1, 1939.

DISCUSSING M. von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw, M. Beck pointed out that the positive result of conversations with the Reich Foreign Minister was the fact that M. von Ribbentrop had understood our attitude towards Russia, and the impossibility of Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact.

During these conversations M. von Ribbentrop raised the question of extra-territoriality for the motor road across Pomorze, and maintained the necessity for finally settling the Danzig question. He underlined his view that the problem should be approached from the "historical viewpoint." In his opinion the solution would lie in the return of the Free City to the Reich in exchange for a general settlement of all outstanding Polish-German questions, and a solemn recognition of our frontiers by Germany.

M. Beck categorically rejected the principle of extra-territoriality for the motor road, for Poland could not allow Germany to possess sovereign rights on any part of Polish territory. But he expressed his willingness to discuss transport facilities across Pomorze. He further told M. von Ribbentrop that we could not make any concessions in regard to Danzig, for we could not part with our tangible rights in exchange for mere assurances. No Polish Government could face Polish public opinion with such a settlement. With reference to M. von Ribbentrop's remark that Germany was painfully affected by the loss of Danzig after the War, M. Beck answered that we also remembered that for hundreds of years Danzig was a part of the Republic of Poland.

M. Beck drew his attention to the impossibility of Poland consenting to the reunion of Danzig with Germany, as the establishment of Germany at the mouth of the Vistula would be equivalent to economic and therefore political control over Polish national life.

When M. von Ribbentrop asked what impression had been made in Poland by M. Beck's conversations with Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden, M. Beck said, the worst possible. He also warned the Reich Foreign Minister against presenting the result of the Warsaw conversations to the Chancellor in too optimistic a light.

Only when talking of the Committee of Three[1] and the eventual withdrawal of the League of Nations from Danzig was a Gentlemen's Agreement reached between the two Ministers, to the effect that in this event a joint declaration by Poland and Germany would be published within 24 hours, declaring that the existing state of affairs at Danzig would remain in being until some other solution was reached.

No. 54

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ *on M. von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw* *January* 28, 1939.

THE visit of the Reich Foreign Minister, M. von Ribbentrop, to Warsaw, on the fifth anniversary of the Polish-German Agreement, to return the visit made by the Polish Foreign Minister, M. Beck, to Berlin, came to an end yesterday. During his stay in the capital of Poland, the Reich Foreign Minister, M. von Ribbentrop, had an opportunity for exhaustive conversations with the leading statesmen of the Polish Republic.

On Thursday afternoon M. von Ribbentrop had an exhaustive conversation with M. Beck on all the problems directly concerning the two neighbouring States. They also discussed the general international situation. The conversations, conducted in an atmosphere of frankness and sincerity, had as their base the policy inaugurated by the Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934. They revealed a unanimity of view that both current and future problems concerning the two States should be studied and solved with due regard to the legitimate interests of both nations.

M. von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw took place in an atmosphere of friendly understanding, and the results of the conversations demonstrate once more that the collaboration between Poland and the Reich, already tested over five years, has not only contributed to progress in Polish-German relations, but also in the new situation has constituted a valuable contribution to the restoration of appeasement in Europe.

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[1]Appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, and composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, and Sweden.

No. 55

TELEGRAM *from M. von Ribbentrop to M. Beck after his visit to Warsaw*

January 27, 1939.

ON leaving the territory of the Polish State I should like to express to Your Excellency my most courteous thanks for the exceptionally cordial hospitality shown to my wife and myself during our stay in Warsaw. I am convinced that the friendly relations between our two countries have been considerably improved by the conversations we have had in Warsaw. The spirit in which, in 1934, Marshal Pilsudski and the Fuehrer achieved a completely new alignment of Polish-German relations, constitutes a guarantee that in the future also there will be continuous progress in peaceful relations together with a deepening of friendly neighbourly relations, serving the interests of both countries.

No. 56

COUNT SZEMBEK'S *Minute of his conversation with M. von Moltke Warsaw, February* 6, 1939.

DISCUSSING the Warsaw conversations, the Ambassador considered that one positive result was that M. von Ribbentrop completely understood why Poland could not join the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Ambassador added that in his opinion Poland's reserved attitude to this question was quite understandable.

For my part, I stated that conversations with M. von Ribbentrop on the Danzig problem had not yielded any really positive results. The Ambassador replied that he was under no illusions whatever as to the difficulties of finding a solution to this problem, but he thought that from the point of view of our general relations, and also from the historical standpoint (*"vom sekulären Standpunkt"*), it would be desirable to achieve a definite solution. I told the Ambassador I entirely agreed with his reasoning, but pointed out that I did not see any real solution acceptable to us. Assuming that Danzig were to be annexed to Germany, I asked him what was his view of its future existence. In my opinion, Danzig, in such a case, would be automatically condemned to play the rôle of some Elbing. The Ambassador answered that he himself fully realized the position, but unfortunately in Berlin too little attention was paid to economic considerations.

We next discussed the Gentlemen's Agreement which the two ministers reached on the Danzig question. The Ambassador remarked that, so far as he knew, the Agreement was to the effect that in the event of the withdrawal of the League of Nations from Danzig, the present state of affairs would be provisionally maintained. I explained the contents of the said Gentlemen's Agreement to the Ambassador

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No. 57

EXTRACT *from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech*
January 30, 1939.

"WE have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion to-day among the true friends of peace as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."

No. 58

AGREEMENT *concluded between Chancellor Hitler and President Hacha*
March 15, 1939.

AT their own request and in the presence of M. von Ribbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister, the Fuehrer has to-day received the President of the Republic, Dr. Hacha, and the Czecho-Slovakian Foreign Minister, Dr. Chwalkowsky. During the meeting the serious situation which has arisen during the last few weeks, in the area which hitherto has constituted Czecho-Slovakian territory, was examined with the utmost frankness.

Both parties agreed in their conviction that the aim of all their efforts must be to assure tranquillity, peace and order in that part of Central Europe. The President of the Czecho-Slovak State declared that, in order to serve that aim and achieve a definite pacification, he with perfect confidence delivered the destiny of the Czech people and country into the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.

The Fuehrer accepted this declaration, and expressed his decision to take the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich. He would guarantee them an autonomous development of their national life, in conformity with its own individual character.

No. 59

GERMAN-SLOVAK *Agreement*
March 23, 1939.

ARTICLE 1

THE German Reich assumes responsibility for the protection of the political independence of the State of Slovakia and the inviolability of its territory.

ARTICLE 2

To carry out the protection thus undertaken by the German Reich the German armed forces shall have the right at any time to set up military establishments and maintain therein garrisons of a strength which the Reich considers indispensable, and in a zone which is bounded on the west by the frontier of the State of Slovakia, and on the east by a line running along the eastern extremity of the Little Carpathians, the eastern extremity of the White Carpathians, and the eastern extremity of the Jawornica Mountains. The Government of Slovakia shall issue instructions that the German armed forces be assigned the areas requisite for such establishments. The Government of Slovakia agrees to make the dispositions indispensable to ensure customs-free commissariat for the German troops, and also to ensure customs-free equipment from the German Reich for the military establishments. In the above-specified zone the German armed forces shall exercise rights of military jurisdiction. Persons possessing German citizenship, who in virtue of private agreement are engaged in constructing military establishments in the above-specified zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 3

THE Government of Slovakia shall organize its own armed forces, in close understanding with the German armed forces.

ARTICLE 4

IN accordance with the accepted principle of protection, the Government of Slovakia shall conduct its foreign policy in close understanding with the German Government.

ARTICLE 5

THE present agreement comes into force immediately on its signature, and is valid for 25 years. Before the expiry of this period the two Governments shall enter into negotiations on the subject of an extension of this agreement.

No. 60

GERMAN-LITHUANIAN *Agreement*

March 22, 1939.

THE Chancellor of the German Reich and the President of the Lithuanian Republic have resolved to regulate by way of an International Agreement the reunion of the Memel Territory with the German Reich, and to clarify problems outstanding between Germany and Lithuania, thus opening the way for friendly relations between the two countries.

To this end they have appointed Plenipotentiaries . . . who have agreed on the following dispositions:

ARTICLE 1. The Memel Territory, severed from the Reich by the Treaty of Versailles, is this day reunited with the German Reich.

ARTICLE 2. The Memel Territory shall be immediately evacuated by the Lithuanian military forces and police. The Lithuanian Government shall take steps to ensure that on the evacuation the area shall be left in good order. Both parties, should the necessity arise, will appoint commissioners who will carry out the transfer of the administration of the Memel Territory not already in the hands of autonomous authorities. The settlement of all questions arising from the change of State sovereignty, in particular economic, financial and administrative problems, and also questions of State citizenship, shall be reserved for a separate Agreement.

ARTICLE 3. In consideration of Lithuania's economic needs a free Zone shall be created for Lithuania in Memel. Details will be determined in accordance with principles laid down in the Appendix hereto attached.

ARTICLE 4. To strengthen their decision to assure the friendly development of relations between Germany and Lithuania, both parties undertake not to use force in their mutual relations, and not to encourage any use of force directed against either of the Contracting Parties by a Third Party.

The present Agreement comes into force from the moment of signature.

No. 61

M. LIPSKI *to M. Beck*

Berlin, March 21, 1939.

I SAW M. von Ribbentrop to-day. He began by saying he had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety.

He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students' demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit. He said the Chancellor was convinced that the poster in Danzig had been the work of Polish students themselves.[1] I reacted vigorously, asserting that this was a clear attempt to influence the Chancellor unfavourably to Poland.

He mentioned the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which had particularly troubled Polish opinion, and stated that this question had been settled in conformity with Poland's wishes. This was to be communicated to you by Ambassador von Moltke. He spoke of the experts' negotiations on the Minority questions, and dwelt on the fact of the failure to reach agreement as to a joint communiqué.

At this point I interrupted him to correct his inaccurate statement.

[1]Some days prior to the date of this conversation a poster had been put up in a café at Danzig, bearing the inscription: "Entry forbidden to Poles and dogs." This had caused protest demonstrations by Polish students.

Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which M. Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavourable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favour of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other. It must not be forgotten that, by defeating Russia in the World War, Germany had been a contributory factor in the emergence of the Polish State. Obviously they could not forget the shedding of Polish blood, which they held in high honour. Subsequently, thanks to Chancellor Hitler's policy, General Schleicher's plan of German-Soviet collaboration had been smashed. That plan, which would have led to the annihilation of the Polish State, was defeated. It must also be remembered that Danzig and Pomorze had belonged to the Second Reich, and that only through Germany's breakdown had Poland obtained these territories.

At this point I remarked that it was not to be forgotten that before the Partitions these territories had belonged to Poland.

M. von Ribbentrop replied that it was difficult to appeal to purely historical conceptions, and he stressed that the ethnic factor was to-day of prime importance.

I remarked that Pomorze certainly was Polish, and alluded to the fact that in regard to the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia the Germans had used historical arguments.

M. von Ribbentrop recalled that after all Danzig was a German city, but he realized that in regard to the Danzig question Poland also was actuated by sentiment.

I corrected him by pointing out that in addition it was a vital necessity to Poland, to which M. von Ribbentrop remarked that that could be settled by way of a guarantee.

Discussing the guarantee which the Chancellor was prepared to give with respect to Poland's frontiers and Pomorze in particular, M. von Ribbentrop stressed the point that no previous German Government had been able to give such a guarantee.

In connection with Danzig, the motor road and the guarantee, M. von Ribbentrop also mentioned the question of Slovakia, indicating that conversations would be possible on this subject. He emphasized that obviously an understanding between us would have to include explicit anti-Soviet tendencies. He affirmed that Germany could never

collaborate with the Soviets, and that a Polish-Soviet understanding would inevitably lead to Bolshevism in Poland.

I stated that no Polish patriot would allow himself to be drawn towards Bolshevism. He said he realized that, but in this respect the Jewish element in Poland was a danger.

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Replying generally to M. von Ribbentrop's arguments, I pointed out that so far as our Press was concerned its tone was now quieter than that of any other country. M. von Ribbentrop retorted that he took no notice of the uproar in the British Press. That agitation was entirely without importance. He believed that the Fuehrer always followed the right policy.

Subsequently, I stressed the fact that since 1934 our public opinion had been put to considerable trials. Nevertheless it remained quiet. I recalled that we had adopted a completely understanding attitude on the question of realization of Germany's equality of rights. We had maintained the same attitude in regard to the Austrian problem. After the settlement of the Sudeten problem, the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had come up, and had clouded the atmosphere between our two countries.

I stated that now, during the settlement of the Czecho-Slovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations.

M. von Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed.

I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. M. von Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.

Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.

M. von Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen M. Urbszys on the latter's return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution.

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In view of the importance of this conversation I am sending this report through Prince Lubomirski.

Arising out of the conversation, I am prompted to make the following remarks:

The fact that M. von Ribbentrop said nothing on his own initiative about Memel suggests that his conversation with me to-day, proposing a fundamental exchange of views between you and the Chancellor, is perhaps aimed at securing our neutrality during the Memel crisis.

M. von Ribbentrop's suggestion of a conversation and his emphasis on its urgency are a proof that Germany has resolved to carry out her Eastern programme quickly, and so desires to have Poland's attitude clearly defined.

In these circumstances the conversation acquires very real importance, and must be carefully considered in all its aspects.

I assume that you will be desiring to summon me to Warsaw in a day or two in regard to this matter.

No. 62

M. Beck's *instructions to M. Lipski*
Warsaw, March 25, 1939.

With reference to the questions addressed to you on the 21st inst. by M. von Ribbentrop, relating to the complex of Polish-German relations, please communicate the following reply:

1. As in the past, so now, the Polish Government attach full importance to the maintenance of good neighbourly relations to the utmost extent with the German Reich.

The Polish Government have given definite proof of this by the fact that in 1933 it adopted a friendly attitude towards the Third Reich, and opened conversations with a view to eliminating difficulties —conversations which led to the Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934.

It will be appropriate, at this moment, to remind the German Reich of the friendly attitude adopted by the Polish Government towards the first National-Socialist Senate of the Free City of Danzig.

During all the five years following, in all its political activity in the international sphere, the Polish Government always refused to take any part in action directed against the interests of the German Reich.

2. In regard to questions on which hitherto agreement has always been achieved, but concerning which the German Reich has recently put forward new proposals, namely, on the question of transit between the Reich and East Prussia, and on the question of regulating the future of the Free City of Danzig, the Polish Government consider that:

(*a*) They have no interest in hindering the German Government's free communication with the Eastern Province of the Reich. For this reason also, despite many changes which have occurred of recent

years, by comparison with the previous state of affairs (for instance, the payment transfers), the Polish Government not only has not placed any difficulties in the way of privileged rail transit, but has arranged the financial side of this transit in accordance with German interests. This being their attitude, the Polish Government is quite willing to study together with the German Government the possibility of further simplification and more facilities in rail and road transit between Germany and East Prussia, so that German citizens shall not encounter unnecessary difficulties while using these communications. To this end, technical experts could set to work to draw up plans which would by degrees render possible an improvement, also from the technical aspect of these communications. All facilities granted on Polish territory could, however, only exist within the limits of Polish sovereignty, and therefore extra-territorial status for ways of communication could not be considered. With this proviso the Polish Government's intentions are in the direction of the most liberal treatment of the German desiderata.

The solution of the problem, however, depends upon the attitude the German Government adopt in regard to my suggestions in the following point.

(*b*) So far as the status of the Free City of Danzig is concerned, the Polish Government recall that they have, for a long time now, made references to the necessity for a settlement of this issue by way of an understanding between Warsaw and Berlin, this because it would correspond to the essence of the problem, and all the more because the League of Nations is losing the possibility of fulfilling the obligations it has undertaken in the matter.

From previous conversations it is clear that there is no difference of opinion as to the basic approach to the problem: i.e., that the Polish Government in no way hinder the free national life of the Free City of Danzig, while the German Government have declared their respect for Polish rights and interests in the spheres of economy, communications, mercantile marine, and the Polish population on the territory of the Free City. As the entire problem is contained within these two points, the Polish Government consider it would be possible to find a solution based on a joint Polish-German guarantee to the Free City of Danzig. Such a guarantee would need to meet the aspirations of the German population on the one hand, and to safeguard Polish interests on the other, which interests for that matter are synonymous with the interests of the population of the Free City, considering that the City's well-being has, for centuries, been based upon Polish maritime trade.

The problem of the motor road is primarily of a technical nature. In the opinion of the Polish Government it should be studied by technical experts. On the question of the Free City of Danzig it would be advisable first to have a discussion of political principles between the Government of the German Reich and the Polish Government so as to ensure that in this organism, in the Chancellor's words employed in February last year, the national conditions of the Free City on the one hand, and the rights and interests of Poland on the other, would be respected. To assure a stabilization of conditions in our part of

Europe, the Polish Government consider it desirable to carry on conversations on all these questions as quickly as possible, so as to find a basis for a lasting consolidation of good neighbourly relations between Poland and Germany.

I request you to add, orally, and with some emphasis, that Marshal Pilsudski explicitly stressed to me that the method of handling the Polish-Danzig problem would be a touchstone of Polish-German relations. I ask you to add that you would be grateful if this opinion were brought to the Chancellor's notice.

You can present your statement, in extenso or recapitulated in the form of a memorandum, to the Reich Foreign Minister. On this occasion please add that if it is a question of my eventual meeting with the Reich Chancellor, I always regard this contact as a factor of immeasurable importance, not only to relations between our countries, but to general European policy. Yet I would add that in the present difficult situation I think it indispensable that such conversations should be prepared for by a previous elucidation of the above-mentioned questions, at least in outline form. For, in the atmosphere existing to-day, personal contacts which yielded no positive results might prove to be a retrogressive step in relations between our States. That my Government would desire to avoid.

Please add at the same time that we must now devote great attention to our mutual relations. For, owing to Germany's latest steps in regard to both Slovakia and Lithuania, of which the Polish Government were not informed even at the last moment, although they concerned territories situated right on the frontiers of the Polish Republic, the general atmosphere demands clarification, and the methods of progress utilized by both Governments must be chosen with particular caution.

No. 63

M. Lipski *to M. Beck*

Berlin, March 26, 1939.

I was received to-day by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. von Ribbentrop. The conversation lasted from 12.30 till 2.

M. von Ribbentrop gave me a distinctly cold reception.

I began by saying that I had been in Warsaw, where I had reported my conversation with him on the 21st inst. In this connection I had received instructions from my Government to communicate our position in the matters raised. I left with M. von Ribbentrop a memorandum conforming with your instructions of March 25.[1]

M. von Ribbentrop stated, with some excitement, that news had been received of our "mobilization measures." Certain movements of troops had also been observed in Pomorze. This had made a very bad impression. He pointed out that whereas on March 21 he had made a certain offer of a wide agreement, we had subsequently taken military measures. It reminded him of similar

[1] No. 62.

risky steps taken by another State (obviously he was thinking of Czechoslovakia). He added that all aggression on our part against Danzig would be an aggression against the Reich.

In reply, I insisted categorically that our measures were quite natural in the conditions prevailing. I added that there was no question of mobilization. I stressed the point that similar measures had been taken some time ago by the Reich Government.

I added that it is obvious that we had no aggressive intentions. I further emphasized that when entering Czechoslovakia the German forces had in the first instance marched towards Morawska Ostrawa along our frontier. Further, I raised the fact that Poland had been taken by surprise in the case of Slovakia, which has a long frontier line with Poland, and I also reminded him of the German troop movements in Slovakia and the fortifications established there by those troops. I said that after our conversation of the 21st inst. the German ultimatum to Lithuania had been a complete surprise to Poland.

I concluded by saying that in these circumstances the protective measures we had taken were quite understandable, the more so as other countries, such as Hungary and Italy, had done the same.

Subsequently the conversation turned to the questions of the motor road and Danzig.

From the statement on transit facilities between Eastern Prussia and the rest of the Reich, M. von Ribbentrop singled out the introductory passage, which declares that there can be no question of extra-territoriality for communication ways.

His thoughts ran along the lines that the, to the German people, painful separation of Eastern Prussia from the Reich must find such an accommodation as would secure the desired psychological effect. Therefore, in his opinion, the question could not be treated purely within the limits of technical communication aspects, but on a broader, political plane. In the German view an extra-territorial motor road would provide a tangible factor. It would be a kind of corridor within the Corridor, though this term was not entirely accurate. Yet in German public opinion it would constitute a German-owned link between East Prussia and the Reich.

M. von Ribbentrop was equally critical of our standpoint on the Danzig question, reverting to his previous statements as to the possibility of guaranteeing us all our interests and rights if the Free City adopted German sovereignty. He laid the greatest of emphasis on such sovereignty. He indicated that the entire conception was visualized by Germany within the framework of a very broad Polish-German *ausgleich* (accommodation) based on the principle that Germany and Poland were mutually dependent, and that Poland was a factor of prime importance in the East. At this stage he mentioned that, for instance, Germany recognized Poland's priority of right in the Ukrainian question, despite the fact that this might not please certain sections of German public opinion. He also mentioned that it might be possible to discuss the Slovak question within the framework of such an *ausgleich*.

In my reply on communications between East Prussia and Germany I tried to convince him that we are prepared to act liberally in regard to all transit facilities. As for Danzig, I adduced a number of arguments. I pointed out, to begin with, that we had not interfered with the life of the German population of the Free City in the days when the League of Nations had had a good deal to say in the matter. So that we had made our concessions in advance. Then I stressed the point that in the Free City there was a German Senate, a German Gauleiter, and complete freedom of development for the German population. So that I could not understand how German feelings could be hurt. I pointed out that in view of the new legal forms which the Reich was finding to-day, it would surely not be difficult to find a mutually acceptable way out along the lines of our proposal.

Nevertheless, M. von Ribbentrop always returned to the question of German sovereignty over Danzig. When he mentioned that the Chancellor was said to have declared that Danzig was of no importance from the military aspect, I said he should look at the map in order to realize our position, adding that the Statute provided for the demilitarization of the Free City. This argument seemed to impress M. von Ribbentrop.

M. von Ribbentrop said that our answer would be communicated to the Chancellor, who at present is in Bavaria, but that he himself would be bound to adopt a critical attitude towards it.

He was afraid the Chancellor might come to the conclusion that it is impossible to reach an understanding with Poland, which he would like to avoid. As from what I said it resulted that a meeting between you and the Chancellor could take place only if the bounds of discussion were clearly established, he said that he did not see any possibility of this at present. Accordingly he was considering what further steps to take. I answered that a valuable thing at the moment would be above all else to reassure public opinion.

As M. von Ribbentrop had complained of our Press I frankly told him a few home truths. I stated, to begin with, that Poland at the present moment was certainly much more tranquil than other States. This resulted from the fact that during 150 years we had fought for our freedom during the insurrections. It also resulted from our love of independence, which gave us internal peace. I could not, however, conceal from M. von Ribbentrop that the latest surprise moves in Slovakia and Lithuania had caused an understandable agitation in our public opinion.

As we were discussing this subject M. von Ribbentrop in a sense raised the question why there was such mistrust in Poland. I replied circumspectly that recent swiftly moving events had changed so many treaties and agreements that public opinion should not be surprised.

At the end of our conversation M. von Ribbentrop tried to obtain an elucidation whether, in the event of public opinion being reassured, any chance existed that the proposals of an extra-territorial motor road and German sovereignty over Danzig could be accepted by the Polish Government in the near future. I returned to my state-

ment that in practice existing transit facilities were equivalent to an extra-territorial motor road, and so far as Danzig was concerned I strongly insisted that he should study the problem once more, for even the Chancellor himself had acknowledged its complicated nature during his conversation with you at Berchtesgaden, when he had said that a real solution needed to be found by the creation of a kind of organism (*Körperschaft*).

No. 64

MINUTE *of Conversation between M. Beck and M. von Moltke*
Warsaw, March 28, 1939.

M. BECK made the following declaration to the German Ambassador:

"In a conversation which has taken place in Berlin between the Polish Ambassador and M. von Ribbentrop, the latter has declared that Polish aggression against the Free City of Danzig would be regarded by the Reich Government as an aggression against Germany itself.

"Without considering the justification for this declaration from the point of view of international law, I must state in the name of my Government that any intervention by the German Government aimed at changing the *status quo* in Danzig will be regarded as an aggression against Poland.

"By way of commentary I add that any similar attempt on the part of the Senate of the Free City would cause an immediate reaction on the part of the Polish Government.

"Nevertheless you have my authority for telling your Government that the Polish Government have no intention of committing any act of violence against the Free City, and are still of the opinion that the fate of that Organism should be settled by way of an agreement between the Polish and German Governments."

The Ambassador: "You want to negotiate at the point of the bayonet!"

M. Beck: "That is your own method."

No. 65

MEMORANDUM *presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Sir Howard Kennard*

March 21, 1939.

RECENT German absorption of Czechoslovakia shows clearly that the German Government are resolved to go beyond their hitherto avowed aim to consolidate the German race. They have now extended their conquest to another nation, and if this should prove subsequently part of a definite policy of domination, there is no State in Europe which is not directly or ultimately threatened.

2. In the circumstances thus created, it seems to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to be desirable to proceed without delay to the organization of mutual support on the part of all those who realize the necessity of protecting international society from further violation of the fundamental laws on which it rests.

3. As a first step they propose that the French, Soviet and Polish Governments should join with His Majesty's Government in signing and publishing a formal declaration, the terms of which they suggest should be on the lines of the following:

> "We, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, hereby declare that inasmuch as peace and security in Europe are matters of common interest and concern, and since European peace and security may be affected by any action which constitutes a threat to the political independence of any European State, our respective Governments hereby undertake immediately to consult together as to what steps should be taken to offer joint resistance to any such action."

4. It appears to His Majesty's Government that such a declaration would in itself be a valuable contribution to the stability of Europe, and they would propose that the publication should be followed by an examination by the signatories of any specific situation which requires it, with a view to determining the nature of any action which might be taken.

5. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared to sign the declaration immediately the three other Governments indicated their readiness to do so.

6. They would propose to say nothing of this to other Governments concerned before the four Powers are agreed on the declaration.

No. 66

M. Beck's *instructions to Count Raczyński*
Warsaw, March 23, 1939.

With reference to the British proposal of March 21,[1] I request you to inquire of Lord Halifax whether, in view of:

1. the unavoidable difficulties and complications, and consequent waste of time, involved in multilateral negotiations,

2. on the other hand the very rapid pace of events, which from one day to the next might create the necessity for friendly understanding to co-ordinate views and actions,

the British Government would not be prepared to consider the possibility of concluding with us immediately a bilateral agreement in the spirit of the proposed declaration.

In my understanding, such an agreement would not prejudge the fate of further general negotiations; nevertheless it would at once give us a basis for useful co-operation in various fields which to-day present certain dangers.

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I have mentioned the idea of such an agreement to the British Ambassador here, adding that we have an alliance with France dating from 1921, and the British, for their part, also have their understandings with the French, so that in the event of our two Governments reaching an agreement, we would not be acting in contradiction either to Polish or to British policy in relation to France. I also assume that the French Government would be confidentially informed of our eventual decisions.

The form and scope of such an arrangement, or possibly "Gentlemen's Agreement," could be quickly defined, if the British Government regarded the principle itself as possible of acceptance.

No. 67

M. Beck's *instructions to M. Lukasiewicz*
Warsaw, March 27, 1939.

Please inform the French Government confidentially, best of all M. Daladier personally, that the Polish Government have raised certain objections to the British proposal for a joint declaration by Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R. and Poland. These objections are induced by a lack of faith that a step of this kind would be adequate. However, the Polish Government do not decline bilateral discussions with the British Government on matters which were to have been the subject of the said declaration.

Furthermore, the Polish Government desire to make known to the French Government that they regard any Polish-British discussion of this kind as running parallel with Polish-French relations, and treat it as a strengthening of the alliance between Poland and France.

No. 68

Minute *of Conversation between M. Beck and Sir Howard Kennard*
March 30, 1939.

Arising out of M. Beck's instruction of March 23, 1939,[1] to Count Raczyński, who gave it effect in an interview with Lord Halifax on March 24, on March 30 Sir Howard Kennard called on M. Beck for a discussion of the British Government's attitude towards the Polish proposals.

During this conversation the Secretary of the British Embassy in Warsaw, Mr. Hankey, called, bringing Sir Howard an instruction from his Government to ask the Polish Government whether they had any objection to a British Government guarantee to meet any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their

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national forces. Mr. Chamberlain would propose to make a declaration on the subject in the House of Commons the next day, March 31.

M. Beck informed Sir Howard that the Polish Government fully accepted the British Government's proposal.

No. 69

STATEMENT *by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons*
March 31, 1939.

"As I said this morning, His Majesty's Government have no official confirmation of the rumours of any projected attack on Poland and they must not, therefore, be taken as accepting them as true.

"I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the general policy of His Majesty's Government. They have constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free negotiation between the parties concerned, of any differences that may arise between them. They consider that this is the natural and proper course where differences exist. In their opinion there should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful means, and they would see no justification for the substitution of force or threats of force for the method of negotiation.

"As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.

"I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government."

No. 70

M. LIPSKI *to M. Beck*
Berlin, April 6, 1939.

I HAD a telephone call to-day from the State Secretary, M. von Weizsäcker, who wanted to see me before the holidays, either to-day or Saturday. I called on him this afternoon. I took advantage of this opportunity to tell M. von Weizsäcker that although I have not yet had any information regarding the course of your conversations in London, nevertheless I could outline the general principles by which we are governed. In accordance with the instructions you had given me on your journey to London I stressed the point that we were not

signing, in London, anything which would conflict in any way with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934. Our relations with England are taking the lines of a bilateral defensive character. We are not joining any blocs, but are negotiating in London directly on the basis of a certain reinsurance.

Indicating that he took cognizance of the fact that we still adhered to the principle of the 1934 Declaration, M. von Weizsäcker pointed out that this Agreement, made between Chancellor Hitler and Marshal Pilsudski, had had as its task the achievement of an ever closer *rapprochement* by the elimination of difficulties between the two countries. The Chancellor had recently made us a certain offer which could not have been made by any other German statesman, and which obviously could not be repeated. We had replied to that offer by taking military measures. Our counter-offer, as M. von Ribbentrop had indicated in his conversation with me on March 26,[1] could not be accepted as a basis for discussion.

In reply to these observations, which, incidentally, are repeated by other officials of the German Foreign Office, I confined myself to the statement that the solution of the Czecho-Slovakian problem had been effected completely behind our back. I pointed out that adoption of a protectorate over Slovakia had made the worst possible impression on our country. With respect to the Chancellor's offer, I reminded him that our attitude had been explicitly defined first and foremost in the conversation between you and M. von Ribbentrop in Warsaw. I pointed out that M. von Ribbentrop had returned to this offer in his conversation with me on March 21. Yet the next day I had learnt of the ultimatum to Lithuania.

M. von Weizsäcker made the correction that it was not an ultimatum. As for military measures, I pointed out that these had first been taken by Germany herself.

The State Secretary retorted that our information must be inexact.

I then emphasized the fact of the entry of German troops into Slovakia, to which he replied that they had halted on the line of the River Waag. I said that even this move transferred German troops right on to our frontier, and that only a few days later German troops had begun to occupy Memel, another area of interest to Poland. In addition, I declared that other States, even Norway and Sweden, had taken military measures.

M. von Weizsäcker returned again and again to our troop concentrations, especially in the North.

At the close he gave quite a general expression to his view that it was difficult to reconcile the Polish-German Declaration of 1934 with our negotiations in London. When I tried to correct this statement by pointing out that we had an Agreement with France also, he said that at least it was not intelligible to the man in the street. So far as the diplomatic side of the problem was concerned, it would depend on their inquiry into our Agreement with London, and he gave me to understand that if certain rumoured details were correct, they would be in contradiction with the 1934 Polish-German Declaration.

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No. 71

Polish-English *Communiqué*

April 6, 1939.

The conversations with M. Beck have covered a wide field and shown that the two Governments are in complete agreement upon certain general principles.

It was agreed that the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Polish Government. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, M. Beck gave His Majesty's Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His Majesty's Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by His Majesty's Government to Poland.

Like the temporary assurance, the permanent agreement would not be directed against any other country, but would be designed to assure Great Britain and Poland of mutual assistance in the event of any threat, direct or indirect, to the independence of either. It was recognized that certain matters, including a more precise definition of the various ways in which the necessity for such assistance might arise, would require further examination before the permanent agreement could be completed.

It was understood that the arrangements above mentioned should not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of peace.

No. 72

President Roosevelt's *Peace Appeal to Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini*

April 15, 1939.

You realize, I am sure, that throughout the world hundreds of millions of human beings are living to-day in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars. The existence of this fear—and the possibility of such a conflict—is of definite concern to the people of the United States, for whom I speak, as it must also be to the peoples of other nations of the entire Western hemisphere. All of them know that any major war, even if it were to be confined to other continents, must bear heavily on them during its continuation and also for generations to come.

Because of the fact that after the acute tension in which the world has been living during the past few weeks there would seem to be at least a momentary relaxation—because no troops are at this moment on the march—this may be an opportune moment for me to send you this message.

On a previous occasion I have addressed you on behalf of the settlement of political, economic, and social problems by peaceful methods and without resort to arms. But the tide of events seems to have reverted to the threat of arms. If such threats continue it seems inevitable that much of the world must become involved in common ruin. All the world, victor nations, vanquished nations, and neutral nations, will suffer. I refuse to believe that the world is of necessity such a prisoner of destiny. On the contrary, it is clear that the leaders of great nations have it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impends.

It is equally clear that in their minds and in their own hearts the peoples themselves desire that fears be ended. It is, however, unfortunately necessary to take cognizance of recent facts. Three nations in Europe and one in Africa have seen their independent existence terminated. A vast territory in another independent nation of the Far East has been occupied by a neighbouring State. Reports which we trust are not true insist that further acts of aggression are contemplated against still other independent nations. Plainly, the world is moving towards the moment when this situation must end in catastrophe unless a more rational way of guiding events is found.

You have repeatedly asserted that you and the German (or Italian) people have no desire for war. If this is true, there need be no war. Nothing has persuaded the peoples of the earth that any governing Power has any right or need to inflict the consequences of war on its own or any other people save in the cause of self-evident home defence. In making this statement, we as Americans speak not from selfishness or fear or weakness. If we speak now, it is with the voice of strength and friendship for mankind.

It is still clear to me that international problems can be solved at the council table. It is, therefore, not necessary to the plea for peaceful discussion for one side to plead that unless they receive assurances beforehand that the verdict will be theirs they will not lay aside their arms. In conference rooms, as in courts, it is necessary that both sides enter upon discussion in good faith, assuming that substantial justice will accrue to both, and it is customary and necessary that they leave their arms outside the room where they confer.

I am convinced that the cause of world peace would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to obtain a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of your Government.

Because the United States, as one of the nations of the Western hemisphere, is not involved in the immediate controversies which have arisen in Europe, I trust that you may be willing to make such a statement of policy to me, as head of a nation far removed from Europe, in order that I, acting only with the responsibility and obligation of a friendly intermediary, may communicate such declaration to other nations now apprehensive as to the course which the policy of your Government may take.

Are you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway,

Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran?

Such an assurance clearly must apply not only to the present day but also to a future sufficiently long to give every opportunity to work by peaceful methods for a more permanent peace.

I therefore suggest that you construe the word "future" to apply to a minimum period of assured non-aggression—ten years at the least—a quarter of a century if we dare look that far ahead.

If such an assurance is given by your Government, I will immediately transmit it to the Governments of the nations I have named, and I will simultaneously inquire whether, as I am reasonably sure, each of the nations enumerated above will, in their turn, give a like assurance for transmission to you.

Reciprocal assurances such as I have outlined will bring to the world an immediate measure of relief. I propose that, if they are given, two essential problems shall promptly be discussed in the resulting peaceful surroundings, and in those discussions the Government of the United States will gladly take part.

The discussions which I have in mind relate to the most effective and immediate manner through which the peoples of the world can obtain progressive relief from the crushing burden of armament which is each day bringing them more closely to the brink of economic disaster.

Simultaneously, the Government of the United States would be prepared to take part in discussions looking towards the most practical manner of opening up avenues of international trade to the end that every nation of the world may be enabled to buy and sell on equal terms in the world's market, as well as to possess assurances of obtaining the materials and products of peaceful economic life.

At the same time those Governments other than the United States which are directly interested could undertake such political discussions as they might consider necessary or desirable.

We recognize the complex world problems which affect all humanity, but we know that study and discussion of these must be held in an atmosphere of peace. Such an atmosphere of peace cannot exist if negotiations are overshadowed by the threat of force or by the fear of war.

I think you will not misunderstand the spirit of frankness in which I send you this message. Heads of great Governments in this hour are literally responsible for the fate of humanity in the coming years. They cannot fail to hear the prayers of their peoples to be protected from the foreseeable chaos of war. History will hold them accountable for the lives and happiness of all—even unto the least.

I hope that your answer will make it possible for humanity to lose fear and regain security for many years to come.

No. 73

COMMUNIQUÉ *issued by the D.N.B. Agency*
Berlin, April 17, 1939.

IN a telegram the American President, Roosevelt, has asked the Fuehrer to define his attitude on certain questions.

The Fuehrer considers this occasion so important that he has decided, in the name of the German nation, to give the President of the United States a reply before the Reichstag.

In consequence, the Fuehrer and Chancellor has summoned the Reichstag for April 28 to hear his statement.

No. 74

M. BECK *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad*
Warsaw, April 20, 1939.

IN connection with a new wave of rumours, the Polish Government have to state that their attitude to the Danzig question is as follows:

(*a*) The Polish Government hold unswervingly to the position that the German population of the Free City of Danzig should be left in complete freedom of development of their internal political life.

(*b*) The Polish Government cannot resign their fundamental rights, or consent that the enjoyment of such rights should be under the control of a third Party.

(*c*) The Polish Government cannot accept any unilateral decisions in regard to the Danzig question.

The German Government are aware of this attitude, and at any moment it may be the subject of negotiation, but there is no sign of any haste on the part of Germany.

No. 75

EXTRACT *from Chancellor Hitler's Speech to the Reichstag*
April 28, 1939.

"THERE is little to be said as regards German-Polish relations. Here, too, the Peace Treaty of Versailles—of course intentionally—inflicted a most severe wound on Germany. The strange way in which the Corridor giving Poland access to the sea was marked out was meant, above all, to prevent for all time the establishment of an understanding between Poland and Germany. This problem is—as I have already stressed—perhaps the most painful of all problems for Germany. Nevertheless, I have never ceased to uphold the view that

the necessity of a free access to the sea for the Polish State cannot be ignored, and that as a general principle, valid for this case, too, nations which Providence has destined or, if you like, condemned to live side by side would be well advised not to make life still harder for each other artificially and unnecessarily. The late Marshal Pilsudski, who was of the same opinion, was therefore prepared to go into the question of clarifying the atmosphere of German-Polish relations, and, finally, to conclude an agreement whereby Germany and Poland expressed their intention of renouncing war altogether as a means of settling the questions which concerned them both. This agreement contained one single exception which was in practice conceded to Poland. It was laid down that the pacts of mutual assistance already entered into by Poland—this applied to the pact with France—should not be affected by the agreement. But it was obvious that this could apply only to the pact of mutual assistance already concluded beforehand, and not to whatever new pacts might be concluded in the future. It is a fact that the German-Polish Agreement resulted in a remarkable lessening of the European tension. Nevertheless, there remained one open question between Germany and Poland, which sooner or later quite naturally had to be solved—the question of the German city of Danzig. Danzig is a German city and wishes to belong to Germany. On the other hand, this city has contracts with Poland, which were admittedly forced upon it by the dictators of the Peace of Versailles. But since, moreover, the League of Nations, formerly the greatest stirrer-up of trouble, is now represented by a High Commissioner—incidentally a man of extraordinary tact—the problem of Danzig must in any case come up for discussion, at the latest with the gradual extinction of this calamitous institution. I regarded the peaceful settlement of this problem as a further contribution to a final loosening of the European tension. For this loosening of the tension is assuredly not to be achieved through the agitations of insane warmongers, but through the removal of the real elements of danger. After the problem of Danzig had already been discussed several times some months ago, I made a concrete offer to the Polish Government. I now make this offer known to you, Gentlemen, and you yourselves will judge whether this offer did not represent the greatest imaginable concession in the interests of European peace. As I have already pointed out, I have always seen the necessity of an access to the sea for this country, and have consequently taken this necessity into consideration. I am no democratic statesman, but a National-Socialist and a realist.

"I considered it, however, necessary to make it clear to the Government in Warsaw that just as they desire access to the sea, so Germany needs access to her province in the east. Now these are all difficult problems. It is not Germany who is responsible for them, however, but rather the jugglers of Versailles, who either in their maliciousness or their thoughtlessness placed 100 powder barrels round about in Europe, all equipped with hardly extinguishable lighted fuses. These problems cannot be solved according to old-fashioned ideas; I think, rather, that we should adopt new methods. Poland's access to the

sea by way of the Corridor, and, on the other hand, a German route through the Corridor have, for example, no kind of military importance whatsoever. Their importance is exclusively psychological and economic. To accord military importance to a traffic route of this kind, would be to show oneself completely ignorant of military affairs. Consequently, I have had the following proposal submitted to the Polish Government:

(1) Danzig returns as a Free State into the framework of the German Reich.

(2) Germany receives a route through the Corridor and a railway line at her own disposal possessing the same extra-territorial status for Germany as the Corridor itself has for Poland.

"In return, Germany is prepared:

(1) To recognize all Polish economic rights in Danzig.

(2) To ensure for Poland a free harbour in Danzig of any size desired which would have completely free access to the sea.

(3) To accept at the same time the present boundaries between Germany and Poland and to regard them as ultimate.

(4) To conclude a twenty-five-year non-aggression treaty with Poland, a treaty therefore which would extend far beyond the duration of my own life.

(5) To guarantee the independence of the Slovak State by Germany, Poland and Hungary jointly—which means in practice the renunciation of any unilateral German hegemony in this territory.

"The Polish Government have rejected my offer and have only declared that they are prepared (1) to negotiate concerning the question of a substitute for the Commissioner of the League of Nations and (2) to consider facilities for the transit traffic through the Corridor.

"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago, believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is in itself very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse this suggestion made this once by me. This—as I have said—was an endeavour on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people by a truly unique compromise, and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the international Press, led as you know to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance, which would also, under certain circumstances, compel

Poland to take military action against Germany in the event of a conflict between Germany and any other Power and in which England, in her turn, would be involved. This obligation is contradictory to the agreement which I made with Marshal Pilsudski some time ago, seeing that in this agreement reference is made exclusively to existing obligations, that is at that time, namely, to the obligations of Poland towards France of which we were aware. To extend these obligations subsequently is contrary to the terms of the German-Polish non-aggression pact. Under these circumstances I should not have entered into this pact at that time, because what sense can non-aggression pacts have if one partner in practice leaves open an enormous number of exceptions.

"There is either collective security, that is collective insecurity and continuous danger of war, or clear agreements which, however, exclude fundamentally any use of arms between the contracting parties. I therefore look upon the agreement which Marshal Pilsudski and I at one time concluded as having been unilaterally infringed by Poland and thereby no longer in existence!

"I have sent a communication to this effect to the Polish Government. However, I can only repeat at this point that my decision does not constitute a modification of my attitude in principle with regard to the problems mentioned above. Should the Polish Government wish to come to fresh contractual arrangements governing its relations with Germany, I can but welcome such an idea, provided, of course, that these arrangements are based on an absolutely clear obligation binding both parties in equal measure. Germany is perfectly willing at any time to undertake such obligations and also to fulfil them."

No. 76

GERMAN *Government Memorandum to the Polish Government*[1]
April 27, 1939.

THE German Government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish Government and the British Government a temporary understanding, to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two States being directly or indirectly threatened.

(2) The German Government consider themselves obliged to communicate the following to the Polish Government:

(3) When in 1933 the National-Socialist Government set about the reshaping of German policy, after Germany's departure from the

[1] This memorandum was handed to Count Szembek by the German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, M. Krummer, on April 28, 1939.

League of Nations, their first object was to stabilize German-Polish relations on a new plane. The Chancellor of the German Reich and the late Marshal Pilsudski concurred in the decision to break with the political methods of the past and to enter, as regards the settlement of all questions affecting both States, on the path of direct understanding between them.

(4) By means of the unconditional renunciation of the use of force, guarantees of peace were instituted in order to assist the two States in the difficult task of solving all political, economic and cultural problems by means of the just and equitable adjustment of mutual interests. These principles, contained in a binding form in the German-Polish Peace Declaration of January 26, 1934, had this aim in view, and by their practical success were intended to introduce an entirely new phase of German-Polish relations. The political history of the last five years shows that they proved efficacious in practice for both nations. As recently as January 26 of this year, on the fifth anniversary of the signature of the Declaration, both sides publicly confirmed this fact, while emphasizing their united will to maintain in the future their adhesion to the principles established in 1934.

(5) The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish Government with the British Government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German Government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy. Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British Agreement is intended as a regular pact of alliance, which by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations is directed exclusively against Germany. From the obligation now accepted by the Polish Government it appears that Poland intends in certain circumstances to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 Declaration.

(6) The contradiction between the German-Polish Declaration and the Polish-British Agreement is, however, even more far-reaching in its importance than that. The 1934 Declaration was to constitute a basis for the regulation of all differences arising between the two countries, independently of international complications and combinations, by means of direct discussion between Berlin and Warsaw, to the exclusion of external influences. Naturally, such a basis must rest on the mutual confidence of both parties and on the political loyalty of the intentions of one party with regard to the other.

(7) The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third Power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. In view of this the German Government are obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct friendly

discussions with the German Government. The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 for the shaping of German-Polish relations.

(8) The Polish Government cannot in this connection appeal to the fact that the 1934 Declaration was not to affect the obligations previously accepted by Poland and Germany in relation to third parties, and that the Treaty of Alliance between Poland and France maintained its value side by side with that Declaration. The Polish-French Alliance already existed in 1934 when Poland and Germany proceeded to reorganize their relations. The German Government were able to accept this fact, since they were entitled to expect that the possible dangers of the Polish-French Alliance, dating from the period of the acutest German-Polish differences, would automatically lose more and more of their significance through the establishment of friendly relations between Germany and Poland. However, the entry of Poland into relations of alliance with Great Britain, which was effected five years after the publication of the Declaration of 1934, can for this reason in no way be compared politically with the still valid Polish-French Alliance. By this new alliance the Polish Government have subordinated themselves to a policy inaugurated from another quarter aiming at the encirclement of Germany.

(9) The German Government for their part have not given the least cause for such a change in Polish policy. Whenever opportunity offered, they have furnished the Polish Government, both publicly and in confidential conversations, with the most binding assurances that the friendly development of German-Polish relations is a fundamental aim of their foreign policy, and that, in their political decisions, they will always respect Poland's proper interests. Thus the action taken by Germany in March of this year with a view to the pacification of Central Europe did not, in the opinion of the Government of the Reich, disturb Polish interests in any way. This action led to the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, which had constantly been described on Poland's side as an important political objective. Moreover, the German Government gave unequivocal expression to their readiness to discuss with the Polish Government in a friendly manner all problems which, in the Polish Government's opinion, might arise out of the changed conditions in Central Europe.

(10) In an equally friendly spirit the German Government tried to regulate yet another question outstanding between Germany and Poland, namely, that of Danzig. The fact that this question required settlement had long been emphasized on the German side, and was not denied on the Polish side. For a long time past the German Government have endeavoured to convince the Polish Government that a solution was certainly possible which would be equitable to the interests of both parties and that the removal of this last obstacle would open a path for a political collaboration of Germany and Poland with the most favourable prospects. In this connection the German Government did not confine themselves to allusions of a general nature, but in March of this year proposed to the Polish

Government in a friendly form a settlement of this question on the following basis:

(11) The return of Danzig to the Reich. An extra-territorial railway line and motor road between East Prussia and the Reich. In exchange, the recognition by the Reich of the whole Polish Corridor and the whole of Poland's western frontier; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact for twenty-five years; the maintenance of Poland's economic interests in Danzig and the settlement of the remaining economic and communications problems arising for Poland out of the union of Danzig with the Reich. At the same time, the German Government expressed their readiness to respect Polish interests in ensuring the independence of Slovakia.

(12) Nobody knowing conditions in Danzig and the Corridor and the problems connected therewith can deny, in judging the matter objectively, that this proposal constitutes the very minimum which must be demanded from the point of view of German interests, which cannot be renounced. The Polish Government, however, gave a reply which, although couched in the form of counter-proposals, showed in its essence an entire lack of comprehension for the German point of view and was equivalent merely to a rejection of the German proposals. The Polish Government proved that they did not consider their reply suitable for the initiation of friendly discussions by proceeding at the same time, in a manner as unexpected as it was drastic, to effect a partial mobilization of the Polish army on a large scale. By these entirely unjustified measures, the Polish Government demonstrated the meaning and object of the negotiations which they immediately afterwards entered upon with the British Government. The German Government do not consider it necessary to reply to the partial Polish mobilization by counter-measures of a military character. They cannot, however, disregard without a word the decisions recently taken by the Polish Government, and are forced, to their own regret to declare as follows:

(1) The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just settlement of the Danzig question, for the final safe-guarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich, and thereby for a permanent strengthening of the friendly neighbourly relations between the two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German proposals made with this object.

(2) At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to another State, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish Declaration of January 26, 1934. Thereby the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this Declaration null and void.

(13) In spite of this necessary statement of fact, the Government of the Reich do not intend to alter their fundamental attitude towards the question of the future of German-Polish relations. Should the

Polish Government attach importance to a new settlement of these relations by means of a treaty, the German Government are ready to do this, but on one condition, namely, that such a settlement would have to consist of a clear obligation binding on both parties.

No. 77

M. Beck's *speech to the Diet*

May 5, 1939.

This session of Parliament provides me with an opportunity of filling in some gaps in my work of recent months. The course of international events might perhaps justify more statements by a Foreign Minister than my single *exposé* in the Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs.

(2) On the other hand, it was precisely that swift development of events that prompted me to postpone a public declaration until such time as the principal problems of our foreign policy had taken on a more definite form.

(3) The consequences of the weakening of collective international institutions and of a complete change in the method of intercourse between nations, which I have reported on several occasions in both Houses, caused many new problems to arise in different parts of the world. That process and its results have in recent months reached the borders of Poland.

(4) A very general definition of these phenomena may be given by saying that relations between individual Powers have taken on a more individual character, with their own specific features. The general rules have been weakened. One nation simply speaks more and more directly to another.

(5) As far as we are concerned, very serious events have taken place. Our contact with some Powers has become easier and firmer, while in some cases serious difficulties have arisen. Looking at things chronologically, I refer, in the first place, to our agreement with the United Kingdom, with Great Britain. After repeated diplomatic contacts, designed to define the scope and objects of our future relations, we reached on the occasion of my visit to London a direct agreement based on the principle of mutual assistance in the event of a direct or indirect threat to the independence of one of our countries. The formula of the agreement is known to you from the declaration of Mr. Neville Chamberlain of April 6, the text of which was drafted by mutual agreement and should be regarded as a pact concluded between the two Governments. I consider it my duty to add that the form and character of the comprehensive conversations held in London give a particular value to the agreement. I should like Polish public opinion to be aware that I found on the part of British statesmen not only a profound knowledge of the general political problems of Europe, but also such an attitude towards our country as permitted me to discuss all vital problems

with frankness and confidence without any reservations or doubts.

(6) It was possible to establish rapidly the principles of Polish-British collaboration, first of all because we made it clear to each other that the intentions of both Governments coincide as regards fundamental European problems; certainly, neither Great Britain nor Poland has any aggressive intentions whatever, but they stand equally firmly in defence of certain basic principles of conduct in international life.

(7) The parallel declarations of French political leaders confirm that it is agreed between Paris and Warsaw that the efficacy of our defence pact not only cannot be adversely affected by changes in the international situation, but, on the contrary, that this agreement should constitute one of the most essential elements in the political structure of Europe. The Polish-British Agreement, however, has been employed by the Chancellor of the German Reich as the pretext for unilaterally declaring non-existent the agreement which the Chancellor of the Reich concluded with us in 1934.

(8) Before passing to the present stage of this matter, allow me to sketch a brief historical outline.

(9) The fact that I had the honour actively to participate in the conclusion and execution of the Polish-German Pact imposes on me the duty of analysing it. The pact of 1934 was a great event in 1934. It was an attempt to improve the course of history as between two great nations, an attempt to escape from the unwholesome atmosphere of daily discord and wider hostile intentions, to rise above the animosity which had accumulated for centuries, and to create deep foundations of mutual respect. An endeavour to oppose evil is always the best form of political activity.

(10) The policy of Poland proved our respect for that principle in the most critical moments of recent times.

(11) From this point of view the breaking off of that pact is not an insignificant matter. However, every treaty is worth as much as the consequences which follow it. And if the policy and conduct of the other party diverges from the principles of the pact, we have no reason for mourning its weakening or dissolution. The Polish-German Pact of 1934 was a treaty of mutual respect and good neighbourly relations, and as such it contributed a positive value to the life of our country, of Germany and of the whole of Europe. But since there has appeared a tendency to interpret it as limiting the freedom of our policy, or as a ground for demanding from us unilateral concessions contrary to our vital interests, it has lost its real character.

(12) Let us now pass to the present situation. The German Reich has taken the mere fact of the Polish-British understanding as a motive for the breaking off of the pact of 1934. Various legal objections were raised on the German side. I will take the liberty of referring jurists to the text of our reply to the German memorandum, which will be handed to-day to the German Government. I will not detain you any longer on the diplomatic form of this event, but one of its aspects has a special significance. The Reich

Government, as appears from the text of the German memorandum, made its decision on the strength of Press reports, without consulting the views of either the British or the Polish Government as to the character of the agreement concluded. It would not have been difficult to do so, for immediately on my return from London I expressed my readiness to receive the German Ambassador, who has hitherto not availed himself of the opportunity.

(13) Why is this circumstance important? Even for the simplest understanding it is clear that neither the character nor the purpose and scope of the agreement influenced this decision, but merely the fact that such an agreement had been concluded. And this in turn is important for an appreciation of the objects of German policy, since if, contrary to previous declarations, the Government of the Reich interpreted the Polish-German Declaration of non-aggression of 1934 as intended to isolate Poland and to prevent the normal friendly collaboration of our country with the Western Powers, we ourselves should always have rejected such an interpretation.

(14) To make a proper estimate of the situation, we should first of all ask the question, what is the real object of all this? Without that question and our reply, we cannot properly appreciate the real import of German statements with regard to matters of concern to Poland. I have already referred to our attitude towards the West. There remains the question of the German proposals as to the future of the Free City of Danzig, the communication of the Reich with East Prussia through our province of Pomorze, and the further subjects raised as of common interest to Poland and Germany.

(15) Let us, therefore, investigate these problems in turn.

(16) As to Danzig, first some general remarks. The Free City of Danzig was not invented by the Treaty of Versailles. It has existed for many centuries as the result—to speak accurately, and rejecting the emotional factor—of the positive interplay of Polish and German interests. The German merchants of Danzig assured the development and prosperity of that city, thanks to the overseas trade of Poland. Not only the development, but the very *raison d'être* of the city was formerly due to the decisive fact of its situation at the mouth of our only great river, and to-day to its position on the main waterway and railway line connecting us with the Baltic. This is a truth which no new formulæ can change. The population of Danzig is to-day predominantly German, but its livelihood and prosperity depend on the economic potentialities of Poland.

(17) What conclusions have we drawn from this fact? We have stood and stand firmly on the ground of the rights and interests of our sea-borne trade and our maritime policy in Danzig. While seeking reasonable and conciliatory solutions, we have purposely not endeavoured to exert any pressure on the free national, ideological and cultural development of the German majority in the Free City.

(18) I shall not prolong this speech by quoting examples. They are sufficiently well known to all who have been in any way concerned with the question. But when, after repeated statements by German statesmen, who had respected our standpoint and expressed

the view that "this provincial town will not be the object of a conflict between Poland and Germany," I hear a demand for the annexation of Danzig to the Reich, when I receive no reply to our proposal of March 26 for a joint guarantee of the existence and rights of the Free City, and subsequently I learn that this has been regarded as a rejection of negotiations—I have to ask myself, what is the real object of all this?

(19) Is it the freedom of the German population of Danzig (which is not threatened), or a matter of prestige, or is it a matter of barring Poland from the Baltic, from which Poland will not allow herself to be barred?

(20) The same considerations apply to communication across our province of Pomorze. I insist on the term "province of Pomorze." The word "corridor" is an artificial invention, for this is an ancient Polish territory with an insignificant percentage of German colonists.

(21) We have given the German Reich all railway facilities, we have allowed its citizens to travel without customs or passport formalities from the Reich to East Prussia. We have suggested the extension of similar facilities to road traffic.

(22) And here again the question arises—what is the real object of it all?

(23) We have no interest in obstructing German citizens in their communication with their eastern province. But we have, on the other hand, no reason whatever to restrict our sovereignty on our own territory.

(24) On the first and second points, i.e., the question of the future of Danzig and of communication across Pomorze, it is still a matter of unilateral concessions which the Government of the Reich appear to be demanding from us. A self-respecting nation does not make unilateral concessions. Where, then, is the reciprocity? It appears somewhat vague in the German proposals. The Chancellor of the Reich mentioned in his speech a triple *condominium* in Slovakia. I am obliged to state that I heard this proposal for the first time in the Chancellor's speech of April 28. In certain previous conversations only allusions were made to the effect that in the event of a general agreement the question of Slovakia could be discussed. We did not attempt to go further with such conversations, since it is not our custom to bargain with the interests of others. Similarly, the proposal for a prolongation of the pact of non-aggression for twenty-five years was not advanced in any concrete form in any of the recent conversations. Here also unofficial hints were made, emanating, it is true, from prominent representatives of the Reich Government. But in such conversations various other hints were made which extended much further than the subjects under discussion. I reserve the right to return to this matter if necessary.

(25) In his speech the Chancellor of the Reich proposes, as a concession on his part, the recognition and definite acceptance of the present frontier between Poland and Germany. I must point out that this would only have been a question of recognizing what is *de jure* and *de facto* our indisputable property. Consequently, this proposal

likewise cannot affect my contention that the German desiderata regarding Danzig and a motor road constitute unilateral demands.

(26) In the light of these explanations, the House will rightly expect from me an answer to the last passage of the German memorandum, which says: "If the Polish Government attach importance to a new settlement of Polish-German relations by means of a treaty, the German Government are prepared to do this." It appears to me that I have already made clear our attitude, but for the sake of order I will make a résumé.

(27) The motive for concluding such an agreement would be the word "peace," which the Chancellor emphasized in his speech.

(28) Peace is certainly the object of the difficult and intensive work of Polish diplomacy. Two conditions are necessary for this word to be of real value: (1) peaceful intentions, (2) peaceful methods of procedure. If the Government of the Reich are really guided by those two pre-conditions in relation to this country, then all conversations, provided, of course, that they respect the principles I have already enumerated, are possible.

(29) If such conversations take place, the Polish Government will, according to their custom, approach the problem objectively, having regard to the experience of recent times, but without withholding their utmost goodwill.

(30) Peace is a valuable and desirable thing. Our generation, which has shed its blood in several wars, surely deserves a period of peace. But peace, like almost everything in this world, has its price, high but definable. We in Poland do not recognize the conception of "peace at any price." There is only one thing in the life of men, nations and States which is without price, and that is honour.

No. 78

POLISH GOVERNMENT *Memorandum to the German Government*
May 5, 1939.

As appears from the text of the Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934,[1] and from the course of the negotiations which preceded its conclusion, this declaration had as its object to lay the foundations for a new framing of mutual relations based on the following two principles:

(*a*) The renunciation of the use of force as between Poland and Germany, and

(*b*) The friendly settlement by means of free negotiations of any contentious questions which might arise in the relations between the two countries.

The Polish Government have always understood in this manner their obligations under the declaration, and it is in this spirit that they have always been prepared to conduct neighbourly relations with the German Reich.

[1] No. 10.

(2) The Polish Government had foreseen for several years that the difficulties encountered by the League of Nations in carrying out its functions at Danzig would create a confused situation which it was in Poland's and Germany's interest to unravel. For several years the Polish Government had given the German Government to understand that frank conversations should be held on this subject. The German Government, however, avoided these and confined themselves to stating that Polish-German relations should not be exposed to difficulties by questions relating to Danzig. Moreover, the German Government more than once gave assurances to the Polish Government regarding the Free City of Danzig. It is sufficient here to quote the declaration made by the Chancellor of the Reich on February 20, 1938.

The Chancellor made publicly in the Reichstag the following declaration regarding Danzig:

> "The Polish State respects the national conditions in this State, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, starting from Danzig, has to-day succeeded in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly co-operation."[1]

It was only after the events of September 1938 that the German Government suggested the opening of Polish-German conversations regarding an alteration in the situation in Danzig and regarding the transit routes between the Reich and East Prussia. In this connection the German memorandum of April 28, 1939, refers to the suggestion put forward by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his conversation of March 21, 1939, with the Polish Ambassador in Berlin.[2] In this conversation emphasis was laid on the German side on the necessity for a rapid settlement of these questions, which was a condition of the Reich maintaining its proposals in force in their entirety. The Polish Government, animated by the desire to maintain good relations with the Reich, although surprised at the pressing form in which these proposals were put forward, and by the circumstances in which they were advanced, did not refuse conversations, although they considered the German demands thus couched to be unacceptable.

In order to facilitate endeavours to reach an amicable solution of the question, the Polish Government on March 26, 1939,[3] formulated their point of view in writing to the German Government, stating that they attached full importance to the maintenance of good neighbourly relations with the German Reich. The Polish point of view was summarized in the following points:—

(*a*) The Polish Government propose a joint guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate character of the Free City of Danzig, the existence of which is to be based on complete freedom of the local population in internal affairs and on the assurance of respect for Polish rights and interests.

[1] No. 37. [2] No. 61. [3] No. 62.

(*b*) The Polish Government are prepared to examine together with the German Government any further facilities for persons in transit as well as the technical facilitating of railway and motor transit between the German Reich and East Prussia. The Polish Government are inspired by the idea of giving every possible facility which will permit the citizens of the Reich to travel in transit across Polish territory, if possible without any hindrances. The Polish Government emphasize that their intention is to secure the most liberal treatment possible of the German desiderata in this respect, with the sole reservation that Poland cannot give up her sovereignty over the belt of territory through which the transit routes would run. Finally, the Polish Government indicate that their attitude in the question of facilitating communications across Pomorze depends on the attitude of the Reich regarding the Free City of Danzig.

In formulating the above proposals the Polish Government acted in the spirit of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934 which, by providing for direct exchange of views on questions of interest to both countries, authorized each State to formulate its point of view in the course of negotiations.

The Polish Government received no formal reply to their counter-proposals for a month, and it was only on April 28, 1939, that they learned from the Chancellor's speech[1] and from the German Government's memorandum[2] that the mere fact of the formulation of counter-proposals instead of the acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without alteration or reservation had been regarded by the Reich as a refusal of discussions.

It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the Declaration of 1934, and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland.

In this connection it should be pointed out that the Polish Government were unable at that time to express an opinion regarding the Polish-German-Hungarian guarantee of the independence of Slovakia which was alluded to in a general way in the German memorandum and more precisely stated in the Chancellor's speech of April 28, 1939, since a proposal of this description and in this form had never been made to them before. It is, moreover, difficult to imagine how such a guarantee could be reconciled with the political and military protectorate of the Reich over Slovakia which had been announced a few days previously and before the German Reich formulated its proposals to Poland.

(3) The Polish Government cannot accept such an interpretation of the Declaration of 1934 as would be equivalent to a renunciation of the right to conclude political agreements with third States and, consequently, almost a renunciation of independence in foreign policy. The policy of the German Reich in recent years has clearly indicated that the German Government have not drawn conclusions of this sort from

[1] No. 75. [2] No. 76.

the Declaration so far as they themselves are concerned. The obligations publicly accepted by the Reich towards Italy and the German-Slovak Agreement of March 1939 are clear indications of such an interpretation by the German Government of the Declaration of 1934. The Polish Government must here recall that in their relations with other States they give and require full reciprocity as being the only possible foundation of normal relations between States.

The Polish Government reject as completely without foundation all accusations regarding the alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Guarantee of April 1939 with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934. This guarantee has a purely defensive character and in no way threatens the German Reich, in the same way as the Polish-French Alliance, whose compatibility with the Declaration of 1934 has been recognized by the German Reich. The Declaration of 1934 in its introductory paragraphs clearly stated that both Governments have "decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928." The Pact of Paris, which constituted a general renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, just as the Declaration of 1934 constituted such a renunciation in bilateral Polish-German relations, contained the explicit reservation that "any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war shall be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty." Germany accepted this principle in signing the Pact of Paris and reaffirmed it in the Declaration of 1934, together with other principles of the Pact of Paris. It appears from this that the Declaration of 1934 would cease to be binding on Poland should Germany have recourse to war in violation of the Pact of Paris. Poland's obligations arising out of the Polish-British understanding would come into operation in the event of German action threatening the independence of Great Britain, and, consequently, in the very circumstances in which the Declaration of 1934 and the Pact of Paris ceased to be binding on Poland as regards Germany.

The German Government in making a complaint against the Polish Government for undertaking obligations to guarantee the independence of Great Britain and in regarding this as a violation by Poland of the Declaration of 1934, ignore their own obligations towards Italy of which the Chancellor spoke on January 30, 1939, and in particular their obligations towards Slovakia contained in the agreement of March 18 and 23, 1939. The German guarantees to Slovakia did not exclude Poland, and, indeed, as appears from the provisions of the above agreement regarding the distribution of garrisons and military fortifications in Western Slovakia, they were directed primarily against Poland.

(4) It appears from the above that the Government of the German Reich had no justification for their unilateral decision to regard the Declaration of 1934 as not binding. The pact was, indeed, concluded for ten years without any possibility of denunciation during that time. It should be pointed out that the decision to regard the 1934 Declaration as not binding was taken after the previous refusal of the German State to accept explanations as to the compatibility of the Anglo-Polish guarantee with the 1934 Declaration, which it was the intention of the

Polish Government to furnish to the representative of the Reich in Warsaw.

(5) Although the Polish Government do not share the view of the German Government that the treaty of 1934 has been violated by Poland, nevertheless, if the German Government attach importance to the fresh regulation, by means of a treaty, of Polish-German relations on a good neighbourly basis, the Polish Government would be prepared to entertain suggestions of this kind with the reservation of their fundamental observations contained above in the present memorandum.

No. 79

MR. NORTON'S *Statement to Count Lubieński*

Warsaw, May 27, 1939.

IN the event of a German *coup d'état* in Danzig, it may be carried out in such a way that Polish counter-measures could possibly be regarded as aggression. In such a case, too precipitate action on the part of Poland will inevitably lead to war. If, however, full military action can be postponed for a little time, Germany may be compelled to adopt a more reasonable attitude under the impression that Great Britain, France and the Soviets are supporting Poland.

For instance, the Danzig Senate may vote for union with the Reich and display force, without actually resorting to violence. In that case Poland could hold up her action in order to give Great Britain time to demonstrate clearly to Germany that in the event of a conflict she would support Poland, and so counteract any unilateral solutions based on force. Such an approach to the question could be accompanied on Great Britain's part by certain preparatory military measures.

Such abstention from direct reaction need not necessarily compromise the military situation, and on the other hand it would allow time to settle the matter in a more reasonable way, and, in the worst case, would strengthen our moral position.

It would be well if Poland could consult with her Allies before taking any irrevocable decisions in doubtful cases.

No. 80

COUNT LUBIEŃSKI'S *Statement to Mr. Norton*

Warsaw, May 30, 1939.

M. BECK expresses his gratitude to Viscount Halifax for the communication which reached him through the intermediary of the British Embassy in Warsaw on May 27.

M. Beck entirely shares Lord Halifax's opinion, that in the event of a *coup de main* at Danzig, all means should be employed in order to prevent the German Government taking irrevocable steps which would lead to an armed conflict.

The Polish Government, for its part, has always given proof of its extreme prudence and great calm, in avoiding being drawn into precipitate decisions, despite reiterated provocation on the part of the Danzig politicians.

The attitude of the Polish Government, during the latest incident at Kalthof on the 20th instant, where an armed crowd commanded by uniformed officials of the National-Socialist Party attacked Polish Customs Inspectors, is further testimony to this.

M. Beck thinks that an exchange of views between the Polish and British Governments in the event of a unilateral attempt to alter the international status of Danzig is necessary, but it is impossible now to foresee all the eventualities which might confront the Polish Government during the development of events in Danzig.

He quite agrees that if the violation of the Free City's status were of such a nature as to allow delay in the application of Polish military measures, without compromising Poland's general military situation, the exercise of joint pressure should be tried.

M. Beck, however, would be grateful if Lord Halifax would be explicit as to the "preparatory military measures" the British Government would contemplate in order to support its *démarche* at Berlin. In M. Beck's opinion such measures should on the one hand not leave Germany in any doubt as to the intention of the United Kingdom to use all its forces in support of Poland in the defence of her vital interests, and, on the other hand, should reassure Polish public opinion and remove all suspicion that the diplomatic intervention of the United Kingdom might lead to the suggestion of a compromise unacceptable to Poland.

In résumé of the foregoing, M. Beck considers that concerted action with the British Government, and, if possible, the French, would be preferable, but he must draw Lord Halifax's attention to the difficulty resulting from the fact that Danzig is situated on a highly exposed sector of the Polish frontier, and that this city, being a railway junction of the utmost importance, to a large extent controls Polish ways of communication with the two ports of Gdynia and Danzig.

M. Beck has also the honour to observe that he doubts whether intervention on the part of the Soviet Government would be favourably accepted by the German Government. Consequently it is possible that such intervention might render the peaceable settlement of an eventual incident very difficult. In any case, M. Beck reserves the right to formulate his opinion on this subject.

No. 81

COUNT LUBIEŃSKI *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad*

Warsaw, August 5, 1939.

ON the evening of August 4, acting on the instructions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I invited the Counsellor to the British Embassy and the French Chargé d'Affaires in turn to call on me, and made the following statement to them:

"Acting on instructions from the Danzig Senate, on August 4 the Danzig Customs Officials on the East Prussian frontier informed the Polish Customs Inspectors that as from August 6 they would not be allowed to exercise their functions of control.

"In answer to this we are without delay addressing a Note to the Danzig Senate, demanding a withdrawal of this order by the evening of August 5. We shall regard any attempt to prevent the Customs Inspectors from carrying out their functions as an act violating our interests in Danzig."

No. 82

TEXT *of the Note addressed by M. Chodacki to M. Greiser*
Danzig, August 4, 1939.

I HAVE learned that the local authorities of the Danzig Customs on duty at the posts situated on the frontier which separates the Free City from East Prussia have addressed to the Polish Customs inspectors a communication which is without precedent in the history of Polish-Danzig relations. This document states that the Danzig executive authorities intend, as from seven a.m. on August 6, to prevent a certain number of Polish Customs inspectors from carrying out their duties of control, which form part of the recognized rights of the Polish Government on the Customs frontier. I am convinced that this infringement of the existing agreements which has been committed by the local authorities is the result of a misunderstanding, or of a false interpretation of instructions given by the Senate of the Free City.

You are, I am sure, aware that the Polish Government could not tolerate that the fundamental rights of Poland should be thus violated.

I await from you, before six p.m. on August 5, 1939, a reply assuring me that you have issued instructions countermanding the steps taken by your subordinates.

As the aforesaid facts have occurred at several frontier posts, I am obliged to inform you that all Polish Customs inspectors have been ordered to carry out their duties, as from August 6, in uniform and armed, and this in all the frontier posts where they may consider this of service in the performance of their duties. Any attempt to interfere with the execution of their duty, any attack or intervention by the police, will be regarded as an act of violence directed against Polish State officials engaged in the discharge of their functions. Should such abuses occur, the Polish Government will immediately initiate reprisals (retaliatory measures) against the Free City, and the responsibility for these would fall entirely on the Senate.

I hope to receive a satisfactory reply by the time stated.

No. 83

M. Beck *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad*

Warsaw, August 5, 1939.

The President of the Danzig Senate to-day replied orally that, for the time being, no regulations rendering it impossible for our Customs Inspectors to work will be applied.

A written answer has been promised for the 6th inst. We have provisionally taken cognizance of this statement, pointing out that in the event of any attacks on our Inspectors, or hindrances to their work, the announcement that we shall react remains in force.

No. 84

Text *of the Note addressed by M. Greiser to M. Chodacki*

Danzig, August 7, 1939.

In answer to your two notes of August 4, one of which was not delivered to me until the 5th, I must express my astonishment that you should take advantage of a completely baseless rumour to send to the Danzig Government, in the name of the Polish Government, an ultimatum demanding a reply at short notice, and that, acting without justification, you should court, at a time of great political unrest, dangers which might lead to incalculable disasters. The order which the Polish Government have abruptly given to all Polish Customs inspectors to carry out their duties in uniform and armed is contrary to all the stipulations of the Treaties in force, and cannot be considered other than a provocation intended to cause incidents and acts of violence of the most serious nature.

In accordance with what I have since stated—and as I informed you immediately by telephone on the afternoon of Saturday August 5—no official body, and in particular no section of the Customs Administration of the Free City of Danzig, has ordered its representatives, from seven a.m. on August 6, to prevent a certain number of Polish Customs inspectors from carrying out their duties. I refer you, moreover, to my note of June 3, 1939, in which I dealt at sufficient length with the question of the relationship between the Polish and the Danzig Customs officers on the frontier.

The Danzig Government protest with the utmost energy against the reprisals with which they are threatened by the Polish Government. They consider such procedure entirely inadmissible, and hold the Polish Government fully responsible for any consequences which may result therefrom.

No. 85

M. von Weizsäcker's *Statement to Prince Lubomirski*
Berlin August 9, 1939.

The Reich Government have learnt, with great surprise, the tenor of the Polish Government's Note to the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, in which Note, in the form of an ultimatum, the Polish Government demanded the cancellation of an alleged measure which existed only in the form of unverified rumours. This measure, which was to hinder the activity of Polish Customs Inspectors, has not in reality been been taken by the Danzig Senate. There had been a threat of reprisals in the event of a refusal of cancellation.

The Government of the Reich feel obliged to draw attention to the fact that a repetition of such demands, in ultimatum form, addressed to the Free City of Danzig, and also threats of reprisals, could only lead to an aggravation of Polish-German relations. The responsibility for the consequences of this must fall entirely on the Polish Government, and the Reich Government are compelled from now on to renounce all responsibility in this matter.

Moreover, the German Government draw the attention of the Polish Government to the fact that the measures taken by that Government in order to prevent the export of certain commodities from Danzig to Poland are liable to cause serious economic loss to the Danzig population.

If the Polish Government persevere in maintaining such measures, the Reich Government are of the opinion that in this state of affairs the Free City of Danzig could not but seek other possibilities of exportation, and therefore also of importation.

No. 86

M. Arciszewski's *Statement to M. von Wühlisch*
Warsaw, August 10, 1939.

It is with the greatest surprise that the Polish Government have taken cognizance of the declaration made on the 9th instant, by the Secretary of State for the German Foreign Office, to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* at Berlin, regarding the existing relations between Poland and the Free City of Danzig. The Polish Government fail to see any legal basis that could be held as justifying any intervention by Germany in the said relations.

If exchanges of views between the Polish and German Governments have taken place regarding the Danzig problem, the only basis for such exchanges has been goodwill on the part of the Polish Government, and they did not derive from any obligations whatever.

In reply to the above-mentioned declaration of the German Government, the Polish Government are obliged to warn the German Government that in future, as hitherto, they will react to any attempt on the

part of the Danzig authorities which would tend to compromise the rights and interests which Poland there possesses in virtue of agreements. In any such reaction the Polish Government will resort to any means and measures which they consider suitable, and will regard any eventual intervention on the part of the German Government to the detriment of these rights and interests as an act of aggression.

No. 87

BROADCAST APPEAL *by His Majesty the King of the Belgians in the name of the Heads of States of the Oslo Group of Powers*

August 23, 1939.

THE declaration which I am about to read is being made in the Palace of Brussels in the presence of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Group of States and in the name of the Heads of those States.

The world is living through a period of tension such that there is a risk that all normal collaboration between States will become impossible. The Great Powers are taking measures almost equivalent to the mobilization of their armed forces. Have not the small Powers reason to fear that they will be victims in a subsequent conflict into which they will be dragged against their will in spite of their policy of indisputable independence and of their firm desire for neutrality? Are they not liable to become the subject of arrangements reached without their having been consulted?

Even if hostilities do not begin, the world is menaced by economic collapse. Mistrust and suspicion reign everywhere. Beneath our very eyes the camps are forming, armies are gathering and a fearful struggle is being prepared in Europe. Is our continent to commit suicide in a terrifying war at the end of which no nation could call itself victor or vanquished, but in which the spiritual and material values created by centuries of civilization would founder?

War psychosis is invading every home, and although conscious of the unimaginable catastrophe which a conflagration would mean for all mankind, public opinion abandons itself more and more to the idea that we are inevitably to be dragged into it. It is important to react against so fatal a spirit of resignation.

There is no people—we assert it with confidence—which would wish to send its children to death in order to take away from other nations that right to existence which it claims for itself.

It is true that all States do not have the same interests, but are there any interests which cannot be infinitely better reconciled before than after a war?

The consciousness of the world must be awakened. The worst can still be avoided, but time is short. The sequence of events may soon render all direct contact still more difficult.

Let there be no mistake. We know that the right to live must rest on a solid basis, and the peace that we desire is the peace in which the

rights of all nations shall be respected. A lasting peace cannot be founded on force, but only on a moral order.

Does not wisdom order us to withstand the war of words, incitements and threats, and agree to discuss the problems before us? We herewith solemnly express the wish that the men who are responsible for the course of events should agree to submit their disputes and their claims to open negotiation carried out in a spirit of brotherly co-operation.

It is for this reason that in the name of His Majesty the King of Denmark, the President of the Republic of Finland, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, His Majesty the King of Norway, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, His Majesty the King of Sweden, and in my own name, each of us, acting in agreement with our respective Governments, issues this appeal. We express the hope that other Heads of States will join their voices to ours in this same anxiety to maintain peace and safety for their peoples.

To-morrow hundreds of millions of men will be at one with us in their wish to stop the course of events leading to war. We can only hope that those in whose hands rests the fate of the world will respond to these sentiments, give effect to the desire which they have so often expressed that the disputes which separate them shall be settled in peace, and thereby avoid the catastrophe which threatens humanity.

No. 88

REPLY *of the President of the Polish Republic, M. Ignace Mościcki, to the Appeal of his Majesty the King of the Belgians*

August 25, 1939.

I HAVE noted the noble speech of Your Majesty with profound admiration for the ideas which you have expressed. Poland has always defended the idea that power, if it is to last, cannot be based on the oppression of the weak. Similarly, Poland has always considered the best guarantee of peace to be the settlement of international disputes by the method of direct negotiations based on justice and respect for the rights and interests of those concerned.

No. 89

APPEAL *addressed by the President of the United States of America, Mr. Roosevelt, to the President of the Republic of Poland, M. Mościcki*

August 24, 1939.

THE manifest gravity of the existing crisis imposes the urgent obligation upon all to examine every possible means which might prevent the outbreak of a general war. With this in mind I feel justified in suggesting that certain possible avenues of solution be considered.

The controversy between the Polish and German Governments would be the subject of direct discussion between the two Governments. If that were impossible or unachievable, a second method would be to submit these questions to arbitration.

The third method would be conciliation through the intermediary of a third disinterested party, in which case it would seem legitimate for the parties to accept the services of one of the traditionally neutral states, or that of a disinterested Republic of the American Continent, far removed from the scene and the object of the actual crisis.

Should you determine to attempt a solution by any of these methods you are assured of the earnest and complete sympathy of the United States and of their people. During exploration of the avenues I appeal to you, as I have likewise appealed to the Government of the German Reich, to agree to refrain from any positive act of hostility.

It is, I think, well known to you that, speaking on behalf of the United States, I have exerted, and will continue to exert, every influence on behalf of peace. The rank and file of the population of every nation—large and small—want peace. They do not seek military conquest. They recognize that disputes, claims and counter-claims will always arise from time to time between nations, but that all such controversies, without exception, can be solved by a peaceful procedure, if the will on both sides exists so to do.

I am addressing a communication in the same sense to the Chancellor of the German Reich.

No. 90

REPLY *of the President of the Republic of Poland, M. Mościcki, to the Appeal of the President of the United States of America, Mr. Roosevelt August* 25, 1939.

I APPRECIATE the noble message which your Excellency has been kind enough to send me. I should like to emphasize that the Polish Government have ever considered direct talks between Governments to be the most suitable method of resolving difficulties which may arise between States. We consider that this method is all the more suitable where neighbouring States are concerned. On the basis of these principles Poland concluded Non-Aggression Pacts with Germany and the U.S.S.R. We consider also that the method of conciliation through the intermediary of a disinterested and impartial third party is a just method of resolving differences which have been created between nations.

Although I clearly wish to avoid even the appearance of desiring to profit by this occasion to raise points of litigation, I deem it my duty, nevertheless, to make it clear that in the present crisis it is not Poland which is formulating demands and demanding concessions of any other State. It is, therefore, perfectly natural that Poland should hold aloof from any action of this kind, direct or indirect. I would like to close by expressing my ardent wish that your message of peace may con-

tribute to the general appeasement which is so necessary to enable the nations once more to regain the blessed path of progress and civilization.

No. 91

ANGLO-POLISH *Agreement of Mutual Assistance*
London, August 25, 1939.

THE Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Polish Government,

Desiring to place on a permanent basis the collaboration between their respective countries resulting from the assurances of mutual assistance of a defensive character which they have already exchanged;

Have resolved to conclude an Agreement for that purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Halifax, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Polish Government:

His Excellency Count Edward Raczyński, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Polish Republic in London;

Who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:—

ARTICLE 1

SHOULD one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.

ARTICLE 2

(1) THE provisions of Article 1 will also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.

(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article 1 will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other European State concerned.

ARTICLE 3

SHOULD a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration or in any other way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts. Should the European Power concerned thereupon embark on hostilities against one of the Contracting Parties, the provisions of Article 1 will apply.

ARTICLE 4

THE methods of applying the undertakings of mutual assistance provided for by the present Agreement are established between the competent naval, military and air authorities of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 5

WITHOUT prejudice to the foregoing undertakings of the Contracting Parties to give each other mutual support and assistance immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, they will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any development which might threaten their independence and, in particular, concerning any development which threatened to call the said undertakings into operation.

ARTICLE 6

(1) THE Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may in future give to other States.

(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the other Contracting Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be informed thereof.

(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned.

ARTICLE 7

SHOULD the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 8

(1) THE present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years.

(2) Unless denounced six months before the expiry of this period it shall continue in force, each Contracting Party having thereafter the right to denounce it at any time by giving six months' notice to that effect.

(3) The present Agreement shall come into force on signature.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in English in duplicate, at London, the 25th August, 1939. A Polish text shall subsequently be agreed upon between the Contracting Parties and both texts will then be authentic.

(L.S.) HALIFAX.

(L.S.) EDWARD RACZYŃSKI.

No. 92

MINUTE *of Count Szembek's conversation with M. Noël*
Warsaw, August 26, 1939.

THE French Ambassador told me that in Chancellor Hitler's conversation with Sir Nevile Henderson, the Chancellor declared that he could no longer tolerate the mosaic of nationalities which exists on Germany's eastern frontier. In reply to this Sir Nevile suggested an exchange of populations. The Chancellor made no answer to this suggestion.

M. Noël was instructed by the French Government to urge on us very strongly the idea of such an exchange of populations. The French Government was very anxious that the Polish Government should not take a negative attitude to this plan, which obviously must be based on maintenance of the present territorial *status quo*.

After referring the question to M. Beck I asked the French Ambassador to call again in the afternoon, and made the following statement:

"The suggested exchange of populations was of interest to us. The Polish Government did not reject the idea in advance, but could not take the initiative with the German Government, as it did not seem tactically advisable. If, however, a third party, friendly to Poland, could sound the German Government on the matter, our attitude would certainly not be a negative one. The Polish Ambassador in Berlin would receive instructions not to avoid conversations on the subject of an exchange of populations, and even, eventually—so far as he had appropriate channels through which to do so—to propagate the idea.[1]

The French ambassador took cognizance of my declaration with obvious pleasure. He then discussed with me the question as to who, in Berlin, should take up the initiative. He told me that he would suggest to the Quai d'Orsay that M. Coulondre should get into touch with M. Lipski on this matter.

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[1]Ambassador Lipski received the relevant instruction by telegram on August 26, 1939.

No. 93

MEMORANDUM *on the situation of the Polish Minority in Germany, from the Polish Embassy in Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
August 26, 1939.

THE German Press is carrying on a systematic and violent Press campaign, in which the situation of the German minority in Poland is being discussed tendentiously and in a manner entirely out of accord with the facts. This campaign bears a remarkable resemblance to that waged last year against Czechoslovakia, except that the present propaganda is being carried on with far greater intensity than on that occasion.

Simultaneously there has been a co-ordination of action in relation to the Polish population from the highest authorities down to local elements of the Government, administration, the party and the Gestapo, and the policy of extermination of the Polish population is going to extreme lengths of persecution.

Of the many facts which are coming to light in this sphere of German policy, one outstanding factor is particularly disquieting. Hitherto, although Germany has conducted a systematic political agitation among the German minority in Poland, simultaneously exerting strong pressure in the direction of exterminatory action in regard to the Polish minority in Germany, none the less she has tried to retain possibilities of hostage, exchange and negotiation on these matters. But to-day the German Government's conduct is not veiled by even the flimsiest of pretexts, and this clearly indicates that the German authorities do not now count on any negotiations in future.

In order to understand the German methods now being ruthlessly applied to the Polish population, it must be remembered that they arise out of the National-Socialist spirit, philosophy and legislation.

In the National-Socialist system there is fundamentally no place for any group outside the German nation, far less for those non-German elements who for centuries have been linked with their own soil. Though down to recent months the existence of the Polish minority has been tolerated in Germany, the reason for this was the desire to maintain a hostage against the German minority in Poland. The ruthless extermination of the Lusations, a people without a mother State, is the best confirmation of the real aims of National-Socialism.

The totalitarian National-Socialist State is organically bound up with the conception of a racially and politically homogeneous German nation. The good of the German nation is the sole and supreme criterion of all the legal foundations of the Third Reich recognized by the ideology of National-Socialism. In place, therefore, of State law, the Third Reich recognizes only the law of the single German nation.

The Reich legal prescriptions issued from this aspect constitute an unprecedented instrument of oppression, the point of which is now directed without the least restraint or hesitation against the Polish minority.

To illustrate this state of affairs, several typical examples of National-Socialist laws and their application in practice are listed below:

1. The entire State legislation recognizes that only members of the National-Socialist Party are entitled to full rights of citizenship. Poles cannot become members of the Party, to which only Germans are admitted. Even if they were admitted in isolated cases, it would mean their complete renunciation of Polish nationality. It clearly follows that Poles do not enjoy full rights of citizenship.

2. The law relating to hereditary estates (*Reichserbhofgesetz*) recognizes the German State as the sole owner of the land. Farms can be leased only to German tenants or, to use the National-Socialist terminology, to "persons of German blood." The Courts, known as "Heritage Courts," set up under this law can dispossess any landowner of his property if, for instance, he does not conform to the "standards of honour of German peasants," a conception which has never been more precisely defined. How serious a weapon this is against the Polish minority is shown by the fact that during the last few months large numbers of Poles have been refused renewal of their leases, or have been dispossessed of their farms by judgments of the Heritage Courts.

3. The law relating to the "Labour Front" (*Arbeitsfront*) introduced a single, compulsory Union organization for employers and employees. A non-member of the Front cannot obtain work, but at the same time this organization has declared that membership is proof of German nationality.

4. The Press Law (*Schriftleitergesetz*) makes the Press completely subservient to the State authorities. It exacts complete respect for the interests not only of the State but also of the German nation as a whole, and so of a German minority abroad. It provides for the possibility of deprivation of editorial rights, which in practice connotes the suppression of the paper or journal to which it is applied.

5. The National-Socialist Youth Organizations (*Hitlerjugend* and *Bund Deutscher Madeln*) are definitely national German bodies. A mass campaign to enrol Polish youth into these organizations is now observable, and it has to be emphasized that all possibilities of professional education are denied to those who do not belong to these organizations.

6. The German Government have introduced special bonuses (*Kinderreichenbeihilfe*) for families with numerous children, in order to encourage the growth of the population. In districts inhabited by Poles, who, as is well known, have a very high birth rate, this measure is applied exclusively as a means of Germanization. No Pole who does not renounce Polish nationality can obtain assistance from this source.

7. The State Secret Police (Gestapo) play a special part in the extermination process, and wield a special weapon in the form of the Law for Protective Arrest (*Schutzhaftgesetz*). According to the provisions of this law, any person can be kept under arrest or in a concentration camp for an indefinite period, for no reason whatever and without right of appeal to a Court. The Gestapo may order eviction or forbid all removal from any specified locality.

Great numbers of Poles (the known cases are undoubtedly only a

fraction of the total) are known to be in the custody of the Gestapo, who under heavy penalties forbid all mention of imprisonment, while taking no steps to inform victims' families that they have been arrested.

The foregoing examples are mentioned in order to reveal the ruthless extermination to which Germany is subjecting the Polish minority. They are only a few of the innumerable laws and administrative acts which could be cited, but the census held in Germany in May 1939 must not be overlooked. The preparatory steps for taking the census were of such a nature that they proved a decided intention to apply strictly discriminatory treatment to the Polish minority in Germany. Specimen sheets explaining how the census forms were to be filled in were distributed in advance. They contained exact indications as to the way the question on nationality was to be filled in without using the word "Polish."

The nature of the National-Socialist laws, which almost entirely exclude the possibility of free national development to the Polish population in Germany, as also the anti-Polish tendency of the preparatory measures for the population census, constituted the two main questions to which the Polish delegates drew attention during the Polish-German conversations which were carried on at Berlin from February 27 to March 6, 1939. These conversations, conducted by delegates of the administrative authorities of the two countries, concerned the position of the Polish minority in Germany and of the German minority in Poland. The decided refusal of the German delegates to allow any of the Polish desiderata contributed largely to the failure of the negotiations, and in consequence, further aggravated the situation of the Polish population in Germany.

On the other hand, to give a true picture, it must be mentioned that Germany herself has never questioned the loyalty of the Polish minority towards the German State, as the German Home Secretary, Dr. Frick, himself recently confirmed.

The fact that since April last there are known to have been more than one thousand separate cases of acts of violence against Poles proves the dimensions of the campaign being waged against them. These are all cases known from the Polish Press in Germany, which is censored by the German authorities, and so cannot risk reporting every incident.

The attitude of the German authorities towards the Polish minority in Germany has so far taken the form rather of a very intensive individual terror. But the activities of the last few days, by their mass character, have involved very different features, and force one to very grave conclusions. What we are now witnessing is the German authorities' wholesale closing down of Polish associations, the confiscation and removal of their records, attacks on and the closing down of Polish schools, the prohibition of meetings, and even singing lessons. Among these acts of violence the mass expropriation of Polish farmers and the everyday deportation of large numbers of persons of Polish race from the frontier regions into the interior of Germany are particularly noteworthy.

The extreme seriousness of the position is shown best of all by the

news that all the students, teachers and staff of the Polish High School at Kwidzyn (Marianwerder) have been deported to an unknown destination by the Gestapo.

No. 94

POLISH *Official Communiqué*

Warsaw, August 28, 1939.

FOR some time the German Press has been conducting a campaign of calumnies, accusing Poland of maltreating German minorities and adducing evidence not only erroneous but entirely invented. So long as this campaign was limited to a campaign of propaganda, even though by a Press entirely subordinated to its Government, the Polish side was content to issue denials or to give information to all who required it for honest purposes.

However, for some days past these pure inventions and false reports have found their way into the statements of high governing circles in Germany, who are manifestly and tendentiously misinformed.

It appears that the German Government desire to use them as a weapon in the diplomatic game. With this fact in mind, the Polish Government are obliged solemnly to protest against methods having as their object the misleading of international public opinion, and foreign governments. Without entering for the moment into details, it is worth mentioning such false accusations as that of the assassination of 24 Germans near Lodz, and of 8 Germans near Bielsko, the cases of castration executed by decisions of courts, the concentration camp for the German minority, etc.

Such information must be branded as pure invention. Not one of the so-called facts mentioned above corresponds with the truth.

No. 95

TELEGRAM FROM VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO SIR HOWARD KENNARD.

This telegram was communicated by Sir Howard to M. Beck on August 28

August 28, 1939.

OUR proposed reply to M. Hitler draws a clear distinction between the method of reaching agreement on German-Polish differences and the nature of the solution to be arrived at. As to the method, we wish to express our clear view that direct discussion on equal terms between the parties is the proper means.

(2) Polish Government enjoy protection of Anglo-Polish Treaty.

(3) His Majesty's Government have already made it plain and are repeating in their reply to M. Hitler to-day that any settlement of

German-Polish differences must safeguard Poland's essential interests and must be secured by international guarantee.

(4) We have, of course, seen reports of M. Hitler's reply to M. Daladier, but we should not consider intimation by Polish Government of their readiness to hold direct discussions as in any way implying acceptance of M. Hitler's demands, which would, as made plain above, have to be examined in light of principles we have stated.

(5) As Polish Government appear in their reply to President Roosevelt to accept idea of direct negotiations, His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that in the light of the considerations set forth in foregoing paragraphs Polish Government will authorize them to inform German Government that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussion with Germany.

(6) Please endeavour to see M. Beck at once and telephone reply.

No. 96

M. Beck *to Count Raczyński and M. Lukasiewicz*
Warsaw, August 28, 1939.

The British ambassador has consulted me on the question of an answer to M. Hitler. I agreed to inform the German Government that Poland was ready to negotiate, and asked him to define what the British Government understood by the conception "international guarantee."

Please treat the entire question of the consultation as strictly confidential.

No. 97

Communiqué *issued by the Polish Telegraphic Agency*
Warsaw, August 29, 1939.

On the 28th inst. the Slovak wireless, after the arrival of German troops in the territory of Slovakia, "in accordance with the German-Slovak agreement on protection," announced that danger was threatened from Poland, and called upon the Slovak population to treat the German troops as good friends and to collaborate with them in the struggle against the common enemy.

The moment selected by Slovakia for declaring Poland an enemy of that country speaks for itself, and proves that under the pressure of a foreign country the Slovak Government are no longer master of the situation in their own country.

Poland has no unfriendly intentions whatever against the Slovak nation or State, for which the Polish nation retains the most friendly feelings, and she must warn the Slovak people against this deliberate attempt to lead them into error. Yesterday the Polish Government made a strong protest to the Slovak minister in Warsaw and through their chargé d'affaires at Bratislava against the above-mentioned proclamation and the hostile action directed against Poland.

No. 98

MINUTE *of Count Szembek's conversation with Sir Howard Kennard and M. Noël*

Warsaw, August 29, 1939. 4 *p.m.*

ON M. Beck's instruction I saw the British and French Ambassadors together, and made the following statement:

In face of the German troop concentrations on our frontier, their entry into Slovakia, the incessant frontier incidents, and the aggressive moves within the territory of Danzig, there is no doubt of the Third Reich's aggressive intentions in regard to Poland. In these circumstances, and taking into account the warnings received from most reliable sources, including that of the British Ambassador yesterday, that Germany intends to make a surprise attack on Poland, the President of the Republic, on the Government's advice, has decreed a general mobilization. This step, however, only completes the military measures already taken. It is not anticipated that there will be proclamation of a state of war, and measures concomitant with normal mobilization will be reduced to a minimum. Polish policy will undergo no change.

The British Ambassador observed that the word "mobilization" would create the impression all over the world that we were embarking on war. At the present moment British-German conversations were still in progress, London was awaiting Berlin's answer. It would be highly desirable for the public announcement of mobilization to be delayed until this answer was received. The French Ambassador supported his British colleague's attitude, adding, however, that he had no objections whatever to make to the actual fact of mobilization.

Both Ambassadors asked whether an official communiqué would be issued on the question of mobilization. I acquainted them with the relevant text.[1]

I told the Ambassadors that I would inform M. Beck of their attitude, and I asked them whether they wished to take down my statement in writing. They said this was not necessary. The most important thing was the actual fact of mobilization, of which they would inform their Governments. They only asked that M. Beck should be informed of their point of view as quickly as possible.[2]

No. 99

POLISH *Official Communiqué*

Warsaw, August 30, 1939.

FOR several months past Germany has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards Poland. The Press campaign, threatening statements by leading German statesmen, systematic provocation by means of

[1] No. 99.

[2] In consequence of the observations made by the British and French Ambassadors to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Polish Government decided to postpone the public announcement of mobilization for several hours.

frontier incidents, and the ever-increasing concentration of German mobilized military forces on the frontiers of Poland, are a manifest proof of this.

The recent activity within the territory of the Free City of Danzig directed against the irrefutable rights and interests of Poland, and also Germany's manifest territorial designs upon the Polish State, leave no doubt of the fact that Poland is threatened.

All attempts at conciliation, either by highly placed personages making efforts to maintain the peace, or by the Governments of Poland's Allies, who are animated by the same spirit, have always received the full approval of the Polish Government, but so far have met with no response from the Government of Germany.

Taking these facts into consideration, and above all that of the entry of German troops into a neighbouring State, that of Slovakia, the Polish Government, having taken certain internal measures, are to-day obliged to add to their security by taking the defensive military measures demanded by the situation.

The policy of the Polish Government, which neither has been nor is animated by any aggressive designs against any State whatsoever, remains unchanged. The desire for loyal collaboration with all States, a desire which lately found expression in the reply made by the President of the Polish Republic to the President of the United States, is the best testimony to the tendencies of Polish policy.

No. 100

M. Babiński *to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
The Hague, August 29, 1939.

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call on him last night, and made the following statement:

The Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians wish to make a last attempt to save the peace. Animated by this desire, they jointly put their good offices at the disposition of the States in conflict, if those States regard this as of service.

The Minister especially emphasized that the Royal initiative derived solely from altruistic motives and was far from being an attempt at interference. For this reason the Queen asked that the utmost discretion should be observed, as she wished to avoid giving the impression of seeking publicity or applause.

No. 101

M. Mościcki *to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
Brussels, August 29, 1939.

At 11 p.m.[1] the Premier asked me to call on him, and declared, in the name of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands, that they offered their good offices to Poland, Great Britain,

[1] Of August 28.

France, Italy and Germany in order to facilitate a peaceful solution of the present conflict.

The Premier made the same proposal to the representatives of the countries above mentioned. A similar *démarche* was to be made by the Foreign Minister for the Netherlands.

No. 102

M. Beck *to M. Babiński*

Warsaw, August 29, 1939.

Please convey to the Belgian Government the Polish Government's deep appreciation of the noble motives which inspire the King of the Belgians and his Government. In his reply to the appeal of the President of the United States of America, the President of the Polish Republic adopted a positive attitude in regard to conciliation, and his attitude remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the absence of any response on the part of Germany makes it impossible for us to give a more detailed answer.[1]

No. 103

M. Beck *to M. Babiński*

Warsaw, August 29, 1939.

Please convey to the Netherlands Government the Polish Government's deep appreciation of the noble motives which inspire the Queen of the Netherlands and her Government. In his reply to the appeal of the President of the United States of America, the President of the Polish Republic adopted a positive attitude in regard to conciliation, and his attitude remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the absence of any response on the part of Germany makes it impossible for us to give a more detailed answer.

No. 104

M. Babiński *to M. Beck*

The Hague. August 30, 1939.

I have given effect to your instruction.[2] The Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked me to express his satisfaction to the Polish Government. He said he had expected such an answer. He emphasized that the peace initiative aimed only at creating the most general possibilities and reducing the tension. He had not at all expected any definite proposals.

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[1]The contents of the above telegram were communicated by M. Mościcki to Prime Minister M. Pierlot on August 30, 1939, at 12.30 p.m.

[2]**No. 103.**

No. 105

STATEMENT *made by Count Lubieński to Mr. Norton*
Warsaw, August 30, 1939. 7 *p.m.*

1. The British Government may rest absolutely assured that the Polish Government have no intention of provoking any incidents. On the other hand, they point out that German provocation at Danzig is becoming more and more intolerable.

2. The Polish Government feel sure that the British Government will not express any definite views on problems concerning Poland without consulting Polish Government.

No. 106

M. ZAWADOWSKI *to M. Beck*
Danzig, August 28, 1939.

COMPLEMENTARY to the reports of the Polish Commissioner General concerning the situation in the Free City of Danzig, I present the following compilation of facts and observations covering the last period.

1. *The Situation in the Port of Danzig*

The daily increasing incidents in Danzig render it impossible to put into effect the rights to which Poland is entitled in the port. The situation that has been created makes it impossible for Poland to utilize the port of Danzig for Polish commerce and shipping.

(*a*) Since approximately the middle of the month the Danzig authorities have been sequestering the warehouses of Polish commercial firms engaged in the export of Polish commodities via Danzig. This is seriously injuring Polish interests, for it affects the export of such articles as grain, coal, mineral oil, and timber. The directors of the largest firms, such as the "Central Association of Agriculturists," "Polmin," "Paged," and so on, have informed the Commissioner General's office of the fruitlessness of their steps and efforts to get their warehouses freed from sequestration. Interventions on the part of the Commissioner General's office, made in agreement with the Ministry, are equally without effect.

Goods imported to Poland are also affected by the sequestration and prohibition of exports from Danzig territory. This primarily affects imports of colonial produce. It is a characteristic fact that a transport of Swedish iron ore which had arrived at the Port of Danzig was released from sequestration on presentation of proof that it was assigned to one of the foundries in the "Protectorate" (Witkowice), whereas ore destined for Polish foundries was sequestrated.

(*b*) The Danzig administrative authorities, both customs and police, are encroaching upon the functions of the Harbour Board.

Under various pretexts, frequently even without pretext, they prescribe the movement of commercial vessels entering the port, issue instructions prohibiting sailings, change mooring positions, and so on. Such incidents occurred most of all during the period in which the German battleship *Schleswig-Holstein* was expected to "visit" the port. Thus, during this period there were such incidents as the Danzig authorities' suspension of the activities of the port police, although they are under the Harbour Board. Moreover, the Polish members of the police were dismissed and all pilots of Polish nationality were arrested, including the commodore of the pilots, M. Ziolkowski, who has held this position for many years.

(*c*) The Harbour and Waterways Board in Danzig is struggling under the greatest of difficulties to retain some control over the port administration. But during this period it has been deprived of almost all possibility of carrying out its functions, as the Danzig authorities are illegally calling up its workers to undertake other work, agricultural, for instance, as well as a large number of its employees for service of a military nature. At the same time officials of Polish nationality are being attacked and arrested under all kinds of pretexts.

2. *The Situation on the Polish railways*

The maintenance of railway traffic is faced with insuperable difficulties, for the Danzig police are systematically arresting employees on the Polish railways and are conniving at attacks upon them by elements of the Hitler Party. During the past few days especially cases of beating-up and arresting Polish railwaymen, chiefly among the higher traffic staff, have been increasing. The difficulties have now been added to by the refusal of railwaymen of German nationality to travel beyond Danzig territory; also, railwaymen of this category are increasingly failing to turn up to work at all, on the pretext that they feel ill. As I have been informed, the Danzig railwaymen of German nationality do this in consequence of instructions issued to them by the National-Socialist Party. These instructions evidently have as their object the disorganization of our railway service. The mobilization of special Polish railway crews, who have removed trains from the frontier, has made it possible to avoid a complete stoppage of railway traffic.

As the office of the Commissioner General has already reported, armed party detachments of Storm troopers have been posted at several railway stations. Thus, the frontier railway stations at Zoppot, Pszczolki (Hohenstein), and the main station at Danzig have been occupied, while similar steps have been taken at goods stations, such as Saspe, Neufahrwasser, etc. In addition, during the past few days the railway stationmasters have received instructions from the Danzig police not to allow trains and locomotives to leave Danzig without first obtaining permission from the Danzig Customs Direction.

All these measures are in practice rendering it impossible for the Polish Railways Administration to avail itself of the rights appertaining

to it, and to maintain railway traffic proportionate to the needs of the Port of Danzig and the Polish hinterland. The situation is also such that for several days now only two passenger trains each way daily have been running between Danzig, Gdynia and Tczew, while goods traffic has been reduced considerably.

3. *The Situation in regard to Customs*

The situation in this sphere is taking a sharp turn for the worse. The attempts made during the past two weeks to put the work of Polish customs inspectors on a normal basis by negotiation have yielded no results. President Greiser's declarations to the Commissioner General as to the possibility of agreement in this sphere have not been confirmed in the course of the conversations. On the contrary, during these conversations the ill will of the Danzig side has been manifested in all its fullness. The Danzig authorities are continuing their illegal interference with the functions of the Polish inspectors, from refusing them access to their place of work, refusing them their right to examine customs documents, and to assist at customs despatch, down to attacking them, arresting them, and holding them under police arrest for several days. The building occupied by the office of the Polish Customs Inspectorate in Danzig has been surrounded by police, who detain office workers as they leave and subject them to examination and investigation while under arrest. On one occasion recently a certain inspector and a chauffeur of the Inspectorate were beaten up with unusual brutality. The position of the customs inspectors' posts on the East Prussian frontier is simply hopeless. Instigated by party elements, the population are attacking and thwarting the inspectors with impunity, both during working hours and outside them. The police have arrested all the Polish inspectors in the Pieklo locality. In Danzig port itself the police have arrested the Polish customs motor-boat with its crew, consisting of two chief inspectors and a mechanic. Obviously this was done to render it impossible for them to observe the unloading of arms brought from Reich territory to the warehouses of Schichau dock. The German customs office for the despatch of passenger vessels coursing between the Free City of Danzig and German ports, which was installed on the quay at Zoppot in agreement with the German authorities, but without the permission of the Central Polish Customs Administration, is continuing to function despite the protests of the Polish Government.

As the result of instructions issued by the Senate of the Free City, these difficulties have now been added to by the swearing in of officials of the customs service in accordance with the Danzig administrative enactment of the autumn of 1938, which provides for an oath of allegiance to the leadership of the National-Socialist Party. By this action the Danzig authorities have one-sidedly prejudged the problem, though we had been assured that without agreement with us there would be no swearing in of Danzig customs officials subordinate to the Polish Customs Administration.

4. *The Situation in the Postal Service*

On this subject I desire to draw attention to the completely illegal searches carried out by the Danzig police authorities in the Polish Postal Administration, and the steadily increasing cases of arrests of Polish postmen under the pretext that they are illegally distributing Polish newspapers and periodicals. This action aims at entirely cutting off the Danzig area from Polish sources of information.

5. *The Position of the Polish Population in Danzig*

In this sphere we have to face the systematic elimination of the Polish element from all kinds of institutions (schools) and commercial and trading enterprises. Lately this action has taken a particularly severe turn, *inter alia* as the result of the forcible removal of several hundred Polish employees and workmen from the Danzig dock and from the railway workshops at Troyla. After depriving them of work, the Danzig authorities are now endeavouring to incorporate these Polish workers and officials in the so-called labour service, for agricultural and fortification works. In this connection I must also note the steadily growing numbers of Danzig Poles who are fleeing to Poland.

On the other hand, hardly a day passes without several, and even several dozen Poles being beaten up by members of Party formations. In many cases the Poles so treated are brought before the Danzig Courts on the charge of disturbing public order. The Courts regularly pass biased sentences and mete out oppressive punishment.

In consequence of the police and licensing systems instituted by the Danzig authorities the small Polish traders and craftsmen have been deprived of the possibility of earning their living. In such cases appeal to the Commissioner General's office for help is always harshly punished by the Danzig police.

The activities of the larger Polish firms and commercial enterprises are now systematically rendered impossible by the application of a whole series of taxation, currency exchange, social and other impositions.

In practice the right of assembly, the discussion of their interests, and expression of opinion guaranteed to the Polish population both by the Danzig Constitution, and by binding Polish-Danzig agreements, have long since ceased to exist. All attempts by the Polish population to assert their rights are crushed by resort to extraordinarily brutal force.

6. *The Militarization of the Free City of Danzig*

In previous reports the Commissioner General has reported on particular phases of the militarization of the area of the Free City. I shall now attempt briefly to recapitulate the facts. As is known, the Senate's decree on universal compulsory police service of November last year was intended in fact to provide a basis for the organization of armed forces in the Danzig area. The assurances which the President of the Senate of the Free City gave on certain occasions to the

Polish Commissioner General, and also to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, that it was only a question of a contingent of some four hundred fresh police, were quickly contradicted by the course of events during the early months of this year. On the basis of this decree Danzig citizens have been called up for military service within the territory of the German Reich. Approximately from May of this year onward, citizens who had undergone military training in the Reich have been returning to Danzig, where they are incorporated in military formations. These at first were in the nature of party detachments, but later they became clearly military units, organized in battalions and regiments. Independently of these detachments, from June onward military detachments began to flow into Danzig from the Reich both by land from East Prussia, and by sea. To accommodate these forces all the former military barracks in Danzig were emptied, and forts, such as Hagesberg and Baschowsberg, were put into repair for the same purpose. During the last few weeks school buildings have been requisitioned for military use.

I would divide the militarization of Danzig into three main categories:

(*a*) Man power.
(*b*) Equipment.
(*c*) Defensive works.

Re (*a*). So far as man power is concerned, I estimate the military forces in the Danzig area to be about 18,000 men, including the detachments of S.S., S.A. and Hitlerjugend, who are entrusted with special functions throughout the entire organization.

Re (*b*). These forces are now adequately equipped with arms of all requisite categories, and are amply supplied with ammunition. They are under a single command of officers sent from the Reich. The military formations in the Danzig territory also possess motorized, technical and artillery equipment.

Re (*c*). During the last few weeks efforts have been observable on the part of the Danzig elements to push on with fortification works in the Danzig territory as far as possible. The camp at Matzkau, armed with anti-aircraft guns, is either completed or on the point of completion. On the roads leading to Poland anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire have been placed. It is also confirmed that special cables capable of carrying high tension current have been laid. On the forest roads along the Polish-Danzig frontier obstacles consisting of fallen trees or pine beams have been erected. According to information, the work of building fortifications for heavy coastal artillery at Zoppot has already been finished. It also appears that the fortification works around two further military encampments, one on the frontier of the Starogard district, the other on the frontier of Tczew district, have been completed.

Of late, military and party formations in full equipment are marching almost daily through the streets of Danzig. These demonstrations are undoubtedly intended to influence the attitude of the population. In particular, the ceremony of dedication of military standards, held with a great parade on Maifeld, was intended on the one hand to

raise the fighting spirit of the local population, and on the other to show that the process of militarizing the Free City, which strikes at the very basis of the existence and organization of Danzig, was on the point of completion.

7. Final Remarks

I have to report that the battleship "Schleswig-Holstein" has not left the port within the period fixed by the programme of the visit. I learn that the "Schleswig-Holstein" has changed her moorings and is now anchored in the immediate proximity of Westerplatte.

The above-described steps and activities on the territory of Danzig have now found characteristic expression in the law appointing Gauleiter Foerster "Staatsoberhaupt" of the Free City. This law, which is in clear contradiction with the statute of the Free City and its Constitution, points explicitly to the objective aimed at by certain elements. Rumours have reached me that M. Foerster, as "head of the State of the Free City," is planning to subordinate Danzig to the Fuehrer.

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* *

It is to the point to recall that, during the months which followed March 26, 1939—the date of the Polish Government's reply to the German suggestions of March 21, 1939—the German Government made no reply whatever to the Polish counter-suggestions presented on March 26, 1939.[1] *Moreover, during all this period, Germany's attitude to Poland was demonstrated through a series of unfriendly acts such as violating the Republic frontiers by land and in the air, and encouraging the authorities of the Free City of Danzig in their hostile attitude to Poland.*

In face of Chancellor Hitler's and the German Government's increasingly explicit threats of war, during all the last ten days of August Great Britain and France, as is known, continued their efforts in Berlin with a view to avoiding a conflict. As the result of several exchanges of view which took place between the British Government and the German Government during the night of August 30-31, Sir Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, addressed an official proposal to M. Beck, tending to establish negotiations directly between the Polish Government and the Reich Government.

No. 107

REPLY *of the British Government to the German Chancellor's Communication of August 29, 1939. Copy handed by Sir Howard Kennard to M. Beck in the night of August 30-31, 1939*

HIS Majesty's Government appreciate the friendly reference in the Declaration contained in the reply of the German Government to the

[1] Nos. 62 and 63.

latter's desire for an Anglo-German understanding and to their statement of the influence which this consideration has exercised upon their policy.

2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government's desire for improved relations, but it will be recognized that they could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain that improvement. They fully understand that the German Government cannot sacrifice Germany's vital interests, but the Polish Government are in the same position and His Majesty's Government believe that the vital interests of the two countries are not incompatible.

3. His Majesty's Government note that the German Government accept the British proposal and are prepared to enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government.

4. His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made the subject of an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the guarantee His Majesty's Government have always assumed.

5. His Majesty's Government also note that the German Government accept the position of the British Government as to Poland's vital interests and independence.

6. His Majesty's Government must make an express reservation in regard to the statement of the particular demands put forward by the German Government in an earlier passage in their reply. They understand that the German Government are drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt these proposals will be fully examined during the discussions. It can then be determined how far they are compatible with the essential conditions which His Majesty's Government have stated and which in principle the German Government have expressed their willingness to accept.

7. His Majesty's Government are at once informing the Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The method of contact and arrangements for discussions must obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German and Polish Governments, but in His Majesty's Government's view it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as to-day.

8. His Majesty's Government fully recognize the need for speed in the initiation of discussion, and they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two mobilized armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should undertake that, during the negotiations, no aggressive military movements will take place. His Majesty's Government feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking from the Polish Government if the German Government would give similar assurances.

9. Further, His Majesty's Government would suggest that a

temporary *modus vivendi* might be arranged for Danzig, which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to render German-Polish relations more difficult.

No. 108

STATEMENT *in writing handed by M. Beck to Sir Howard Kennard*
Warsaw, August 31, 1939. 12 *noon.*

In reply to the question addressed by His Majesty's Government to the Polish Government last night, regarding our attitude towards the possibility of negotiations with the German Government, I have the honour to communicate the following:

(1) Polish Government confirm their readiness, as has previously been expressed, for a direct exchange of views with the German Government on the basis proposed by British Government and communicated by Lord Halifax's telegram of August 28 addressed to the British Ambassador at Warsaw.

(2) Polish Government are also prepared on a reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee that in the event of negotiations taking place Polish troops will not violate the frontiers of the German Reich provided a corresponding guarantee is given regarding non-violation of frontiers of Poland by troops of the German Reich.

(3) In the present situation it is also essential to create a simple provisional *modus vivendi* in the Free City of Danzig.

(4) As regards the suggestions communicated to Polish Government on August 28 through the intermediary of the British Ambassador at Warsaw, an explanation of what the British Government understands by international guarantee would be required in regard to relations between Poland and the German Reich. In default of an answer to this fundamental question the Polish Government are obliged completely to reserve their attitude towards this matter until such time as full explanations are received.

(5) Polish Government express hope that in the event of conversations with the German Reich being initiated, they will continue to be able to take advantage of good offices of His Majesty's Government.

No. 109

M. LIPSKI *to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
Berlin, August 31, 1939. 11.45 *a.m.*

M. COULONDRE has told me that Sir Nevile Henderson's information of Germany's intention to wait only until midnight of August 30-31, originated from M. von Ribbentrop's entourage. M.

Coulondre considers that in the last resort we could inform the German Government after midnight on the lines of our answer to President Roosevelt and to the British Government, that the Polish Embassy at Berlin was always at the German Government's disposition. It would be a peace gesture.

No. 110

M. Beck *to M. Lipski*
Warsaw, August 31, 1939. 12.40 *p.m.*

With reference to your reports, please request the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or the Secretary of State, for an interview and inform him as follows: Last night the Polish Government were informed by the British Government of an exchange of views with the Reich Government as to a possibility of direct negotiations between the Polish and the German Governments.

The Polish Government are favourably considering the British Government's suggestion, and will make them a formal reply on the subject during the next few hours at the latest.

No. 111

The Polish Embassy *in Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
August 31, 1939. 3.15 p.m.

In accordance with instructions received, M. Lipski asked, at 1 p.m., for an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At 3 p.m. the Under Secretary of State, M. von Weizsäcker rang up the Ambassador personally, asking him whether he wanted to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs as a special plenipotentiary or in some other capacity.

M. Lipski replied that he was asking for an interview in his capacity of Ambassador to remit a communication from his Government.

M. von Weizsäcker took note of the information and said he would pass it on to M. von Ribbentrop.

No. 112

M. Lipski *to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
Berlin, August 31, 1939.

(Received at 10.30 p.m.)

I was received by M. von Ribbentrop at 6.30 p.m.

I carried out my instructions.[1] M. von Ribbentrop asked if I had special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said no,

[1]No. 110.

He then asked whether I had been informed that on London's suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion M. von Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would communicate my *démarche* to the Chancellor.

No. 113

OFFICIAL GERMAN COMMUNIQUÉ *broadcast by the German Wireless at* 9 p.m.

August 31, 1939.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Government informed the German Government, in a note dated August 28, 1939, of their readiness to offer their mediation towards direct negotiations between Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so doing they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were aware of the urgent need for progress in view of the continuous incidents and the general European tension. In a reply dated August 29, the German Government, in spite of being sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government to come to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the interests of peace to accept the British mediation or suggestion. After considering all the circumstances prevailing at the time, they considered it necessary in their note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe was to be avoided, then action must be taken readily and without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of August 30, with the proviso that the latter was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations.

Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.

Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization, and only towards 12 o'clock on the night of August 30, 1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.

Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of the views of the German Government as regards possible bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for *direct* negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign

Affairs, M. von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note precise information as to the text of the German proposals which would be regarded as a basis of negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

The Government of the German Reich considered themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish personage would immediately be nominated, at any rate retroactively.

For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their part continually not only to emphasize their willingness to start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while being from the Polish side merely put off with empty subterfuges and meaningless declarations.

It has once more been made clear as a result of a *démarche* which has meanwhile been made by the Polish Ambassador that the latter himself has no plenary powers either to enter into any discussion, or even to negotiate.

The Fuehrer and the German Government have thus waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers.

In these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having this time too been to all intents and purposes rejected, although they considered that these proposals, in the form in which they were made known to the British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and practicable.

The Reich Government consider it timely to inform the public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated to the British Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. von Ribbentrop.

The situation existing between the German Reich and Poland is at the moment of such a kind that any further incident can lead to an explosion on the part of the military forces which have taken up their position on both sides. Any peaceful solution must be framed in such a way as to ensure that the events which lie at the root of this situation cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered, and that thus not only the East of Europe, but also other territories shall not be brought into such a state of tension. The causes of this development lie in: (1) the impossible delineation of frontiers, as fixed by the Versailles dictate; (2) the impossible treatment of the minority in the ceded territories.

In making these proposals, the Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution which will remove the impossible situation created by frontier delineation, which may assure to both parties their vitally important line of communication, which may—as far as it is at all possible—remove the minority problem and, in so far as this is not possible, may give the minorities the assurance of a tolerable future by means of a reliable guarantee of their rights.

The Reich Government are content that in so doing it is essential that economic and physical damage done since 1918 should be exposed and repaired in its entirety. They, of course, regard this obligation as being binding for both parties.

These considerations lead to the following practical proposals:—

(1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German Reich in

view of its purely German character, as well as of the unanimous will of its population;

(2) The territory of the so-called Corridor which extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (inclusive) and thence may run in a westerly direction to Schönlanke, shall itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or Poland;

(3) For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on January 1, 1918, or who by that date have been born there, and similarly of Poles, Kashubes, etc., domiciled in this territory on the above day (January 1, 1918) or born there up to that date. The Germans who have been driven from this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their vote with a view to ensuring an objective plebiscite, and also with a view to ensuring the extensive preparation necessary therefor. The above territory shall, as in the case of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision of an international commission to be formed immediately, on which shall be represented the four Great Powers—Italy, the Soviet Union, France and England. This commission shall exercise all the rights of sovereignty in this territory. With this end in view, the territory shall be evacuated within a period of the utmost brevity, still to be agreed upon, by the Polish armed forces, the Polish police, and the Polish authorities;

(4) The Polish port of Gdynia, which fundamentally constitutes Polish sovereign territory so far as it is confined territorially to the Polish settlement, shall be excluded from the above territory. The exact frontiers of this Polish port should be determined between Germany and Poland, and, if necessary, delimited by an international committee of arbitration;

(5) With a view to assuring the necessary time for the execution of the extensive work involved in the carrying out of a just plebiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place before the expiry of twelve months;

(6) In order to guarantee unrestricted communication between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and the sea during this period, roads and railways shall be established to render free transit traffic possible. In this connection only such taxes as are necessary for the maintenance of the means of communication and for the provision of transport may be levied;

(7) The question as to the party to which the area belongs is to be decided by simple majority of the votes recorded;

(8) In order to guarantee to Germany free communication with her province of Danzig-East Prussia, and to Poland her connection with the sea after the execution of the plebiscite—regardless of the results thereof—Germany shall, in the event of the plebiscite area going to Poland, receive an extra-territorial traffic zone, approximately in a line from Bütow to Danzig or Dirschau, in which to lay down a Motor Road and a 4-track railway line. The road and the railway shall be so constructed that the Polish lines of communication are not affected, i.e. they shall pass either over or under the latter. The breadth of this zone shall be fixed at 1 kilometre, and it is to be German sovereign

territory. Should the plebiscite be favourable to Germany, Poland is to obtain rights, analogous to those accorded to Germany, to a similar extra-territorial communication by road and railway for the purpose of free and unrestricted communication with her port of Gdynia;

(9) In the event of the Corridor returning to the German Reich, the latter declares its right to proceed to an exchange of population with Poland to the extent to which the nature of the Corridor lends itself thereto;

(10) Any special right desired by Poland in the port of Danzig would be negotiated on a basis of territory against similar rights to be granted to Germany in the port of Gdynia;

(11) In order to remove any feeling in this area that either side was being threatened, Danzig and Gdynia would have the character of exclusively mercantile towns, that is to say, without military installations and military fortifications;

(12) The peninsula of Hela, which as a result of the plebiscite might go either to Poland or to Germany, would in either case have similarly to be demilitarized;

(13) Since the Government of the German Reich has the most vehement complaints to make against the Polish treatment of minorities, and since the Polish Government for their part feel obliged to make complaints against Germany, both parties declare their agreement to have these complaints laid before an international committee of enquiry, whose task would be to examine all complaints as regards economic or physical damage, and any other acts of terrorism. Germany and Poland undertake to make good economic or other damage done to minorities on either side since the year 1918, or to cancel expropriation as the case may be, or to provide complete compensation to the persons affected for this and any other encroachments on their economic life;

(14) In order to free the Germans who may be left in Poland and the Poles who may be left in Germany from the feeling of being outlawed by all nations, and in order to render them secure against being called upon to perform action or to render services incompatible with their national sentiments, Germany and Poland agree to guarantee the rights of both minorities by means of the most comprehensive and binding agreement, in order to guarantee to these minorities the preservation, the free development and practical application of their nationality (*Volkstum*), and in particular to permit for this purpose such organization as they may consider necessary. Both parties undertake not to call upon members of the minority for military service;

(15) In the event of agreement on the basis of these proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves ready to decree and to carry out the immediate demobilization of their armed forces;

(16) The further measures necessary for the more rapid execution of the above arrangement shall be agreed upon by both Germany and Poland conjointly.

No. 114

HIS HOLINESS *the Pope's Appeal for Peace*
Holy See, August 31, 1939.

HIS HOLINESS THE POPE is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world continues to pray for.

His Holiness therefore, in the name of God, beseeches the German and Polish Governments to do all that is in their power to avoid any incident and to abstain from taking any step that might aggravate the present tension.

His Holiness begs the British, French and Italian Governments to support his appeal.

No. 115

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S REPLY *to His Holiness the Pope's Appeal for Peace, transmitted by the Polish Embassy to the Holy See*
Rome, September 14, 1939.

THE Message from the Holy Father which was conveyed to the Polish Ambassador on August 31 by His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, concerning the noble and moving efforts of His Holiness to reach a just and peaceful solution to the Polish-German conflict, was transmitted by the Polish Ambassador the same day to the Government of the Republic of Poland.

Owing to difficulties in communication, the Polish Government's answer has arrived only this morning.

The Polish Government profoundly regret that His Holiness's noble appeal did not restrain Germany from launching a brutal attack on Polish territory the following day.

No. 116

LIST OF INCIDENTS *on the Polish-German Frontier during August* 1939

AUGUST 6, 1939.—At 7.30 p.m., near Kamienica Krolewska (Kartuzy district), three armed German soldiers crossed the frontier. When called upon by a Polish frontier guard to halt, they took no notice. The latter fired, wounding one of the Germans.

Night of August 9-10.—Ludwik Pieczychlebek, a Polish frontier guard, was attacked by a number of individuals stealing from Germany into Poland. As the result of the clash the above-named was seriously wounded. The attackers fled, leaving behind them eleven military pistols and several hundred rounds of ammunition.

August 23.—A German three-engined bomber was seen about 1 p.m. above Bogumin town and New Bogumin. A Polish fighter aeroplane forced it to withdraw from Polish territory.

Night of August 23-24.—A group of some fifteen Germans crossed the frontier and attacked the railway station and customs house at Makoszówa, near Katowice. They fired several hundred shots.

August 24.—From 12.30 to 1.45 a.m. and again from 2.30 to 2.50 a.m., Germans machine-gunned the frontier guard house at Gieraltowice (Rybnik district).

August 24.—At midnight a German diversionist band crossed the Polish frontier at the Szczyglowo post in Silesia, and fired on the frontier guard house at Krywalda.

August 25.—At 5 a.m. a German diversionist band attacked the frontier post at Falęcice (Rybnik district), firing several dozen shots.

August 25.—At 5 a.m. a German group, 30 strong, and armed with six light machine-guns, attacked the house of the frontier guard at Dzwonów (Rybnik district). Several hundred shots were fired.

August 25.—At 8.25 a.m. a German military hydroplane flew over Hel. A similar flight was repeated in the afternoon.

August 25.—At 11.50 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. Polish buildings at Szmine and Falęcice (Rybnik district) were heavily fired on by two German bands of 50 and 100 men respectively. At the same time the former frontier sentry-box at Zworowice (Rybnik district) was also fired at.

August 25.—At 2.20 p.m. a German military aircraft flew over Gdynia port.

August 25.—At 4.30 and 4.40 p.m. German hydroplanes coming from the direction of Danzig flew over Redlowo.

August 25.—At 5 p.m. a German military patrol crossed the frontier near the village of Pelty in the Ostrołęka sector. At a distance of one kilometre inside Polish territory it encountered a Polish frontier guard patrol and opened fire on it with a light machine-gun.

August 26.—At about 9 a.m., at Dzwierznia (Dzialdowo district), a Polish frontier guard patrol met a German cavalry patrol at a distance of 6 kilometres inside the frontier. The Germans had crossed the frontier through a forest at Bialuty.

August 26.—At about 1.30 p.m. a German heavy machine-gun opened fire on two Polish frontier guards, who were walking at a distance of 100 metres from the frontier, near Malinowo (Dzialdowo district).

August 26.—At 1.30 p.m. two Polish frontier guards at the Głodówka Witamowa Pass (Nowy Targ district) were fired upon by three German soldiers who had penetrated into Polish territory to a depth of 30 metres.

August 26.—At 3.30 p.m., in the neighbourhood of Sucha Góra, the Polish side of the frontier was fired at with a light machine-gun.

August 26.—At 8.30 p.m. the frontier post at Guzy (Kościerzyna district) was fired upon from Danzig territory.

August 26.—At 11 p.m. a Polish frontier patrol at Maloslońce, near Tczew, was fired upon from the opposite bank of the River Vistula.

August 27.—At 2.45 a.m. a German diversionist band opened fire on buildings at Szczygłowice (Rybnik district), entering Polish territory to a depth of a dozen or more metres.

August 27.—At 10 p.m. a German infantry patrol violated Polish territory in the district of Male Polko, near Gniewo (Pomorze Province).

The night of August 27-28.—The frontier guard-house at Wilcza Dolna, in Silesia, was attacked and fired upon. Shots from the direction of Raciborz towards Brzezie on the River Oder. The frontier localities of Makoszow, Kończyce and Karol Emanuel came under machine-gun fire. Bullet-holes were found in fences and the walls of houses.

August 28.—At 1 a.m., in the region of Borowicz Mile farm, a Polish frontier guard was shot at by the Germans. At the same time the railway station and frontier post at Brzezie was also fired on from German territory.

August 28.—Between 8 and 9 a.m. a German cavalry patrol crossed the frontier in the Bialudy Młynarskie neighbourhood.

August 28.—Between 11 a.m. and 12 noon two German infantry patrols crossed the frontier near Skoroszewo (Kepno district).

Night of August 28-29.—A German patrol crossed the frontier at Szczygłowice (Rybnik district) and threw hand-grenades at some buildings.

August 29.—At 10.20 a.m. a German aeroplane appeared over Strzepcz (Kartuzy district), five kilometres from the frontier. At 4.45 p.m. a three-engined Junkers machine was observed over Redlowo.

August 30.—The Polish frontier was again violated four times by German aeroplanes at four different points. During the night skirmishes between German and Polish frontier guards had occurred at several places on the Polish-German frontier.

August 31.—At 2 a.m. there was a skirmish at a point between Orlowo and Kack, on the Polish-Danzig frontier. Several shots were exchanged.

No. 117

M. Zawadowski *to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
Danzig, August 31, 1939. 10.30 p.m.

We have received information from an authoritative source that detachments of German troops from East Prussia have crossed the German-Danzig frontier.

No. 118

Major Sucharski *to Naval Headquarters at Gdynia*
Westerplatte, September 1, 1939. 4.50 a.m.

At 4.45 a.m. the battleship *Schleswig-Holstein* began an intensive shelling of Westerplatte. The bombardment continues.

No. 119

COMMUNIQUÉ No. 1 *issued by Commander-in-Chief's Staff Headquarters.*

September 1, 1939.

ON September 1, 1939, in the early morning, Germany invaded our territory, by a surprise attack from the air and on land, without a declaration of war.

Activities of the German Air Force in the early hours of September 1:

The German Air Force carried out a series of raids on many points over the whole of Polish territory. German airmen bombed Augustów, Nowy Dwór, Ostrów Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrów, Radomsko, Toruń, Kutno, Tunel, Kraków, Grodno, Trzebinie, Gdynia, Jaslo, Tomaszów Mazowiecki, Katowice. In the towns bombed from the air there are killed and wounded among the civilian population.

Near Kutno an evacuation train was machine-gunned and bombed from the air. At Grodno the Catholic Church was damaged, at Biala Podlaska an Orthodox Church. Reports of further bombing are coming in.

In the Danzig area a strong air attack on Gdynia is developing. The town has been exposed to bombing all day to-day.

Enemy losses: Altogether 16 German aircraft have been brought down to-day.

Our own losses: Two aircraft.

Land operations: Simultaneously with the air attacks the German land forces opened operations, invading our territory at various points. The frontier battles are continuing. The fiercest struggle is going on in Silesia. So far we have destroyed by artillery fire an enemy armoured train, capturing the tender with its crew. Several tanks have been put out of action. In various places we have taken prisoners. At Danzig three attacks on Westerplatte have been repulsed.

No. 120

PROCLAMATION *by the President of the Republic to the Polish Nation*

CITIZENS,—During the course of last night our age-old enemy commenced offensive operations against the Polish State. I affirm this before God and History.

At this historic moment I appeal to all citizens of the country in the profound conviction that the entire nation will rally around its Commander-in-Chief and armed forces to defend its liberty, independence and honour, and to give the aggressor a worthy answer, as has happened already more than once in the history of Polish-German relations.

The entire nation, blessed by God in its struggle for a just and sacred cause, and united with its army, will march in serried ranks to the struggle and the final victory.

IGNACE MOŚCICKI.

Warsaw, September 1, 1939.

No. 121

M. BECK *to Count Raczyński and M. Lukasiewicz*
Warsaw, September 1, 1939.

(1) PLEASE inform the Government to which you are accredited that despite Poland's collaboration in the British initiative, which collaboration is known to the Allied Governments, German forces attacked Polish territory at dawn; simultaneously a number of localities were bombed from the air.

(2) The Polish Government, resolved to defend the independence and honour of Poland to the end, expresses its conviction that in accordance with the existing treaties of alliance, in this struggle it will receive immediate help from its Allies.

No. 122

APPEAL OF MR. ROOSEVELT, *President of the United States of America, in regard to bombing of open towns*
September 1, 1939.

THE ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centres of population during the course of the hostilities which have raged in various quarters of the earth in the past few years, which have resulted in the maiming and death of thousands of defenceless women and children, has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity.

If resort is had to this sort of inhuman barbarism during the period of tragic conflagration with which the world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings, who have no responsibility for, and who are not even remotely participating in, the hostilities which have broken out, now will lose their lives.

I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every Government which may be engaged in hostilities, publicly to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event and under no circumstances undertake bombardment from the air of civilian populations or unfortified cities, upon the understanding that the same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all their opponents.

No. 123

POLISH GOVERNMENT'S REPLY *to appeal of the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, in regard to bombing of open towns*
September 1, 1939.

THE Polish Government acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the telegram relating to the aerial bombing of civilians in non-fortified centres of population in war-time.

The Polish Government completely agree with the principles laid down and with the sentiments which inspire them.

It is with these principles in view that the supreme military authorities in Poland have given formal orders, in the event of war, to abstain from the bombing of open towns and from similar actions which would constitute a direct danger to the civilian population.

Unfortunately, Poland, whose territory since early this morning has been the object of an unprovoked aggression on the part of the German Forces, has already been the victim of several aerial attacks. The losses among the civilian population, already announced, make it doubtful whether our opponents are respecting the rules to which the President refers. These rules, which naturally derive from humanitarian sentiments, remain in force on the condition that they are scrupulously observed by our opponents also.

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* *

On the night of September 1–2, 1939, *after* 2 *a.m., the official on duty at the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs received a telephone call that was announced as coming from Berlin.*

This statement by the operator at the Central Telephone Exchange seemed improbable at first, in view of the fact that for several hours past Poland had been at war with the Reich. Nevertheless, at the other end of the line the Polish Embassy in Berlin was clearly heard communicating the contents of the German Note printed below.[1]

The German Foreign Office had, in fact, conveyed the contents of the Note to the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski, on the afternoon of September 1. *As the Ambassador had already obtained his passports and was waiting to leave Germany, he replied that it was technically impossible for him to transmit the contents of the Note to his Government, whose interests had moreover been entrusted to the Swedish Government at the opening of hostilities. The German authorities thereupon arranged for telephonic connection to be made via Copenhagen, in order to ensure that the Polish Government should be acquainted betimes with the Reich's intention not to bomb the civil population.*

Shortly after this telephonic communication the Netherlands Minister in Warsaw, who had been entrusted with the representation of German interests, called on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to deliver the same Note from the German Government.

[1] No. 124

During the same night the Polish Legation at The Hague had received through the Dutch Government the self-same German Note. It is obvious that the German Government attached importance to the safe transmission of their Note to the Polish Government. The latter replied the same night, giving Germany assurances of reciprocity in refraining from the bombardment of open towns and civilian population.

This, however, did not prevent the German Air Force from proceeding during the following day to destroy open towns and intensively bomb the civilian population.

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* *

No. 124

NOTE VERBALE *from the Reich Foreign Office transmitted to the Polish Embassy in Berlin*

THE Foreign Minister of the Reich has the honour to communicate the following to the Polish Embassy:

The German Air Force have received orders to restrict their action to military objectives. It is a necessary prerequisite to the observance of this order that the Polish Air Force shall observe the same rule. Should this not be the case, the most severe reprisals will immediately be taken on the German part.

Berlin, September 1, 1939.

No. 125

SEMI-OFFICIAL NOTE *from the Polish Embassy in Berlin transmitted to the Reich Foreign Office*

IN reply to the Note Verbale, No. RM. 443, II, delivered to him by the Foreign Ministry at 9.30 p.m. to-day, the Polish Ambassador has the honour to communicate that he possesses neither the possibility nor the means of transmitting the said communication to his Government.

Berlin, September 1, 1939.

No. 126

NOTE *from the Netherlands Legation in Warsaw handed in at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

THE Royal Netherlands Legation has the honour to inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the German Government have

requested Her Majesty's Government to transmit to the Polish Government the following communication:

"The German Air Force have received orders to restrict their action to military objectives. It is a necessary prerequisite to the observance of this order that the Polish Air Force shall observe the same rule. Should this not be the case, the most severe reprisals will immediately be taken on the German part."

The Royal Netherlands Legation would be obliged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a reply as soon as possible.

Warsaw, September 2, 1939.

No. 127

NOTE VERBALE *from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmitted to the Royal Netherlands Legation at Warsaw*

IN reply to the Royal Netherlands Legation's *Note Verbale* of September 2, Ref. No. 1348/Pol., which was delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2.25 a.m. on September 2 by the Netherlands Minister in person, and in confirmation of the verbal communication made by the Foreign Minister to the Netherlands Minister at 4.30 a.m. on September 2, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to communicate the following:

Even before the outbreak of hostilities the Polish Air Force had received orders that in the event of war they were strictly to limit their activities to military objectives. This order has been strictly observed since the beginning of hostilities, despite the fact that bombing by German aircraft has already caused great havoc among civilians and in open towns. The order, nevertheless, remains in force.

In the circumstances the instructions issued to the German Air Force can be applied in conditions of reciprocity.

September 2, 1939.

No. 128

NOTE *from the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs transmitted to the Polish Minister at The Hague*

The Hague, September 1, 1939.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

In consequence of a *démarche* from the German Legation, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency herewith the text of a *Note Verbale* from the said Legation:

Note Verbale

"Im Auftrage der Deutschen Regierung beehrt sich die Deutsche Gesandtschaft zu bitten, die Königlich Niederländische Gesandtschaft

in Warschau anzuweisen, der Polnischen Regierung Folgendes zu notifizieren:

"Die deutschen Luftstreitkräfte haben den Befehl erhalten, sich bei ihren Kampfhandlungen auf militärische Objekte zu beschränken. Es ist eine selbstverständliche Voraussetzung für die Aufrechterhaltung dieses Befehls, dass die polnischen Luftstreitkräfte sich an die gleiche Regel halten. Sollte das nicht der Fall sein, so wird deutscherseits sofort schärfste Vergeltung geübt werden.

"Für die Vermittlung beehrt sich die Gesandtschaft ihren verbindlichten Dank auszusprechen."[1]

I am, etc.,
(Signed) J. H. VAN ROYEN.

His Excelency M. Waclaw Babiński,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Poland,
The Hague.

No. 129

Note Verbale *from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs transmitted to the Royal Netherlands Legation*

Note Verbale

The Polish Government have to state that German aircraft, after repeatedly bombing various localities and, among others, even certain villages of no military importance whatever, and having fired at peaceful farmers at work in the fields, have again carried out raids on Warsaw, in the course of which they bombed a health resort situated 20 kilometres from the capital, and in particular the villa of the United States Ambassador. This very day, in suburbs of Warsaw which are an integral part of the city, four private houses have been bombed as well as a lamp factory, and a railway station at the very moment when a Red Cross train was standing there.

Referring to the *démarche* by the Netherlands Government, which resulted in the exchange of Notes on September 2, the Polish Government consider it their duty to inform the Netherlands Government that either the German Government have committed a violation of the declaration made by them with regard to the conduct of aerial warfare, or there is a lack of discipline on the part of German airmen

[1] "Note Verbale. On the instruction of the German Government the German Legation has the honour to request that the Royal Netherlands Legation at Warsaw may be charged with notifying the following to the Polish Government:

" 'The German Air Force have received orders to restrict their action to military objectives. It is a necessary prerequisite to the observance of this order that the Polish Air Force shall observe the same rule. Should this not be the case the most severe reprisals will immediately be taken on the German part.'

"For this service the Legation has the honour to express its most grateful thanks."

which leads them to criminal acts. The Polish Government hope that the Netherlands Government will draw the foregoing to the attention of the Reich Government.

The orders issued to the Polish Air Force in this connection have not to date been modified in any way, and on this ground their activities have given no cause whatever for reproach.

Warsaw, September 4, 1939.

No. 130

NOTE *from Polish Minister at The Hague to the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

The Hague, September 5, 1939.

MONSIEUR LE DIRECTEUR,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 1, in which you were good enough to inform me of the text of a *Note Verbale* presented by the German Legation at The Hague, declaring that the German Air Force will restrict its activity to military objectives.

I should like to draw your particular attention to the *communiqués* reporting numerous bombardments systematically carried out by German air forces on open Polish towns and defenceless civilian populations, objects of no military importance.

I am, Sir,

(*Signed*) DR. W. BABIŃSKI.

No. 131

M. FOERSTER'S *telegram to Chancellor Hitler*

September 1, 1939.

MY Fuehrer, I have just signed the following constitutional law concerning the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, and I have put it into force:

The constitutional law concerning the reunion of the Free City of Danzig with the German Reich from September 1:

Article 1.—The Constitution of the Free City of Danzig is cancelled with immediate effect.

Article 2.—All legislative and executive power is in the hands of the head of the State.

Article 3.—The Free City of Danzig with its territory and population shall immediately form part of the territory of the German Reich.

Article 4.—Until the Fuehrer makes a definite decision about the introduction of German Reich law, all legal provisions of the Constitution remain in force as they are at the moment of the issue of this constitutional law.

I ask you, my Fuehrer, in the name of Danzig and its population, to agree to this Constitutional Law and to carry out the reincorporation of Danzig by a law of the German Reich. The eternal gratitude and everlasting faith of Danzig are devotedly pledged to you, my Fuehrer.

No. 132

CHANCELLOR HITLER'S *reply to M. Foerster's telegram*
September 1, 1939.

I ACCEPT the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig concerning the return to the German Reich.

I thank you, Gauleiter Foerster, and all Danzig men and women for the resolute loyalty which you and they have preserved for so many years. Greater Germany greets you with overflowing heart. The law for reunion is ratified forthwith. I appoint you herewith as head of the civil administration of Danzig territory.

No. 133

DECREE *of the President of the Polish Republic constituting Czech and Slovak Legions*

ARTICLE 1.—In view of the aggression against the Republic of Poland, and in consequence of the great tragedy of the Czech and Slovak nations in being subjugated by a German occupation, Czech and Slovak Legions are to be constituted on Polish territory, in order to give these nations an opportunity to free themselves by their own armed action.

Article 2.—These Legions will be incorporated into the Polish Army and subject to its supreme command, without prejudice to their specific national character.

Article 3.—Volunteers of Polish citizenship are free to join the Czech and Slovak Legions equally with persons of Czech or Slovak origin not possessing Polish citizenship. No legal consequences so far as citizenship is concerned will ensue to the volunteers from their service in these Legions.

Article 4.—The Minister for War is charged with the execution of the present Decree.

(*Signed*) MOŚCICKI,
President of the Republic.
GENERAL KASPRZYCKI,
Minister for War.

Warsaw, September 1, 1939.

No. 134

SLOVAK MINISTER'S LETTER *protesting against the German occupation of Slovakia. Handed by M. Szathmary to Count Szembek*
Warsaw, September 1, 1939.

IN the name of the Slovakian nation and its representatives who, under the pressure of the Third Reich, are forced to be silent, and are exploited for intrigues exclusively in Germany's interests, I protest as the representative of the State of Slovakia to the Polish Republic against the brutal disarmament of the Slovak Army, against the arbitrary occupation of Slovakia by forces of the Third Reich, and against the use of Slovakia as a base for military action against the brotherly Polish nation.

The Slovak nation both at home and abroad will never assent to the outrage committed by the German Third Reich and will join in armed resistance against the invaders in order, in collaboration with the civilized nations of the world, to have the power to decide its own destiny.

I would be very grateful to the Polish Government if it would take cognizance of my present declaration and if by all means at its disposal, and in conjunction with its Allies, it would support the struggle of the Slovak nation to save its national honour and its Fatherland, and to gain true independence.

I am, etc.,
DR. LADISLAW SZATHMARY.

No. 135

POLISH *Official Communiqué*
Warsaw, September 2, 1939.

YESTERDAY German land and air forces committed an aggression against Poland along the entire length of the Polish-German frontier.

In his speech yesterday, Chancellor Hitler proclaimed the continuation of the struggle.

The Polish nation takes up this war in a manner according with its age-old traditions.

Ambassador Lipski has been instructed to leave Berlin. Similarly, the German Chargé d'Affaires at Warsaw has asked for his passports in the name of his Government.

The situation must be regarded as perfectly clear.

No. 136

Polish *Official Communiqué*
Warsaw, September 2, 1939.

The *communiqué* broadcast by the German wireless about eleven o'clock on Thursday evening, in which the German Government in terms of an ultimatum demanded the reunion of Danzig and three-fourths of the Province of Pomorze with the Reich and unconditional acceptance of this demand by a Polish delegate sent specially to Berlin for that purpose, calls for the following observations:

The Polish Government informed the British Government that they agreed to their mediatory action, the object of which was to arrange conversations with the German Government in order to avoid war. A similar statement was also made at Berlin on Thursday evening, by M. Lipski to M. von Ribbentrop. In reply, the German Government published the *communiqué* mentioned above, laying down the conditions on which these conversations were to be conducted. A few hours later the Germans began hostilities. The Polish Government learned these German conditions only from the German Government's *communiqué*. As is known, these conditions in no way aimed at an improvement in Polish-German relations; they constituted and constitute only an ultimatum and a flagrant attack on the vital interests of the Republic and its territory. No Government could accept such conditions. Though they were not known to the Polish Government, they were put in the form of an ultimatum, and were cynically fictitious pretexts for the aggression on Poland which took place yesterday.

Chancellor Hitler's reference in his speech yesterday to the alleged Polish aggression against Reich territory is a downright and deliberate lie. Poland has always expressed her readiness to settle all Polish-German disputes by way of mediation. It is worth recalling Poland's agreement to the proposal of the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, to which Germany made no reply; and Poland's favourable response to the appeal of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands, and to that of His Holiness the Pope.

It is obvious that in face of Germany's failure to reply to our proposal, presented on Thursday by the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, any conversations between Poland and Germany on the subject were rendered impossible. Poland's gesture was ignored.

In face of this turn in Polish-German conversations and the many acts of aggression against Polish territory committed yesterday morning, which the German official *communiqué* described as the German troops' invasion of Poland along the entire length of the frontier, it must be affirmed that the responsibility for this course of events falls exclusively on Germany, and that the Germans are aggressors, and flagrant aggressors. For, despite Chancellor Hitler's promise that only military objectives would be subjected to bombing attacks, the German Air Force yesterday bombed centres of civilian population.

No. 137

M. Beck *to Count Raczyński and M. Lukasiewicz*
Warsaw, September 2, 1939.

To-day the struggles all along the front are acquiring a very serious character. German attacks are meeting everywhere with very energetic resistance on our part. The greatest difficulty confronting our troops arises from the employment of almost the entire German Air Force. It is not only bombing military objectives, but also factories and even villages. In these conditions Allied decisions which would tie up a considerable part of the German Air Force are the concern of all.

Please inform the Government to which you are accredited immediately.

No. 138

M. Beck *to Count Raczyński*
Warsaw, September 3, 1939.

Please communicate immediately to Lord Halifax—even at night: We appreciate with full satisfaction the formula in which Lord Halifax stated that the British Government will not consider any conference, so long as the German invasion of Poland and Danzig continues. We are now fighting the great mass of the German Army along our entire front, disputing every yard of territory. Even the garrison of Westerplatte is resisting. The action of all the German Air Force is growing more and more brutal in its nature. To-day we have suffered many casualties among the civilian population. Invoking the clause stipulating immediate assistance, I ask for information of the British Government's decision without delay.

No. 139

Polish-French *Protocol*
September 4, 1939.

The Polish Government and the French Government, desiring to assure the full efficacy of the Polish-French Alliance, and having especially in view the present situation of the League of Nations, agree to confirm that their mutual obligations of assistance in the event of aggression by a third Power continue to be founded on the Agreements of Alliance in force.

At the same time they declare that henceforth they interpret the said Agreements as embodying the following obligations:

ARTICLE 1

The undertaking of the two Contracting Parties mutually to render all aid and assistance in their power at once and from the outbreak of hostilities between one of the Contracting Parties and a European Power in consequence of that Power's aggression against the said Contracting Party, equally applies to the case of any action by a European Power which manifestly directly or indirectly threatens the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and is of such a nature that the Party in question considers it vital to resist that aggression with its armed forces.

Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article 1 will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other European State concerned.

ARTICLE 2

The methods of applying the undertakings of mutual assistance provided for by the present Agreement are established between the competent military, naval, and air authorities of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 3

(1) The Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may in future give to other States.

(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the other Contracting Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be informed thereof.

(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in those undertakings and the third State concerned.

ARTICLE 4

Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

The present Protocol, constituting an integral part of the Polish-French Agreements of 1921 and 1925, shall remain in force as long as the said Agreements.

The present Protocol comes into force on signature.

Done in Paris. *September* 4, 1939.

JULJUSZ LUKASIEWICZ.
GEORGES BONNET.

No. 140

COUNT RACZYŃSKI *to M. Beck*
London, September 5, 1939.

I CALLED on Lord Halifax and submitted your message[1]. With the greatest of emphasis I urged the necessity for immediate military action in the West. On this occasion I referred to the appeal of our Air Force, addressed to-day to Headquarters through the Military Attaché, asking for air action against Germany in order to relieve us.

Lord Halifax took cognizance of my appeal and told me that my letter to Mr. Churchill on the same question had been read at to-day's Cabinet meeting. He solemnly assured me that from now on Great Britain was devoting herself to the sole aim of defeating Germany. He understood our anxieties and felt them almost as his own. However, the British Government, who stand and will stand by Poland to the end, cannot disperse their forces, which are needed for a decisive blow.

No. 141

M. LIPSKI *to Polish Embassies in London and Paris*
Copenhagen, September 5, 1939.

I ARRIVED at Copenhagen on Monday. I have to state that the German demands, formulated in sixteen points, were not handed either to me or to the Polish Government.

In the afternoon of August 31 I stated to M. von Ribbentrop that the Polish Government was giving a positive answer to the British Government in regard to the suggestion of direct negotiations between Poland and Germany.

I learned about the German aggression against Poland from the wireless last Friday morning, September 1.

No. 142

M. BECK *to Polish Embassies in London and Paris*
Krzemieniec, September 12, 1939.

DURING the past two days the Germans in Poland have intensified their methodical bombardment of open towns far in the rear of the fighting forces. There is no doubt that the method aims at paralysing the internal life of the country. Among other places, Lublin, Janów, Zamość, Chelm, Kowel and Luck have been bombed from very low altitudes, the centres of the towns being hit.

I have informed the Ambassadors here, and have deposited an official protest with the Netherlands Government, declaring that the Germans are clearly violating their own assurances.

[1] No. 138

No. 143

BRITISH *broadcast message to Warsaw*
September 19, 1939.

"THIS is a message from the people of Britain to the City of Warsaw. All the world is admiring your courage. Once again Poland has fallen a victim to the aggressive designs of her neighbours. Once again she has by her heroic defiance of the invader become the standard-bearer of liberty in Europe.

"We, your Allies, intend to continue the struggle for the restoration of your liberties.

"Please reply if you can to this message on S.P.Z. 71.70 kilocycles during to-night."

No. 144

REPLY *of the Lord Mayor of Warsaw*
September 19, 1939.

"I, LORD MAYOR of Warsaw, in the name of the population of Warsaw and of the whole Polish nation, thank you from the bottom of my heart for your message and the assurance that we shall fight together our common enemy.

"The brutal bombardment of Warsaw and other towns, the destruction of our historic treasures, such as the Castle of Warsaw, the destruction of hundreds of churches, hospitals and private dwellings, and the murder of thousands of women and children, are being carried out mercilessly."

No. 145

LAST COMMUNIQUÉ *issued by the Warsaw Defence Command*
Warsaw, September 29, 1939. 9.25 a.m.

HAVING exhausted all the possibilities of continuing resistance, and having in view the desperate plight of the civil population, as also the lack of food and munitions mainly for artillery, the Warsaw Defence Command announces that it feels obliged to conclude an armistice.

The Warsaw Defence Command has agreed with the German military authorities as to the conditions of surrender of the city of Warsaw and its garrison to-day at noon. The German military authorities undertake to assure conditions of honourable captivity to the officers who have participated in the defence of the capital, authorizing them to retain their swords. On the other hand, the Germans undertake to demobilize the non-commissioned officers and privates and allow them to return to their homes.

No. 146

M. Zaleski *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad*
Paris, October 26, 1939.

Please present the following declaration, in the form of a Note, to the Government to which you are accredited:

The Polish Government learn that the German Reich has ordered the reunion with Germany, as from November 1, 1939, of part of the territory of the Polish Republic, by creating two new provinces designated as West Prussia and Posen, and also by enlarging the provinces of German Silesia and East Prussia.

The Polish Government declares that this administrative disposition constitutes a further violation by the Reich of the elementary principles of international law governing the conduct of the enemy in conquered territory.

Consequently, it considers this illegal act as null and void.

No. 147

Final *Report from the former Polish Ambassador in Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs*
Paris, October 10, 1939.

In consequence of the German aggression against Poland, which was begun without declaration of war on September 1, 1939, at 4.45 a.m. (the hour at which the Germans started to bombard Westerplatte), I left Berlin with the personnel of the Embassy on September 2, and travelled to Poland through Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Being obliged to leave Poland owing to the Soviet invasion, and now residing in France, I consider it my duty to present my final report on the termination of my mission in Berlin.

My mission to Germany began in September 1933. I fulfilled it first in the capacity of Minister Plenipotentiary and then, from October 1934, as Ambassador.

* * *

Polish-German relations were based upon the Declaration of January 26, 1934, in which the Governments of both States undertook for a period of at least ten years to refrain from resort to force to settle any differences which might arise between them.

In the course of the negotiations which I conducted with the German Government, and which ended in the Declaration of January 26, 1934, it was expressly specified that existing international obligations of the two States would not be infringed by that Declaration, and this found expression in the text itself.[1] This attitude of Poland's was fully accepted by authoritative German circles.

[1] No. 10.

In the same way the principle of independence for Polish policy, which constituted the starting-point of the conversations with Chancellor Hitler, was fully confirmed in numerous conversations during the years 1934 to 1938 with the highest Reich officials, and was recognized as the basis of mutual relations.

As you are in possession of my previous reports on Polish-German relations during my mission in Berlin, in this report I shall confine myself to a chronological outline of the last phase of these relations, beginning with October 1938.

The German action in relation to Poland, initiated on October 24, 1938, in the form of suggestions which were withdrawn after a conversation on November 19, and put forward again in January 1939, in March 1939 assumed the form of pressure, supported by the entry of German troops into Slovakia and the naval demonstration at the occupation of Memel.

The question of the return of the Free City of Danzig to the Reich, raised by M. von Ribbentrop on October 24,[1] was quite unexpected. Danzig questions had been the subject of several exchanges of opinion between the two Governments in previous years. A basis for understanding was provided by the declaration of the Reich Government, explicitly confirmed in the Chancellor's statements of November 5, 1937,[2] and January 14, 1938,[3] that the Reich respected the legal status of the Free City together with Polish rights and interests, while Poland for her part did not intervene in the life of the German population of Danzig.

While the central Reich authorities handled the Danzig situation on the basis of the above principles, in the territory of Danzig itself the activities of Gauleiter Foerster, a Party extremist, was the cause of numerous complications and tense situations from the moment of his arrival in the Free City. It can be said confidently that M. Foerster was the individual who contributed most to the continual misunderstandings and tension that arose between the two States. Obviously, it is difficult for me to estimate how far M. Foerster acted on his own initiative, and to what degree on the orders of the highest authorities of the Reich.

It frequently happened that after assurances in regard to Danzig questions had been given to me by members of the German Government, during the very next few days M. Foerster's activities, particularly his speeches to the Danzig Party Convention, negated what had been said in Berlin, and thus revived the atmosphere of distrust, particularly as it was known that he had close contacts with the German Chancellor.

In reply to M. von Ribbentrop's suggestions of October 24, the Polish Government handed him counter-proposals on November 19, 1938.[4]

Subsequently these matters were raised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Beck, in conversations with Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden on January 5, 1939,[5] with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,

[1]No. 44. [2]No. 33. [3]No. 36. [4]No. 46. [5]No. 48.

M. von Ribbentrop, in Munich on January 6,[1] and during the latter's visit to Warsaw on January 26, 1939,[2] the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Polish-German Declaration.

In the course of a casual exchange of views with the Chancellor at the reception to the Diplomatic Corps on March 2, he once more assured me that so long as he stood at the head of the Government of the Reich there was no need to fear that relations between the two countries would be exposed to danger.

During the period from October 1938 to March 1939 the German attitude towards us acquired certain features which in Poland began to evoke an understandable mistrust and criticism.

In connection with the problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia terroristic Ukrainian elements, acting to the detriment of Polish interests and good Polish-Ukrainian relations, were supported by German propaganda and Party organs (S.S. and Gestapo). Vienna became the centre of these activities, and the wireless of that city incessantly disseminated Ukrainian broadcasts hostile to Poland. In Germany Ukrainian maps and pamphlets in the German language, directed against the integrity of the Polish Republic, were distributed.

Whenever Poland intervened on the matter the Germans always replied that their pro-Ukrainian activities were directed against the Soviets and not against Poland, and that if Ukrainian terroristic elements were supported by Germany, it was because they constituted the most active element among the Ukrainian *émigrés*.

Similarly, on the territory of Slovakia Germany began to carry on activities hostile to Poland, and this activity grew stronger as the German plan for separating Slovakia from Bohemia was gradually realized.

Finally, during this period the attitude of Party elements in relation to Poland began to deteriorate—obviously as the result of instructions from above—and revisionist ideas concerning Polish territories were openly propagated.

In November 1938 direct Polish-German relations were exposed to serious difficulties as the result of the ruthless expulsion of 15,000 Jews of Polish citizenship from Germany.

Summing up, I wish to state that the above period brought with it a deterioration in Polish-German relations unprecedented since the conclusion of the Declaration of 1934, and great efforts had to be made by Poland in order to avoid still greater friction.

The crisis in Polish-German relations began in the first half of March 1939.

Acting by surprise, and without any contact with the Polish Government, the Germans created a new situation on the Polish frontier, annexing Bohemia and Moravia, extending a protectorate over Slovakia, building fortifications and establishing garrisons in Western Slovakia, and, finally, establishing a naval base at Memel.

In the course of these German activities, which developed at

[1]No. 49. [2]No. 52.

lightning speed, I tried in vain from March 11 to 13 to obtain an interview with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State. On the evening of March 13 I chanced to meet General von Keitel, and informed him that—despite German activities so immediately affecting Poland—for three days I had been unable to make contact with the German Government. General von Keitel promised to intervene with M. von Ribbentrop the next day on the matter, but this brought no result.

The German assumption of a protectorate over Slovakia was a step explicitly directed against the security of Poland, and the fact that it was carried out in conditions of complete secrecy from the Polish Government was in contradiction to the principles on which the execution of the 1934 Declaration was based. The military operations against Poland in the southern sector in September completely confirmed this.

It was in this atmosphere of tension between the two countries that I had a conversation on March 21 with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his invitation.[1]

Without going into the details of that interview, I wish only to recall that the tone of M. von Ribbentrop's exposition departed considerably from that in which matters affecting the two Governments had been previously discussed, and was in the nature of definite pressure. He put forward the German claims, and urged that the Polish Government should take the swiftest possible decision. In this conversation M. von Ribbentrop made no reference whatever to the ultimatum in regard to Memel, which he had presented the previous day to the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I inquired about his meeting with M. Urbszys, he confined himself to a few explanatory remarks of a purely general character.

The news of the entry of German troops into Memel, and of the Chancellor's demonstrative voyage at the head of the German Fleet along our coast, was as great a surprise to Polish public opinion as the German entry into Slovakia had been.

Despite the prevailing atmosphere, which certainly was not conducive to negotiations, the Polish Government did not hold aloof from further discussions with the German Government. On March 26 I handed M. von Ribbentrop our counter-proposals, in the form of a written note, in respect to Danzig and the motor road.[2] Although M. von Ribbentrop's personal reaction to it was of a negative character, he stated that he would communicate a reply only after the matter had been referred to the Chancellor. The reply in question was not transmitted to me, and only on the occasion of his speech to the Reichstag on April 28 did Chancellor Hitler impart it publicly.[3]

As is known, the Polish Government, not wishing to increase the tension, and desirous of leaving the way open for further conversations, maintained discretion as to the subject of the exchanges of opinion which had taken place in March. By his declaration to the Reichstag on April 28 and his unilateral denunciation of the Declaration of January 26, 1934, which forbade resort to force in mutual

[1]No. 61. [2]Nos. 62-63. [3]No. 75.

relations between the two States, Chancellor Hitler annulled the policy inaugurated between Poland and Germany in 1933.

In his conversation with me on March 26, M. von Ribbentrop spoke strongly against the military steps Poland had taken. Coming from the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs after the German Army's occupation of Prague, the entry into Slovakia, and the naval demonstration off the Polish coast, this objection sounded strange, to say the least. In the face of Germany's obvious steps, of a military character, towards encirclement of Poland to north and south, steps about which, moreover, Poland was left completely uninformed by Berlin, it is difficult to imagine how the responsible Polish authorities could have been expected not to take certain precautionary measures.

Germany's explanation that Poland, by forming an alliance with Great Britain, had joined the so-called 'encirclement front' against Germany, and so had violated the Declaration of January 26, 1934, is, in the light of the situation brought about by German action, entirely groundless. This without reference to the legal aspect of the problem, which was thoroughly covered in the Polish Government's memorandum to the Reich Government on May 5.[1]

The 1934 Declaration was concluded for a term of ten years. For this period both States renounced resort to force in their mutual relations. The application of force can be direct, that is to say, through a direct attack by the particular State. But it can equally well be applied by indirect methods, which sometimes are even more dangerous, because they are less apparent to the world. The tactics employed by Chancellor Hitler's Government usually relied on the second method.

At the time of the March incidents we had to deal with a definite instance of pressure brought to bear on Poland through her military encirclement.

I should remark that in another conversation which I had with M. von Ribbentrop on March 27, 1939, I made the suggestion that public opinion in both countries might be appeased by the publication of a few reassuring words from the two Governments. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs rejected this suggestion.

After Chancellor Hitler's speech on April 28 I left for Warsaw, and went back to Berlin in the second half of May.

On my return I took steps to ascertain whether there was any desire on the German side for conversations with us. I was given to understand that authoritative German circles did not consider the moment suitable for discussions, and that a certain period of time must elapse to allow the atmosphere to clear.

The whole of German diplomacy was taking the line of opposition to Great Britain. The German Press was chiefly attacking Great Britain, endeavouring to represent the attitude Poland had taken towards the German demands as resulting from the Anglo-Polish Agreement.

Grave signs of Germany's aggressive intentions became more and more apparent. Rearmament proceeded at an unprecedented pace,

[1] No. 78.

and the general State administration was entirely subordinated to military requirements.

From April onward contraband in arms developed on a large scale in the territory of Danzig, being carried on by land, sea and air. Simultaneously it was observed that fortifications were being clandestinely built. It became apparent that, contrary to international agreements, the Free City, in understanding with the Reich, was heading for complete militarization.

In spite of Danzig's continual violation of binding agreements, the Polish Government, anxious to avoid a conflict with the Reich, displayed until the end the utmost restraint.

From April onward a considerable aggravation of the situation occurred in the sphere of national minorities. The reason for this has to be sought in the German aim to exterminate the Polish element in the Reich, which was to be achieved through the totalitarian legislation and the Party machinery, and by placing the practical control of the entire life of the Polish minority in Germany in the hands of the Gestapo.

On the other hand, the German propaganda machine launched a violent campaign in defence of the allegedly oppressed German minority in Poland. In this connection I desire to recall that National-Socialism has created a special doctrine for Germans living abroad, subordinating them to the interests of Reich foreign policy. This became the subject of numerous conflicts with various countries, even in South Africa.

This National-Socialist activity in Poland increased in strength from April onward, when the German Government decided—as was confirmed by the numerous cases reported during the first days of the war—to exploit the German minority for diversionist, political and even military aims.

During the period of my mission in Berlin I frequently drew the attention of authoritative German circles to the need for minorities, in the interests of good Polish-German relations, to confine their activities to the cultural and educational sphere. The subjugation of the German minority to Reich policy hostile to Poland was, of course, bound to provoke an understandable reaction on our part.

As in the case of the Sudetens, German propaganda exaggerated every little incident among the German minority in Poland, and in the final phase the Press was daily publishing completely fictitious stories.

Any measures against espionage, treason or sabotage were represented as persecution of the cultural life of the German minority. For lack of other material, the same incidents were written up in various ways, to be republished as new acts of terrorism.

I have many proofs that a large part of public opinion in Germany finally ceased to give credence to this exaggerated propaganda.

In spite of the prevailing tension between Poland and Germany, members of the Embassy maintained normal contact on current matters with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. During my frequent absences from Berlin the Chargé d'Affaires, Prince Lubomirski, often

saw the Under-Secretary of State, M. Woermann, and other high officials in order to discuss various matters, and he took every opportunity of indicating our desire for action to moderate the tone of the Press in both countries. This, however, produced no response from the head of the Press Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

By the end of July the clandestine mobilization in Danzig was proceeding at an extraordinarily intensive pace.

At the beginning of August occurred the well-known incident of the Free City's attempt to rid itself of the Polish Customs control.

On August 9 the State Secretary, M. von Weizsäcker, asked the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, Prince Lubomirski, to call on him, and made an oral statement on the Danzig Customs inspectors' incident.[1] This step was tantamount to German Government interference in relations between Poland and the Free City. The State Secretary avoided giving any explanation of this action.

The Polish Government gave its reply, also in oral form, to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw the next day.[2]

From the beginning of August frontier incidents staged by the Germans increased in number, not only in the Danzig sector, but along the entire Polish-German frontier. The tone of the German Press became more and more aggressive. The entire propaganda machine was directed against Poland and her integrity.

On August 21 came the announcement of M. von Ribbentrop's imminent departure for Moscow to conclude a Soviet-German Pact of Non-Aggression. The Soviet-German negotiations had been shrouded in the deepest secrecy, and rumours of them were received only from certain indirect sources. Down to the last moment the Soviet Embassy in Berlin flatly denied the existence of any political negotiations, intimating that only economic matters were being discussed.

This step on the part of the German Government constituted a complete reversal of their international policy. Under the slogan "The fight against Bolshevism" Chancellor Hitler had engaged in the Spanish Civil War, and had created the so-called Anti-Comintern Bloc. During the whole of my six-year stay in Berlin the German Chancellor, as well as all his collaborators, continually declared that the foundation of Hitler-German policy was exclusion of Soviet Russia from Europe and the struggle against Communism. M. von Ribbentrop more than once told me of his view that Poland should join the Anti-Comintern Pact and that Russia must be pushed still farther east.

By signing the Pact with Moscow Chancellor Hitler threw over his own principles, thus demonstrating that behind his actions was only an opportunism of the moment.

On August 24 at five p.m. I was received by Field-Marshal Goering, with whom I talked for over an hour. The conversation was of a friendly character; it was more a personal than official exchange of opinion, and M. Goering laid particular emphasis on this circumstance. I recall the more important points of the conversation:

[1] No. 85. [2] No. 86.

M. Goering expressed regret that the policy of Polish-German understanding lay in ruins and, seeking the causes, declared that but for the Anglo-Polish Alliance the crisis would not have developed on such a scale, in spite of the difficulties over Danzig.

He gave it unequivocally to be understood that he anticipated war with Poland.

He admitted that by concluding a pact with Russia the Reich had made a complete *volte-face*, and explained that in her international relations Germany must choose between England and Russia.

For my part, I pointed out that Poland followed a consistent policy in relation to both Germany and Russia.

I observed that Moscow desired to provoke war in Europe, which Goering did not deny.

I said I was at the Chancellor's disposition if that would assist in finding a way out of the situation. M. Goering assured me he would inform the Chancellor accordingly.

The British Government, and later the French Government, began their efforts at mediation with the Reich Government on August 22.

I shall not go into the details of these negotiations here, as during that period there was a direct exchange of views between Warsaw, Paris and London. I desire only to point out that I was in continual touch with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson. Both these ambassadors spared no effort and did their utmost to save the peace and bring about direct negotiations between Poland and Germany to clear up the situation.

I cannot omit mention here of the moderating influence of the Italian Ambassador, M. Attolico, who during the years we spent together in Berlin worked unremittingly in the cause of peace.

On August 23 Sir Nevile Henderson presented M. Hitler with a letter in M. Chamberlain's own hand. He received a negative reply.

From August 25 onward, German action against Poland assumed a character verging on aggression. The troop concentrations on the Polish frontier, observed for several days past, steadily increased in dimensions. It was significant that on that day telephonic communication between Germany and the West was cut off. Frontier provocations grew more and more frequent and grave. On that same day Prince Lubomirski handed a note of protest to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in connection with these incidents. The Consulate at Marienwerder reported the severing of telephone lines. The Consul submitted a protest to the president of the region, and personally intervened with him in respect to the deportation from Marienwerder of the teaching staff of the Polish High School. On his return the Consul was confronted with the police, who had forced their way into the Consulate building and had taken possession of it.

The Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to call on him, and put forward a proposal for an understanding with Great Britain. The next day the British Ambassador flew to London. The Chancellor also received the French Ambassador.

On August 26 I visited the Under Secretary of State, M.

Woermann, and handed him a note protesting against the previous day's violation of the Polish frontier on the East Prussian sector by a patrol of ten German soldiers. During this incident a German corporal was shot dead on Polish territory, some 300 metres from the frontier. The Germans left a machine-gun behind.

Then I submitted a note protesting against incidents which had occurred on August 24 on the Silesian sector, during which Polish frontier patrols had been shot at by Germans.

On that same day news was received that M. Foerster had been appointed head of the Free City of Danzig.

And on the same day the French Ambassador handed M. Hitler a letter from M. Daladier.

On August 27 the issue of food-ration cards was announced in Germany and arrangements were made for controlling sales of ready-made clothing. Military and air attachés were informed that they must not leave the district of Berlin without special permission from the German War Office. There followed an extensive calling up of older categories of reservists.

M. Hitler handed the French Ambassador a letter for M. Daladier.

On August 28 the Germans published the notes exchanged between M. Daladier and M. Hitler, in which the latter for the first time officially demanded the union not only of Danzig but also of Pomorze with the Reich. Late in the evening the British Ambassador, who had returned from London, presented the British Government's reply.

On August 29 the German Chancellor informed Sir Nevile Henderson that he would expect a Polish representative with full powers on August 30, and that the German demands concerned the return of Danzig and Pomorze to Germany, as well as protection of the German minority in Poland. The German Government made their participation in an international guarantee to Poland dependent on the Soviet Government's attitude.

On August 31, at 2 a.m., I saw Sir Nevile Henderson, when he informed me of his conversation with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. I learned that M. von Ribbentrop had prepared certain demands in the sphere of Polish-German relations. The British Ambassador could not give me any details, as M. von Ribbentrop had read out the German demands very rapidly and had refused to provide him with a copy of the text.

Sir Nevile Henderson pointed out how threatening was the situation, and advised the establishment of direct Polish-German contact. We discussed the most effectual means of achieving this.

I told the British Ambassador that I would immediately report to my Government.

To this end, in addition to telegrams, early in the morning I sent Prince Lubomirski to Warsaw. As Germany had suspended all regular means of communication with Poland, Prince Lubomirski motored to Poznań and thence flew to Warsaw, arriving before noon.

Soon after 12 o'clock I received telegraphic instructions from Warsaw to hand the Minister for Foreign Affairs a declaration of the

Polish Government's favourable attitude to any proposal for direct negotiations.[1]

At 1 p.m. I asked for an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of presenting my Government's communication.

At 3 p.m. the State Secretary, M. von Weizsäcker, telephoned to inquire whether I sought an interview with the Foreign Minister in the capacity of a fully empowered delegate or in some other capacity. I replied that I was asking for an interview as Ambassador, to present a declaration from my Government.

At 6.15 p.m. I was requested to call on M. von Ribbentrop immediately. He received me in the presence of Minister Schmidt.

Having communicated my Government's declaration, I presented it in writing:

"Last night the Polish Government were informed by the British Government of an exchange of views with the Reich Government as to a possibility of direct negotiations between the Polish and the German Governments.

"The Polish Government are favourably considering the British Government's suggestion, and will make them a formal reply on the subject during the next few hours."

I added that I had been trying to present this declaration since 1 p.m.

M. von Ribbentrop asked me whether I had come in the capacity of delegate with full powers, to which I replied that for the time being I had only been instructed to submit the above declaration for the German Government's information.

M. von Ribbentrop asked whether I was acquainted with the latest Anglo-German conversations, to which I answered that I had received indirect information regarding them, since these matters had been handled directly between Warsaw and London.

At the end of our conversation M. von Ribbentrop stated that he had thought I would come as a fully empowered delegate, and that he would inform the Chancellor of the Polish Government's declaration.

On my return to the Embassy I found myself unable to communicate with Warsaw, as the Germans had cut the telephone lines. This prevented my getting in touch with my Government by the quickest means. On August 26 the German authorities had severed direct railway communication with Poland. Telephonic communications had similarly been rendered impossible or impeded since the same date.

I informed the French and British Ambassadors of the nature of my conversation with M. von Ribbentrop. I learned of the invitation extended by the State Secretary to both Ambassadors and the American Chargé d'Affaires, to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs between 9 and 10 p.m. There they were informed that as a Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived, it was considered that the German proposals contained in sixteen points had been rejected by Poland. I desire to state emphatically that the German demands, contained in sixteen points, have never been handed or communicated to me by the German Government.

The German wireless had broadcast a similar communiqué at

[1]No. 110.

9 o'clock, publishing the German proposals as comprised in the sixteen points, while the Press issued special editions.[1] Not until the German proposals were published in the Press did I learn of their exact nature.

At about 11 p.m. Prince Lubomirski arrived by car from Warsaw.

During the same night the German wireless stations broadcast false information of aggressive action taken by Polish military detachments on the German frontier. The same night I had yet another conversation with the French and British Ambassadors.

In the early hours of September 1 I learned from the wireless that German armed forces had invaded Poland, and that the German air force had bombed a number of Polish towns.

In the morning I received a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that in the interests of my personal safety I was requested not to leave the Embassy building. At about 1 p.m. Prince Lubomirski called in my name on the Director of the Protocol, Baron Doernberg, and asked for my passports.

Arrangements for our departure were discussed. I suggested the route via Hungary, whereas the Ministry for Foreign Affairs considered that for technical reasons departure to Denmark would be more desirable. It was arranged with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the personnel of the Berlin Consulate would leave simultaneously with that of the Embassy, while the personnel of other Polish consulates would leave separately and by different routes.[2]

I collected the Embassy personnel in the Embassy building.

In accordance with arrangements made between the Polish and Swedish Governments for the protection of the property and citizens of the State of Poland in Germany, in the event of war, I exchanged notes with the Swedish minister, M. Richert, handing over this charge to him. M. Richert and his staff accorded us every attention.

I handed the keys of the Embassy building and those of the Berlin Consulate General to the Councillor of the Swedish Legation, M. de Post, who was present at our departure.

In the evening of September 1 I received a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requesting me to communicate to the Polish Government the German Government's declaration of its intention to refrain from bombarding open towns, provided a similar undertaking was given by the Polish Government. I replied immediately with an unofficial note to say that, owing to the absence of communications, I was not able to transmit the contents of the German note to my Government. Shortly afterwards the Ministry for Foreign Affairs telephoned to say that they were prepared to establish telephonic communication with Warsaw via Denmark, to which I expressed my assent. Thus the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw were informed of the German note.[3]

[1] No. 124.

[2] It has to be stated that the Polish Consul-General at Koenigsberg, M. Wachalowski, the Polish Consul at Allenstein, M. Jalowieski, and the attaché at the Consulate General in Koenigsberg, M. Winiarski, were interned in Reich territory. The same fate befell five other members of the Polish Consular service in Germany.

[3] No. 113.

On September 2, the sixth anniversary of my arrival in Berlin, with the members of the Embassy and the Consulate General in Berlin I left in a special train, which departed from the Charlottenburg Station at 8.30 a.m. for Denmark. A representative of the Protocol accompanied us to the frontier.

Every courtesy was shown us during the journey.

The halt at the Danish frontier station of St. Peter lasted all the day of September 3, pending agreement as to the date when the members of the German Embassy in Warsaw were to cross the Lithuanian frontier. We crossed the Danish frontier during the night of September 4-5.

Immediately before my departure from Germany I was notified by the representative of the Protocol that, as two members of the German Embassy had been detained in Poland, he was obliged to hold the Assistant Military Attaché, Captain Bialy, and Embassy Attaché M. Szubert, in Germany. I commended them by telephone to the special care of the Swedish Minister in Berlin. On the following day the matter of the detention was settled, and MM. Bialy and Szubert duly arrived in Denmark.

In Denmark we were given a most hospitable and cordial reception.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

Auswärtiges Amt.

Note Verbale

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to communicate to the Polish Embassy that, in the interests of the personal safety of the Ambassador and the members of the Polish Embassy, it is requested that they remain in the Embassy or at their residences until further notice. Should some urgent reason render it necessary for the Ambassador or his staff to leave the Embassy or their residences, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs requests that a car be used and that the Ministry be notified in advance, in order that police protection may be accorded the persons concerned.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has also advised all Polish Consulates in Germany to the same effect.

Berlin, September 1, 1939.

Appendix II

Auswärtiges Amt.

Note Verbale

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the Polish Embassy that preparations are being made for the departure of the members of the Polish Consular posts to neutral countries. The Government of the Reich must, however, make the evacuation of the members of the Polish Consular posts from the territory of the Reich conditional upon the Polish Government giving a formal assurance that unimpeded and protected departure from Polish territory will be accorded the members of the German Consular posts in Poland.

In order to facilitate the earliest possible departure of the members of the Polish Consular posts, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs suggests that the Polish Embassy should arrange for a similar declaration as to the unimpeded and safe departure of the members of the German Consular posts in Poland to be issued as soon as possible.

Berlin, September 1, 1939.

Appendix III

Auswärtiges Amt.

Note Verbale

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to refer to its Note Verbale of September 1, 1939, and to inform the Polish Embassy that the special train which is to take the members of the Polish Embassy, as well as those of the Polish Consulate-General to a neutral

country, as mentioned in the said Note Verbale, will leave Berlin on September 2, 1939, at 8.31 from the Charlottenburg Station, Gerviniusstrasse, south side, in the direction of Denmark.

Instructions have been issued that the cars to be furnished by the German military authorities for the members of the Polish Embassy and the Polish Consulate-General are to be before the building of the Polish Embassy at Kurfürstenstrasse 136 for the drive to the station, two hours prior to the departure of the special train. Lorries will also be provided for the transport of a restricted quantity of baggage.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs requests punctuality on the part of the persons leaving in the special train, since the time scheduled for its departure must be strictly observed.

Berlin, September 1, 1939.

Part Two

Polish-Soviet Relations

INTRODUCTION

The Russian defeats during the war of 1914-17 and the revolution which followed in 1917 revealed the weakness of the Russian State organism, which was proved incapable of withstanding any serious strain during a period of international crisis. The dissolution which set in as a result of the events of 1917 rendered possible a liberation movement among the peoples enslaved by the Tsarist régime. During the years 1917 to 1920 a very strong centrifugal movement was at work in all the Russian borderlands, each nation declaring its independence and setting up its own State. The Bolshevik Government attempted to oppose this trend, since its tendency towards revolutionary expansion was, though perhaps still unconsciously, analogous with Imperial Russian interests. The war with Poland was the culminating phase in the Bolshevik Government's endeavours to recover lands belonging to the former Russian Empire in the name of the Communist Revolution; but this war was also something more, namely, a conflict between the State of Poland, defending Western civilization, and the State of Russia, which at that time was the greatest existing menace to that civilization. The Polish victory at Warsaw in August 1920 involved the defeat of Bolshevism's movement towards revolutionary expansion, and its Westward advance was by Polish efforts held in check for nearly twenty years.

After the armistice in October 1920, negotiations were opened which led to the peace treaty between Poland and Russia, signed at Riga on March 18, 1921. Thenceforth the situation was stabilized. The process of disintegration of Russia which had begun in 1917 was halted in its course. Certain of the nations oppressed under the Tsarist régime achieved their independence, but others were brought back under the yoke, this time that of the Bolshevik régime. As the result of the Riga Peace Treaty a temporary equilibrium was established, and by its signature the two chief countries of Eastern Europe, Russia and Poland, renounced further offensive action against each other.

From that time on Poland was occupied with the task of organizing the State, while Russia, though she did not cease her revolutionary propaganda, devoted herself to consolidating the Bolshevik régime. Gradually this régime was changed in its nature, growing more and more Russian in the sense that it took on characteristics corresponding to the mentality of the Russian people. The former revolutionary Communism of the Lenin period yielded place to a régime which in many respects recalled the methods of government employed by Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The immutable Russian character again took the ascendant, subjugating the revolutionary doctrine to itself; yet that doctrine was not renounced, but was adapted to its milieu. From the time when Stalin achieved absolute power, not only was the individual sacrificed to the State, but the State was

subordinated to the will of one man. An autocracy in complete accordance with Russian traditions resorted to methods recalling the worst traditions of that unhappy people. The terror which compelled the nation to change its very character, to adopt, perforce, entirely new ways of existence alien to it; the sacrifice not only of freedom but of the individual life to dreams of a problematic better future for society: these are no new ideas, for the Russians have known them again and again in their history.

So long as Russia did not attempt to take active part in the international field and did not put her powers to the test, her weakness remained undisclosed, especially because of the almost impassable wall which divided Russian society from the rest of the world. So much so, that certain people even erroneously thought that the imposing numerical strength of the Russian population was paralleled by a Russian State of equal strength.

These were the conditions which governed the East European equilibrium, which was based mainly on the Treaty of Riga. Poland had no intention of disturbing that equilibrium. It might have seemed that it was even more in the Soviet interest not to disturb the security which existed in that part of Europe, since this security enabled the Bolshevik régime to take steps to consolidate its position, or at the least to mask its weakness. It might have seemed that Russia, although engaging in speculative operations designed to enfeeble other States as the result of war, would herself remain warily in the shade until the last moment.

None the less, when Germany unleashed a European war and the German Army invaded Polish territory, the equilibrium in Eastern Europe was disturbed. In the new, favourable situation thus created for it, the old Russian imperialism, which had assumed the aspect of Bolshevik imperialism, revived, prevailing over the previous caution. Soviet expansion, checked at Warsaw in 1920 and held in restraint by the Riga Peace Treaty with its establishment of equilibrium in Eastern Europe, again sprang into action with a vitality unknown since that year. The aggression upon Poland on September 17, 1939, was its first step. By assisting Germany to eliminate the Polish factor, the Soviets destroyed the equilibrium of forces which had existed ever since 1920 and opened themselves a road to further expansion. The second step along this road was the establishment of a *de facto* protectorate over the Baltic States, while the third was the aggression against Finland. Failing co-operation with Germany, these Soviet actions could not have occurred, for they would have been beyond the possibilities and the strength of the Soviet State. In alliance with Germany, Soviet Russia was able to return to the imperialist traditions of Tsarist Russia, and, in accordance with those traditions, was able to set about modifying the situation in Eastern Europe.

It is impossible to estimate what influence Russia's abandonment of her attitude of cautious expectation and her change-over to naked imperialism may have on the destinies of Eastern Europe, and also on those of Russia herself. But one fact is already established, namely, that Soviet Russia's contact with the outside world, from which the

Bolshevik Government had forcibly isolated her, has made it possible for the first time to obtain a clear insight into the workings of the Soviet mechanism. And whether that contact be with the population of occupied territories or of lands in which Soviet military bases have been established, or whether it be on the field of battle against the Finnish Army, the result is a revelation to all outside her own frontiers. Whereas hitherto the weakness of the Soviet State has been carefully concealed from foreigners, and clever propaganda has built up a wall of illusions, that weakness has now been displayed to all the world.

No. 148

TREATY OF PEACE *between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine, signed at Riga, March* 18, 1921

ARTICLE 2

THE two Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, recognize the independence of the Ukraine and of White Russia, and agree and decide that the eastern frontier of Poland, that is to say, the frontier between Poland on the one hand, and Russia, White Russia and the Ukraine on the other, shall be as follows:

The frontier shall follow the course of the Western Dzwina, from the frontier between Russia and Latvia, to the point at which the frontier of the former Government of Wilno meets the frontier of the former Government of Witebsk; thence it shall follow the frontier between the former Governments of Wilno and Witebsk as far as the road running from the village of Drozdy to the town of Orzechowno, leaving the road and the town of Orzechowno to Poland;

It shall then cross the railway line near the town of Orzechowno, and, turning towards the south-west, shall run along the railway line, leaving the station of Zahacie to Poland, the village of Zahacie to Russia, and the village of Stelmachowo to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the eastern frontier of the former Government of Wilno as far as the meeting point of the districts of Dzisna, Lepel and Borysow;

Thence it shall follow the frontier of the former Government of Wilno at an approximate distance of one kilometre, as far as the point at which this frontier turns westward near to Sosnowiec;

Thence the frontier shall continue in a straight line towards the sources of the River Czernica to the east of Hornowa, and thereafter it shall follow the Czernica river as far as the village of Wielka-Czernica, which it shall leave to White Russia;

Thence it shall continue in a south-westerly direction, across the Lake of Miadziol, to the village of Zarzeczyck which shall be left to White Russia, together with the village of Chmielewszczyzna; on the other hand, the villages of Starosiele, and of Turowszczyzna shall belong to Poland;

Thence the frontier shall run in a south-westerly direction to the confluence of the River Wilja with an unnamed stream on the west of the village of Drohomicz, leaving to White Russia the following villages: Uhly, Wolbarowicze, Borowe, Szunowka, Beztrock, Daleka, Klaczkówek, Zazantów, Maciejowce, and the following to Poland: Komajsk, Raszkówka, Osowa, Kusk, Wardomicze, Solone, Milcz;

Thence the line shall follow the river Wilja to the road on the south of the town of Dolhinowo;

Thence it shall pass to the south as far as the village of Baturyn, leaving to White Russia all that road and the villages of Rahozin, of Tokary, of Polosy and of Hluboczany, and to Poland the following

villages: Owsianiki, Czarnorucze, Zurawa, Ruszczyce, Zaciemień, Borki, Czerwiaki and Baturyn;

Thence it shall run to the town of Radoszkowicze, leaving to White Russia the villages of Papysze, Sieliszcze, Podworany, Trusowicze North, Doszki, Cyganowo, Dworzyszcze, and Czyrewicze, and to Poland the villages of Lukawiec, Mordasy, Rubce, Lawcowicze North, and Lawcowicze South, Budzki, Klimonty, Wielkie Bakszty, and the town of Radoszkowicze;

Thence it shall follow the River Wiazówka, to the village of Lipienie, leaving the latter village to Poland, then running in a south-westerly direction, crossing the railway and leaving the station of Radoszkowicze to White Russia;

Thence it shall run southward as from the town of Raków, leaving to White Russia the villages of Wiekszyce, Dolzenie, Mietkowa, Wielka Borozdynka and Kozielszczyzna, and to Poland the villages of Szypowaly, Macewicze, Stary Raków, Kuczkuny and the town of Raków;

Thence the frontier shall continue as far as the town of Wolma, leaving to White Russia the villages of: Wielkie Siolo, Malawka, Lukasze, and Szczepki, and to Poland the villages of Duszkowo, Chimorydy, Jankowce, and the town of Wolma;

Thence it shall follow the road from the town of Wolma as far as the town of Rubiezewicze, leaving that road and the town to Poland;

Thence it shall continue southward as far as the unnamed inn situated at the point at which the Baranowicze-Mińsk railway crosses the Nowy Swierzeń-Mińsk road (see map, scale one English inch to ten versts, above the letter M at the beginning of the word Miezinowka, and map scale one English inch to twenty-five versts, near Kolosowo) leaving the inn to Poland; the villages of Papki, Zywica, Poloniewicze, Osinówka, shall go to White Russia and the villages of Lichacze and of Rozanka shall go to Poland;

Thence the frontier shall pass across the centre of the Nieświeź-Cimkowicze road to the west of Kukowicze, leaving the villages of Swerynowo, Kutiec, Lunina, Jazwina North, Bieliki, Jazwin, Rymasze, and Kukowicze (all three) to White Russia; the villages of Kul, Buczne, Dwianopol, Zurawy, Posieki, Juszewicze, Lisuny North and Lisuny South, Sultanowszczyzna and Pleszewicze to Poland;

Thence it shall pass halfway between Kleck and Cimkowicze (between the villages of Puzowo and Prochody), leaving to White Russia the villages of Rajówka, Sawicze, Zarakowce, and Puzowo, and to Poland the villages of Marusin, East Smolicze, Lecieszyn, and Prochody;

Thence it shall continue as far as the Warsaw-Moscow road, crossing it to the west of the village of West Filipowicze, and leaving the village of Ciechowa to White Russia and the village of Jodczyce to Poland;

Thence it shall run south as far as the Morocz river, near Choropol, leaving the villages of Stare Mokrany, Zadworze, Mokrany and Choropol to White Russia, and the villages of Ciecierowiec, Ostaszki, Lozowicze, and Nowe Mokrany to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the Morocz river as far as its confluence with the river Slucz of Minsk;

Thence it shall follow the river Slucz as far as its confluence with the River Prypeć;

Thence it shall continue towards the village of Berezce, leaving the villages of Lubowicze, Chilczyce, and Berezce to White Russia, and the villages of North Lutki and South Lutki to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the road from the village of Bukcza, leaving the road and the village of Bukcza to White Russia and the village of Korma to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the Sarny-Olewsk railway, which it shall cross between the stations of Ostki and Snowidowicze, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Wojtkowicze, Sobiczyn, Michalówka, and Budki Snowidowickie, and to Poland the villages of Radziwilowicze, Raczków, Bialowiska, Bialowiź, and Snowidowicze;

Thence the frontier shall continue towards the village of Myszakówka, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Majdan Holyszewski, Zaderewie, Marjanpol, Zolny, Klomowa, and Rudnia Klonowska, and to Poland the villages of Derć, Okopy, Netreba, Woniacze, Perelysianka, Nowa Huta, and Myszakówka;

Thence it shall continue as far as the mouth of the River Korczyk, leaving the village of Mlynek to the Ukraine;

Thence it shall run up the River Korczyk, leaving the town of Korzec to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the village of Milatyn, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Poddubce, Kilikijów, Dolzki, Narajówka, Ulaszanówka, and Marjanówka, and the villages of Bohdanówka, Czernica, Krylów, Majków, Dolha, Friederland, Poreba Kuraska, and Milatyn to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the road leading from the village of Milatyn to the town of Ostróg, leaving the villages of Moszczanówka, Krzywin, and Solowie to the Ukraine, and the villages of Moszczanica, Bodówka, Wilbowno, the town of Ostrog and the road to Poland;

Thence it shall run up the River Wilja as far as the village of Chodaki, which remains to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the town of Bialozórka, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Wielka Borowica, Stepanówka, North Bajmaki and South Bajmaki, Liski, Siwki, Woloski, the town of Jampol, the villages of Didkowce, Wiazowiec, and Krzywczyki, and to Poland the villages of Bolozówka, Sadki, Obory, Szkrobotówka, Pańkowce, Grzybowa, Lysohorka, Molodzków, and the town of Bialozórka;

Thence it shall continue as far as the River Zbrucz, leaving the road and the village of Szczesnówka to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the River Zbrucz, as far as its confluence with the River Dniester.

Article 3

Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the west of the frontier laid down by Article 2

of the present Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favour of the Ukraine and of White Russia all rights and claims to the territory situated to the east of this frontier. The two Contracting Parties agree that, in so far as the territory situated to the west of the frontier fixed in Article 2 of the present Treaty includes districts which form the subject of a dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the question of the attribution of these districts to one of those two States is a matter which exclusively concerns Poland and Lithuania.

No. 149

DECISION *of the Conference of Ambassadors, March* 15, 1923, *on the subject of the frontiers of Poland*

THE British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, signatories with the United States of America, as the principal Allied and associated Powers, of the Versailles Treaty of Peace:

Considering that by the terms of Article 87, paragraph 3, of the said Treaty, it is for them to fix the frontiers of Poland, which have not been specified by that Treaty;

Considering that on February 15, 1923, the Polish Government addressed to the Conference of Ambassadors a request inviting the Powers there represented to avail themselves of the rights conferred on them by the said Article;

That, for its part, the Lithuanian Government has already, in its note of November 18, 1922, shown itself anxious to see the said Powers avail themselves of the said rights;

Considering that by the terms of Article 91 of the Treaty of Peace of Saint Germain-en-Laye, Austria has renounced in favour of the principal allied and associated Powers all its rights and titles to the territories which previously belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, situated outside the new frontiers of Austria, as they are described in Article 27 of the said Treaty, are not actually the subject of any attribution;

Considering that it is recognized by Poland that in so far as the eastern part of Galicia is concerned, the ethnographical conditions necessitate an autonomous régime;

Considering that the Treaty concluded between the principal allied and associated Powers and Poland on June 28, 1919, has provided for special guarantees in favour of racial, language and religious minorities in all the territories placed under Polish sovereignty;

Considering that so far as its frontier with Russia is concerned, Poland has entered into direct relations with that State with a view to determining the line;

That in so far as the frontier between Poland and Lithuania is concerned, there is cause to take into account the actual situation resulting, notably, from the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on February 3, 1923;

Have charged the Conference of Ambassadors with the regulation of this question.

In consequence, the Conference of Ambassadors:

1. Decides to recognize as the frontiers of Poland:

(1) With Russia:

The line drawn and delimited by the agreement between the two States and on their responsibility dated November 28, 1922.

(2) With Lithuania:

The line below described (according to the German map, scale 1: 100,000):

From the point where the northern administrative limit of the district of Suwalki meets the frontier of Eastern Prussia (the point common to Eastern Prussia, Poland and Lithuania) and as far as the most southerly point of re-entry of the limit of the district of Suwalki, a point situated at about seven kilometres to the north-west of Puńsk, the northern administrative limit of the district of Suwalki;

Thence towards the south-east as far as a point on the road Berzniki-Kopciowo, situated about two kilometres to the south-east of Berzniki:

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving Puńsk to Poland, traversing Lake Galadus from its north-westerly extremity as far as a point situated about two kilometres to the north of Zegary, then passing towards the east, then parallel with the line of small lakes situated between Berzniki and Zegary at about two kilometres to the east of these lakes;

Thence as far as a point about two kilometres 500 metres to the east of Zelwa on the River Marycha, a line to be determined on the spot;

Thence, down the course of the River Marycha as far as the confluence of a small tributary situated on the left bank of this river and immediately above Studzianka;

Thence, a line to be determined on the spot as far as the source of the River Igorka, then the course of this river which passes to Warwiszki as far as its confluence with the Niemen;

Thence, down the course of the River Niemen as far as the confluence of the River Grawe;

Thence, the River Grawe as far as the point where it intersects the high road from Merecz to Rotnica;

Thence, a line to be determined on the spot as far as the confluence of the River Skroblis with the River Mereczanka;

Thence, the course of the Mereczanka as far as a bridge about 300 metres to the south-east of Podkamień;

Thence and as far as frontier post 142 at about two kilometres to the north-east of Strzelciszki:

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving to Lithuania the localities of Podkamień, Karpiszki, Strzelciski, to Poland those of Bortele, Kukle, and passing by way of the intersection of the roads from Bobryszki to Olkieniki and from Orany to Wojtowo on the railway from Grodno to Wilno;

Thence as far as a point to be determined on the course of the River Wilja at about 800 metres to the west of Siurmańce:

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving to Lithuania the localities of Kalańce, Szpiengleniki, Giecieniszki, Uzuleje, Prybańce, Greczówka, Ismańce, Jagielany, Dergiańce, Kopciszki, Zailgi, Chwoszczyzna, Niedzwiedówka, Janczuny, Daniliszki, Jerzówka, Nowy Dwór, Promyslówka, Walakiszki, Kurkliszki, Kalejkiemie, Wiluniszki, Kiermanczyszki, Bialolesie and Owsieniszki, and leaving to Poland the localities of Wójtowo, Puszkarnia, Czarnókowale, Kol-Lejpuny, Wejksztelańce, Ejgielańce, Markowszczyzna, Strazn, Skobsk, Wizgirdy, Dombrowo, Dembniaki, Stanislawówka, Kotysz, Staszkuniszki, Lebiedzie, Mejluszki, Podworańce, Glity, Pietkieniszki, Kiermeliszki, Kudrany, Poniewiezka, Mejdany, Miciuny, Lojciszki, Mejryszki, Barcie, Jateluny, Puzanowo, Kazimirówka and Siurmańce;

Thence, the course of the River Wilja as far as a point situated about one kilometre 200 metres to the south of Sejmieniszki.

Thence and as far as a point to be determined at the south-western extremity of Lake Dubińskie to the south of Zaltynie:

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory Pospierze, Kejmińce, Sketery, Olinowo, Pory, Kontromiszki, Kiele, Awizańce, Nieczańce, Bojary, Olany, Palki, Ollis, Okmiánka, Towkiele, Aleksandryszki, Gawejki, Zaltynie, and in Polish territory the localities of Podworzańce, Podgaj, Drawcza, Mejluny, Papiernia, Bortkuszki, Uzubledzie, Lipówka, Poblyńdzie, Zyndule, Astyki, Szalkowszczyzna, Romaszkańce, Pogiry, Borówka, Santoki, Pustylki, Gudejki, Stolewszczyzna, Zylwiszki, Szmilginie, Gawejki, Sidabry;

Thence, a line traversing Lake Dubińskie as far as a point to be determined on the north-east bank at about 500 metres to the south-east of Olka;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined on the south bank of Lake Prowal to the east of Surgańce:

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Olka, Lake Bolosza, Labejszyszki, Mlynek, Janiszki, Szerejkiszki, Surgańce, and in Polish territory the localities of Jankuniszki, Purwiniszki, Szarkiszki, Maciejowo, Orniany, Skardzie, Nowosiólka, Grzybiańce;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined on the southern edge of the lake on the bank of which is Antolkony and at 500 metres to the west of this locality:

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Madejki, Mazule, Szakaliszki, Andrulańce, Zukowszczyzna, Zemajtyszki, Prudziszki, Poluknis, Pozenis, Zwirbliszki, Sidoriszki, Melejszany, and in Polish territory the localities of Maldziuny, Rutowszczyzna, Baranowo, Antoledzie, Berniuny, Lyngmiany, Antokalny:

And thence as far as the frontier of Latvia:

A line to be determined on the spot running towards the north-east then towards the north, passing between Lake Bolosza and Lake Dringis, and leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Auksztenis, Achramiańce, Rejnie, Azany, Sadziuny, W.-Derewnia, Suntupie,

Kalniszki, Szablowczyzna, Mugliszki, Jurkokalnie, Smolweczki, Werugiszki, and in Polish territory the localities of Kozaczyzna, Mejluny, Wardzikiemie, Aliejuny, Sakiszki, Pozemiszki, Karaczuny, Smolwy, Paukszteliszki, Smolwy (north), Dulkiszki, Matejkiszki;

The tracing of this line on the spot is left to the care of the two Governments concerned, who will have every latitude to proceed, by mutual agreement, to rectifications of detail which they may recognize on the spot as indispensable.

2. Decides to recognize to Poland, which accepts all rights of sovereignty over the territories comprised between the frontiers above defined and the other frontiers of the Polish territory, with reserve to the dispositions of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Saint Germain-en-Laye concerning the charges and obligations incumbent upon the States to which any territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

ERIC PHIPPS. R. POINCARÉ.
ROMANO AREZZANA. M. MATSUDA.

The undersigned, duly authorized, declares, in the name of the Polish Government, his acceptance of the foregoing dispositions.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

MAURICE ZAMOYSKI

No. 150

PROTOCOL, *signed at Moscow, February* 9, 1929, *between Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the immediate entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of August* 27, 1928, *regarding renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy*

THE Government of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, His Majesty the King of Rumania, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being desirous of promoting the maintenance of peace between their respective countries and for this purpose of putting into force without delay, between the peoples of those countries, the Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, have decided to achieve this purpose by means of the present Protocol and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries . . .

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

THE Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, a copy of which is attached

to the present Protocol as an integral part of that instrument, shall come into force between the Contracting Parties after the ratification of the said Treaty of Paris of 1928 by the competent legislative bodies of the respective Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

THE entry into force in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 in reciprocal relations between the Parties to the present Protocol shall be valid independently of the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 as provided in Article 3 of the last-named Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

1. THE present Protocol shall be ratified by the competent legislative bodies of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with the requirements of their respective constitutions.

2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within one week of the ratification of the present Protocol by the respective Parties.

3. As from the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two of the Contracting Parties, the present Protocol shall come into force between those two Parties. In reciprocal relations between the other Contracting Parties and the States for which it has already come into force, the Protocol shall come into force as and when their instruments of ratification are deposited.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall immediately notify the deposit of the several ratifications to all the signatories to the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 4

IN order to give effect to Article 1 of the present Protocol, each of the High Contracting Parties, after ratification by its legislative bodies of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, shall immediately notify the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the other Parties to the present Protocol, through the diplomatic channel.

ARTICLE 5

THE present Protocol shall be open for the accession of the Governments of all countries. Notification of final accession shall be made to the address of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall duly notify all the other Parties to the present Protocol. Immediately on receipt of such notification of accession, the present Protocol shall be put into force in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 6

THE entry into force, in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the said Protocol, shall be effected in the way laid down in Article 4 of the Protocol.

ARTICLE 7

THE present Protocol has been drawn up in a single copy, an authentic copy of which shall be communicated by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to each of the signatory or acceding States.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed their seals thereto.

No. 151

PACT *of Non-Aggression between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed at Moscow, July* 25, 1932

THE President of the Polish Republic, of the one part, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part,

Desirous of maintaining the present state of peace between their countries, and convinced that the maintenance of peace between them constitutes an important factor in the work of preserving universal peace;

Considering that the Treaty of Peace of March 18, 1921, constitutes, now as in the past, the basis of their reciprocal relations and undertakings;

Convinced that the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the exclusion of all that might be contrary to the normal condition of relations between States are the surest means of arriving at the goal desired;

Declaring that none of the obligations hitherto assumed by either of the Parties stands in the way of the peaceful development of their mutual relations or is incompatible with the present Pact;

Have decided to conclude the present Pact with the object of amplifying and completing the Pact for the renunciation of war signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, and put into force by the Protocol signed at Moscow on February 9, 1929, and for that purpose have designated as their Plenipotentiaries . . .

Who, after exchanging their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

THE two Contracting Parties, recording the fact that they have renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, reciprocally undertake to refrain from taking any aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other Party, either alone or in conjunction with other Powers.

Any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the other Contracting Party shall be regarded as contrary to the undertakings contained in the present Article, even if such acts are committed without declaration of war and avoid all possible warlike manifestations.

ARTICLE 2

SHOULD one of the Contracting Parties be attacked by a third State or by a group of other States, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to give aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor State during the whole period of the conflict.

If one of the Contracting Parties commits an act of aggression against a third State the other Contracting Party shall have the right to be released from the present Treaty without previous denunciation.

ARTICLE 3

EACH of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to be a party to any agreement openly hostile to the other Party from the point of view of aggression.

ARTICLE 4

THE undertakings provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of the present Pact shall in no case limit or modify the international rights and obligations of each Contracting Party under agreements concluded by it before the coming into force of the present Pact, so far as the said agreements contain no aggressive elements.

ARTICLE 5

THE two Contracting Parties, desirous of settling and solving, exclusively by peaceful means, any disputes and differences, of whatever nature or origin, which may arise between them, undertake to submit questions at issue, which it has not been possible to settle within a reasonable period by diplomatic channels, to a procedure of conciliation, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the application of the procedure of conciliation, which constitutes an integral part of the present Pact and shall be signed separately and ratified as soon as possible simultaneously with the Pact of Non-Aggression.[1]

[1]The Convention for Conciliation between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed at Moscow, November 23, 1932.

ARTICLE 6

THE present Pact shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Warsaw within thirty days following the ratification by Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after which the Pact shall come into force immediately.

ARTICLE 7

THE Pact is concluded for three years. If it is not denounced by one of the Contracting Parties, after previous notice of not less than six months before the expiry of that period, it shall be automatically renewed for a further period of two years.

ARTICLE 8

THE present Pact is drawn up in Polish and Russian, both texts being authentic.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE No. 1

THE Contracting Parties declare that Article 7 of the Pact of July 25, 1932, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the expiry of the time-limit or denunciation before the expiry of the time-period under Article 7 could have as a result the limitation or cancellation of the obligations arising out of the Pact of Paris of 1928.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE No. 2

ON signing the Pact of Non-Aggression this day, the two Parties, having exchanged their views on the draft Conciliation Convention submitted by the Soviet Party, declare that they are convinced that there is no essential difference of opinion between them.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

No. 152

CONVENTION *for the Definition of Aggression, Signed at London, July* 3, 1933

HIS Majesty the King of Rumania, the President of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of

the Polish Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, and his Majesty the King of Afghanistan;

Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression;

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, the defence of their territories, and the free development of their institutions;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries;

And judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force, as between their countries, precise rules defining aggression, until such time as those rules shall become universal;

Have decided, with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention, and have duly authorized for this purpose . . .

Who have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report dated May 24, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Politis Report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which report was made in consequence of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

Article 2

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5. Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

ARTICLE 3

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2 (for examples see Annex).

ARTICLE 4

THE present Convention shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its laws.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the High Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by two of the High Contracting Parties, the present Convention shall come into force as between those two Parties. The Convention shall come into force as regards each of the other High Contracting Parties when it deposits its instruments of ratification.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall immediately be notified by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to all the signatories of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 5

THE present Convention has been signed in eight copies, of which each of the High Contracting Parties has received one.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done in London, July 3, 1933.

ANNEX

To Article 3 of the Convention Relating to the Definition of Aggression.

The High Contracting Parties, signatories of the Convention relating to the definition of aggression,

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article 3 of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor,

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

(*a*) The internal condition of a State:

E.g., its political, economic, or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

(*b*) The international conduct of a State:

E.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial, or other obligations towards

foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

Protocol of Signature.

It is hereby agreed between the High Contracting States that should one or more of the other States immediately adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accede in the future to the present Convention, the said accession shall confer on the State or States in question the same rights and shall impose on them the same obligations as those conferred and imposed on the ordinary signatories.[1]

Done at London, on July 3, 1933.

No. 153

STATEMENT *made by M. Beck to the Representative of the Iskra Press Agency on the Convention of the Eastern Powers*

Warsaw, July 3, 1933.

I CONSIDER the Convention for the definition of Aggression, which has been signed to-day by the Representatives of Poland, Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Rumania, Turkey and the U.S.S.R., as an important political and outstandingly creative act. In the system of Eastern regional pacts it is a synthesis of individual efforts towards the effective organization of a peaceable co-existence. The geographical scope of this Convention is the best indication of its true political significance.

In Poland's foreign policy the Convention for the definition of Aggression is a logical sequence to a whole series of political agreements which are the basis of the constantly improving Polish-Soviet relations. I have in mind the Protocol signed at Moscow in 1929 accelerating the bringing into force of the Kellogg Pact, the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Conciliation Agreement.

In view of our Alliance with Rumania and relations with the Soviet Union, the signatures of Soviet Russia, Rumania and Poland on the same political Agreement are a source of special satisfaction to us.

No. 154

SPEECH *by Commissar Litvinov at the Reception given in honour of M. Beck*

Moscow, February 14, 1934.

I AM extremely glad, Monsieur le Ministre, to welcome you in the name of the Soviet Union Government and in my own.

[1]On July 22, 1933, the Republic of Finland adhered to this Convention.

Your arrival has all the more significance for us, because it is the first official visit paid to our country by a member of the Government of our neighbouring State of Poland. I can affirm with the utmost satisfaction that the change which has occurred in the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Poland, together with the further successful development of those relations, has found its expression in acts having immeasurably important significance not only for relations between our countries, but also for the consolidation of universal peace. I have in mind the very happy conclusion between our two countries of a Pact of Non-Aggression together with a Convention for the definition of Aggression. In the present international conditions, in conditions of increasing distrust among countries, the conclusion of these two agreements is a valuable contribution to the work of establishing lasting universal peace.

Nor can I omit to mention the undoubted successes in the sphere of a cultural *rapprochement* between our two countries. The reciprocal visits of representatives of science and art in the Soviet Union and the Republic of Poland, which have led to co-operation between us, are equally symptoms of a successful and varied development of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. The warm reception which our airmen received during their stay in Poland, and the visit to the U.S.S.R. of a squadron of Polish military aeroplanes with General Rayski at its head, who left the best of memories with us, must equally be regarded as factors in the *rapprochement* between our two countries.

I must add that all the facts I have mentioned as witnessing to the profound process of *rapprochement* between our countries have largely occurred during your direction of Poland's foreign affairs. So they must be reckoned among the numerous personal services you have rendered.

Systematically pursuing a peace policy, the Soviet Government directs special attention to the establishment and maintenance of truly good neighbourly relations with its greatest western neighbour, the Republic of Poland. The Soviet Union recognizes to what a great extent the cause of assuring peace, especially in the East of Europe, depends on these relations—if there still can be any talk at all of a restricted, local peace. That peace must be equally valued by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the Republic of Poland.

We grow more and more convinced that the peaceful policy of the Soviet Government meets in Poland with continually increasing understanding. In addition to the problems directly affecting the U.S.S.R. and Poland, various problems of an international character are bound to exist and arise between them. By elucidating these matters, and relating the viewpoints of the two Governments, an important contribution will be made to the task of considerably weakening, if not frustrating, the factors working to disturb the peace.

Expressing the profound conviction that the establishment of personal contact with an eminent representative of the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, together with an exchange of views on all the problems interesting the Governments of both countries, will extraordinarily conduce to a further development of the *rapproche-*

ment, mutual understanding, and extension of co-operation between our countries in the interests of peace, I propose a toast to the further strengthening of the friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Poland, to the health of the President of Poland, and that of our dear guests, Monsieur le Ministre and his wife.

No. 155

M. Beck's *Speech at the Reception given in his honour by M. Litvinov*

Moscow, February 14, 1934.

Monsieur le Commissaire du Peuple,

I deem it my pleasant duty to thank you personally and also the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the kind reception you have given me and the flattering remarks you have been kind enough to address to me.

The Polish Government for its part attaches great importance to the positive development of its relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The best proof of that development is the series of agreements which you have mentioned, concluded between Poland and the U.S.S.R. Those agreements are steadily leading to an improvement in the peaceable and friendly neighbourly relations between the two countries.

The atmosphere thus created affords us an opportunity for further efforts to this end, and in their origins and aims these activities are in harmony with the efforts made by both countries to secure the general peace. Among happy omens I also count the signs of a cultural *rapprochement* which have allowed the formation of bonds of acquaintance and better understanding between our two peoples. The exchange of artistic and cultural values will no doubt be of benefit to both countries. I am aware of the very friendly and sympathetic reception which the Soviet Union accords to Polish artists who visit the U.S.S.R. In Poland also we follow the development of your cultural life with the closest interest and regard. It must be our desire that the efforts undertaken in both countries in this direction shall have the very best of results.

The spontaneous demonstrations of sympathy accorded to Polish aviation by the Soviet Government and people in connection with the tragic accident to Captain Lewoniewski, and the cordial reception given to the Polish airmen with General Rayski at their head, met with a responsive echo in Poland and gave grounds for hoping that in this direction also mutual relations are improving. We regard this as an important factor in the friendship between our two countries.

The peaceful efforts systematically exerted by Poland and the Soviet Union are the best proof that our two States aim at the stabilization of their relations and pacification of this part of Europe. In addition, they constitute an important factor in general pacification,

which is vitally indispensable to the normal development of international relations. In these circumstances, and in face of the various international problems, both countries are finding, and will continue to find, common ground for co-operation in the cause of peace.

It is with great pleasure that I find it possible to stress your personal influence in this process of stabilization. To me, our co-operation, whether in matters concerning our two countries or in those of wider, international scope, has been a valuable proof of your realism and insight with regard to the solution of pending problems.

Allow me to raise my glass to a still greater improvement in friendly relations between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the prosperity of the Soviet Union, to the health of the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, and to that of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs and his wife, who have shown us such warm hospitality.

No. 156

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ *issued in connection with M. Beck's visit to Moscow*

February 15, 1934.

THE three-day visit to Moscow of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, M. Beck, afforded him and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, an opportunity of having several long conversations.

During these conversations both ministers carried out a survey and considered not only the general political international situation, but also the international problems arising from it, and in particular those which interest or may interest the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The exchange of views between M. Beck and M. Litvinov revealed a community of views in regard to many of these problems, as well as the lasting decision of the Governments they represent to continue their endeavours for a further improvement in mutual relations between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as also for a *rapprochement* between the peoples of both States. The foundation of any such *rapprochement* is the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression concluded between both countries, which it is recognized as desirable to give as permanent a character as possible. In the spirit of these acts both Governments are ready to co-operate in the preservation and reinforcement of a general peace, in this co-operation directing special attention to the maintenance of peaceful and normal relations in the eastern part of Europe which more closely interests them.

Taking into consideration the present state of Polish-Soviet relations, together with the increasing possibilities and importance of the

international co-operation of both States, in the name of his Government M. Beck proposed the reciprocal elevation of the diplomatic representations of both States in Warsaw and Moscow to the status of embassies. M. Litvinov completely associated himself with M. Beck's opinion and accepted the proposal in the name of his Government.

No. 157

PROTOCOL *renewing until December* 31, 1945, *the Pact of Non-Aggression of July* 25, 1932, *between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

Moscow, May 5, 1934.

THE President of the Republic of Poland, and The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Being desirous of providing as firm a basis as possible for the development of the relations between their countries;

Being desirous of giving each other fresh proof of the unchangeable character and solidity of the pacific and friendly relations happily established between them;

Moved by the desire to collaborate in the consolidation of world peace and also for the stability and peaceful development of international relations in Eastern Europe;

Noting that the conclusion on July 5, 1932, at Moscow, of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has had a beneficial influence on the development of their relations and on the solution of the above-mentioned problems;

Have decided to sign the present Protocol, and have for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries . . .

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and true form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

IN modification of the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded at Moscow on July 25, 1932, between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the date and manner in which that Treaty shall cease to have effect, the two Contracting Parties decide that it shall remain in force until December 31, 1945.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to denounce the Treaty by giving notice to that effect six months before the expiry of the above-mentioned period. If the Treaty is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties, its period of validity shall be automatically prolonged for two years; similarly, the Treaty shall be regarded as prolonged on each occasion for a further period of two years, if it is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties in the manner provided for in the present Article.

ARTICLE 2

THE present Protocol is drawn up in duplicate, each copy being in the Polish and Russian languages and both texts being equally authentic.

The present Protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the Contracting Parties at Warsaw.

The present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

FINAL PROTOCOL

IN connection with the signature on this date of the Protocol prolonging the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of July 25, 1932, each of the High Contracting Parties, having again examined all the provisions of the Peace Treaty concluded at Riga on March 18, 1921, which constitutes the basis of their mutual relations, declares that it has no obligations and is not bound by any declarations inconsistent with the provisions of the said Peace Treaty and in particular of Article 3 thereof.

Consequently, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms that the note from the People's Commissar, G. V. Chicherin, of September 28, 1926, to the Lithuanian Government cannot be interpreted to mean that the note implied any intention on the part of the Soviet Government to interfere in the settlement of the territorial questions mentioned therein.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

No. 158

EXCHANGE OF NOTES *between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government in connection with the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations*

Moscow, September 10, 1934.

MONSIEUR LE COMMISSAIRE DU PEOPLE,

In connection with the eventuality of the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, the Government of the Republic of Poland proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a reciprocal recognition that after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has entered the League of Nations the relations between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics will in all their extent continue on the basis of all existing agreements between them, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for Definition of Aggression.

I have, etc.,

HENRYK SOKOLNICKI.

To M. Mikolai Krestinski,
Director of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
in Moscow.

Moscow, September 10, 1934.

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires,

In reply to your note of to-day's date, I have the honour to communicate to you in the name of my Government that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics completely agrees with the Polish Government on the question that, after the eventual invitation to and entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Poland will remain on the basis of the treaties existing between them, all of which, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, will continue to preserve all their force.

I have, etc.,

M. KRESTINSKI.

M. Sokolnicki,
Chargé d'Affaires of the Republic of Poland in Moscow.

No. 159

M. Beck *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad*
Warsaw, November 9, 1937.

So far no proposals to join the Italo-German-Japanese Protocol (Anti-Comintern Pact) have been received by Poland. In any case, Poland could not be a party to that Protocol in view of her special position as neighbour of the U.S.S.R., as well as her objection in principle to the formation of any bloc.

If inquiries are made on this subject please reply in the above sense.

No. 160

Joint Communiqué *issued by the Polish and Soviet Governments on the subject of Polish-Soviet relations*
November 26, 1938.

A series of conversations recently held between the U.S.S.R. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, and the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, M. Grzybowski, has led to the following statement:

1. Relations between the Polish Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are and will continue to be based to the fullest extent on all the existing Agreements, including the Polish-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression dated July 25, 1932. This Pact, concluded for five years and extended on May 5, 1934, for a further period ending December 31, 1945, has a basis wide enough to guarantee the inviolability of peaceful relations between the two States.

2. Both Governments are favourable to the extension of their commercial relations.

3. Both Governments agree that it is necessary to settle a number of current and longstanding matters which have arisen in connection with the various agreements in force, and, in particular, to dispose of the various frontier incidents which have lately been occurring.

No. 161

OFFICIAL *Commentary issued by the Polish Telegraphic Agency on the Joint Polish-Soviet Communiqué regarding Polish-Soviet relations*[1]

November 26, 1938.

CONVERSATIONS recently held between M. Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and M. Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, and the Communiqué recently issued as their result, are the expression of the enduring and unalterable will of both Governments to regulate their mutual relations in accordance with the existing bilateral Agreements, and loyally to observe them. This mutual tendency appears to provide a sufficient guarantee for stabilization of conditions on the Polish-Soviet frontier.

No. 162

COMMUNIQUÉ *issued by the Polish Telegraphic Agency on the signing of the Polish-Soviet Commercial Agreement*

February 19, 1939.

NEGOTIATIONS which have been taking place for some time past between Poland and the U.S.S.R., have led to the signing of the following Agreements embodying economic relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R.: a Commercial Agreement, an Understanding with regard to trade turnover, and an Understanding with regard to clearing operations.

The Agreements were signed on behalf of Poland by M. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, and M. Lychowski, the head of the Trade Delegation, and on behalf of the Soviets by M. A. J. Mikoyan, the U.S.S.R. People's Commissar for Foreign

[1] No. 160.

Trade. This Agreement is the first general Polish-Soviet Commercial Agreement to be based on the most favoured nation principle. It includes a number of points of principle concerning trade turnover and also maritime transport.

The Agreement with regard to trade turnover provides for a considerable extension of trading operations between the two countries. The main articles of Polish imports from the U.S.S.R. will be cotton and cotton by-products, furs, apatites, tobacco, manganese ore, asbestos, graphite, etc. Poland, for her part, will supply the Soviet Union with coal, iron manufactures, zinc and sheet zinc, textiles, textile machinery, tanned leather and viscose.

The clearing Agreement stipulates that financial payments will be effected through a Polish Clearing Institution.

No. 163

M. Beck *to the Polish Embassy in Paris*

Warsaw, May 13, 1939.

The conversations with M. Potemkin during his stay in Warsaw on the 10th inst., have made it clear that the Soviet Government takes an understanding attitude to our point of view with regard to Polish-Soviet relations, which are now developing quite normally.

The Soviets realize that the Polish Government is not prepared to enter into any agreement with either one of Poland's great neighbours against the other, and understand the advantages to them of this attitude.

M. Potemkin also stated that in the event of an armed conflict between Poland and Germany the Soviets will adopt *"une attitude bienveillante"* towards us.

As M. Potemkin himself indicated, his statements were made in accordance with special instructions which the Soviet Government sent to Warsaw for him.

No. 164

Extract *from speech by M. Molotov, to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.*

May 31, 1939.

" . . . We stand for the cause of peace, and for an end being put to the development of aggression. . . .

" . . . As is known, a special communiqué was published in February last confirming the development of good neighbourly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. A certain general improvement is now noticeable in our relations with Poland. Furthermore, the Trade Agreement concluded in March with Poland may

considerably increase the trade turnover between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. . . .

"The foreign policy of the Soviet Union must reflect the changes which have occurred in the international situation, and the rôle falling to the U.S.S.R. as a powerful factor for peace.

"There is no need to demonstrate that the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy is thoroughly pacific and is directed against the aggressor.

" . . . In a united front of the peaceful Powers which effectively opposes aggression, the U.S.S.R. could occupy only a foremost place."[1]

No. 165

SPEECH *made by M. Szaronov on presenting his Credentials to the President of the Polish Republic*

Warsaw, June 2, 1939.

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,

I HAVE the honour to present my Credentials, in which the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. accredits me to the Polish Republic as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R.

The high mission entrusted to me by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. lays on me the duty to support and develop those friendly, neighbourly relations which have been strengthened by a series of political and economic Agreements concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Polish Republic.

The close and fruitful co-operation of our two countries is an important factor in the consolidation of universal peace, and is in harmony with the aims of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., which endeavours to have peaceful and friendly relations with all countries, and in the first instance with its neighbours.

Permit me to express my conviction that the Government of the Polish Republic is also imbued with the determination to foster and consolidate the relations already existing between our two countries.

It is with a feeling of profound satisfaction that I undertake the responsible mission entrusted to me by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and I express the hope that in the fulfilment of my office I shall meet with complete understanding, support and co-operation both from you, Monsieur le Président, and also from the Polish Government.

[1] The dates given by M. Molotov are inexact. The communiqué in question was published not in February 1939 but on November 26, 1938 (No. 160 *supra*), and the Commercial Agreement was concluded on February 19, 1939, and not in March (No. 162 *supra*).

No. 166

COUNT SZEMBEK'S *Minute of his conversation with M. Szaronov*
Warsaw, June 14, 1939.

IN his talk with me, M. Szaronov laid stress on the satisfactory state of Polish-Soviet relations. He pointed out the necessity for their further improvement. He emphasized that the objective must be complete fulfilment of the Trade Agreement. At the moment there are certain difficulties in this respect, for the Agreement has not long been in force, and both sides are anxious for a mutual exchange of commodities at the most favourable prices.' M. Szaronov hopes that in this respect also the situation will develop satisfactorily. Finally he stated that M. Potemkin's visit to Warsaw and his conversation with M. Beck had been very beneficial to Polish-Soviet relations.

Subsequently we discussed the international situation. When I remarked that it was difficult and complicated, the Ambassador said that in his opinion there would be no armed conflict in Europe.

When I asked him about Soviet-Japanese relations M. Szaronov told me that these relations are always and by their very nature very difficult. In any case, Japan is at present greatly occupied with her difficult situation in China.

No. 167

EXTRACT *from Count Szembek's Minute of his conversation with M. Szaronov*
Warsaw, July 8, 1939.

WHEN I asked him the position in regard to the Soviet-German trade negotiations, concerning which there have been rumours in the Press, M. Szaronov told me that no such negotiations were taking place.

No. 168

NON-AGGRESSION PACT *between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*
Moscow, August 23, 1939.

THE Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and taking as a basis the fundamental regulations of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have reached the following agreement:

ARTICLE 1

THE two Contracting Parties bind themselves to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive action and any attack on each other, both singly and also jointly with other Powers.

ARTICLE 2

IN the event of one of the Contracting Parties becoming the object of warlike action on the part of a third Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner support this third Power.

ARTICLE 3

THE Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall in future remain continuously in touch with each other, by way of consultation, in order to inform each other on questions touching their joint interests.

ARTICLE 4

NEITHER of the two Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of Powers which is directed directly or indirectly against the other Party.

ARTICLE 5

IN the event of disputes or disagreements, whatever their nature or origin, arising between the Contracting Parties, both Parties would clarify these disputes or disagreements exclusively by means of friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, by arbitration committees.

ARTICLE 6

THE present Agreement shall be concluded for a period of ten years on the understanding that, in so far as one of the Contracting Parties does not give notice of termination one year before the end of this period, the period of validity of this Agreement shall automatically be regarded as prolonged for a further period of five years.

ARTICLE 7

THE present Agreement shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement takes effect immediately after it has been signed.

For the German Reich Government:
RIBBENTROP.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
MOLOTOV.

No. 169

COUNT SZEMBEK *to Count Raczyński*

August 29, 1939.

ON the strength of instructions from Berlin, the German representative at Bucharest recently told Rumanian political circles that German-Soviet conversations regarding a Non-Aggression Pact have been in progress for some two and a half months, and that all the details of the Pact have been settled for some time.

Please utilize this information, in view of Marshal Voroshilov's statement that the understanding with Germany was brought about only by Poland's negative attitude towards the Staff conversations between the Soviets and Great Britain and France.

No. 170

EXTRACT *from interview with Marshal Voroshilov, reported in "Izviestia"*

August 27, 1939.

"HELP in the form of raw materials and war materials is a commercial question, and no Pact of Mutual Assistance whatever, far less a Military Convention, is needed in order to supply Poland with these materials.

"The United States of America and several other States have neither a Pact of Mutual Assistance nor a Military Convention with Japan, yet for the past two years they have been selling raw materials and war materials to the Japanese, irrespective of the fact that Japan is in a state of war with China."

No. 171

M. BECK *to the Polish Embassy in London*

September 2, 1939.

THE Soviet Ambassador has called on me and asked why we were not negotiating with the Soviets regarding supplies, as the "Voroshilov interview" has opened up the possibility of getting them.

I have instructed Moscow to investigate the situation.[1]

[1] This instruction was sent by special courier, but, owing to difficulties of communication, he did not arrive in Moscow until September 6, 1939. M. Grzybowski replied to the instruction with the telegram printed below (No. 172).

No. 172

M. Grzybowski *to M. Beck*
Moscow, September 8, 1939.

M. Szaronov's suggestions are no longer opportune. M. Molotov has informed me that the intervention of Great Britain and France has created an entirely new situation, which Marshal Voroshilov did not know and could not take into consideration when giving the interview. At present the Soviets are compelled to safeguard first and foremost their own interests, remaining outside the conflict. For us Poland, said M. Molotov, is now synonymous with England. In regard to the practical question which I raised of supply of raw materials and the eventual supply of war materials, he maintains the position of a strict observance of the agreements existing between us. In consequence the Soviets are prepared to supply us only with those raw materials which are provided for in the quotas for the current year. As to war materials, in face of the changed situation he does not consider that the Soviet Government could supply them at present. On the transit question he informed me that all transit of a military character might be in contradiction with the Pact concluded with Germany, and so he does not consider that the Soviet Government could allow it. In answer to my reference to previous promises, he repeated once more that the situation had changed, and that the Soviet Union must care first and foremost for its own security.

No. 173

Count Szembek's *Minute of his conversation with M. Szaronov*
Krzemieniec, September 11, 1939.

In his talk with me M. Szaronov said he had received three telegrams, but could not decipher them. So, on his own responsibility, he is granting visas to MM. Weyers and Zarebski. He cannot himself grant a visa to Colonel Kowalewski, who has acted as Military Attaché in Moscow.[1]

The Ambassador is departing with his family and evacuees for the Soviet frontier to-day. At Krzemieniec he is leaving the second secretary of the Embassy, his private secretary, and chauffeurs. The purpose of his departure is to get into touch with Moscow by telephone, which he is unable to do at Krzemieniec. He intends to return the day after to-morrow, or, if he is summoned to Moscow, in a week's time.

The Ambassador emphasized that we shall be able to get medical supplies from the Soviets.

He then remarked that Warsaw is not yet captured, and he observed a certain hold-up of the German attack there.

[1]These three Polish representatives had been delegated to the U.S.S.R. to investigate the possibility of purchasing medical supplies.

He then said he had had a conversation with Ambassador Noël, whom he had assured that the French would be able to buy everything in Russia. He added: "There are rumours here about mobilization in Russia. I know nothing about it. At the most it would concern five annual levies, which is no great matter. Apparently the Germans are bombing certain points on the Soviet western frontier. The Soviets do not wish to have frontiers with totalitarian States. With France the Soviets have a non-aggression treaty and an agreement for mutual assistance."

No. 174

M. Grzybowski *to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*
Moscow, September 17, 1939.

M. Potemkin sent for me to-day, September 17, at 3 a.m., and read me a note from his Government, signed by Premier Molotov. The note communicates that the Soviet Government has ordered its troops to cross the Polish frontier. The motives given in the note were of such a nature that I refused to take it into cognizance and categorically protested against its contents. In view of the absence of Soviet diplomatic representatives from Poland I agreed only to transmit the above information. I await instructions.

No. 175

Text *of the Russian note communicated by M. Potemkin to M. Grzybowski*
September 17, 1939. 3 a.m.

The Polish-German War has revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State. During the course of ten days' hostilities Poland has lost all her industrial areas and cultural centres. Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland. The Polish Government has disintegrated, and no longer shows any sign of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Therefore the Agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of hazards and surprises, which may constitute a threat to the U.S.S.R. For these reasons the Soviet Government, which hitherto has preserved neutrality, cannot any longer observe a neutral attitude towards these facts.

The Soviet Government further cannot view with indifference the fact that the kindred Ukrainian and White Russian people, who live on Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenceless.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposes to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged by their unwise leaders, and to enable them to live a peaceful life.

No. 176

M. Beck *to the Polish Embassies in London and Paris*
Kuty, September 17, 1939.

Ambassador Grzybowski has refused to accept M. Molotov's note and has presented a protest against the aggression.

I have approved his attitude, instructing him to ask for his passports and to withdraw from Moscow.

The Polish Government, which is functioning on Polish territory and is in contact with the Diplomatic Corps, has made a protest against the Soviet insinuation. Our frontier troops have resisted the invasion.

No. 177

Note *presented by the Polish Ambassador in Paris to the French Foreign Office*[1]
September 18, 1939. 10.30 p.m.

On the instruction of his Government the Polish Ambassador has the honour to communicate the following to the Government of the Republic of France:

To-day, September 17, 1939, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics committed an aggression against Poland. At dawn large Soviet forces crossed the Polish frontier at several points. The Polish troops resisted. In view of the superiority of the Soviet forces, the Polish troops withdrew, fighting.

The Polish Government have protested to Moscow, and have instructed their Ambassador to demand his passports. The Polish Government await from the Allied French Government a categorical protest against the aggression committed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Polish Government reserve the right to call upon their Allies in regard to the obligations devolving upon them by virtue of the treaties in force.

[1] A similar note was presented to the British Foreign Office by the Polish Ambassador in London.

No. 178

COMMUNIQUÉ *issued by the Polish Embassy in London*
September 17, 1939.

ON September 17, at 4 a.m., Soviet troops crossed the frontier of Poland at many points and were met immediately with strong resistance on the part of the Polish National Army. A sharp encounter in particular is being fought near the frontier in the region of Molodeczno.

The pretext which the Soviet Government advance in order to justify this flagrant act of direct aggression is that the Polish Government has ceased to exist, and that it has abandoned the territory of Poland, thus leaving the Polish population on territories outside the zone of war with Germany without protection. The Polish Government cannot enter into any discussion of the pretext which the Soviet Government has invented in order to justify the violation of the Polish frontier.

The Polish Government, responsible to the President of the Republic and to the duly elected National Parliament, are functioning on Polish territory and are carrying on the war against the German aggressors by all the means in their power.

By the act of direct aggression committed this morning the Soviet Government have flagrantly violated the Polish-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression concluded in Moscow on July 25, 1932, in which both parties mutually undertook to abstain from all aggressive action or from attack against each other. Moreover, on May 5, 1934, by the Protocol signed in Moscow, the above Pact of Non-Aggression was prolonged until December 31, 1945.

By the Convention concluded in London on July 3, 1933, Soviet Russia and Poland agreed on a definition of aggression, which clearly stamped as an act of aggression any encroachment upon the territory of one Contracting Party by the armed forces of the other and furthermore, that no consideration of a political, military, economic, or any other order could in any circumstances serve as a pretext or excuse for committing an act of aggression.

Therefore, by the act of wanton aggression committed this morning, the Soviet Government stands self-condemned as a violator of its international obligations, thus contradicting all the moral principles upon which Soviet Russia pretended to base her foreign policy since her admittance into the League of Nations.

No. 179

GERMAN-SOVIET *Agreement*
Moscow, September 28, 1939.

THE Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government, following the collapse of the former Polish State, consider it as exclusively their own task to restore peace and order in these territories and

to assure to the peoples inhabiting it a peaceful existence which will correspond to their national characteristics. With this object in view, they have concluded the following Agreement:

ARTICLE 1

THE Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government establish, as the frontier between their respective State interests in the territory of the former Polish State, a line which is marked on the attached map and which will be given in more detail in a supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE 2

BOTH countries recognize as final the frontier between their respective State interests, as set out in Article 1, and will resist any interference with this decision on the part of other Powers.

ARTICLE 3

THE German Government will carry out the necessary State reconstruction on the territory west of the line indicated in Article 1, and the Soviet Government on the territory east of this line.

ARTICLE 4

THE Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government regard the above-mentioned reconstruction as a reliable foundation for the future development of friendly relations between their peoples.

ARTICLE 5

THIS agreement is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place as soon as possible in Berlin.

The agreement enters into force from the moment of its signature.

No. 180

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S *protest against the German-Soviet Agreement of September* 28, 1939. *Presented by the Polish Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Office*[1]

London, September 30, 1939.

IN face of the flagrant violation of the sacred rights of the Polish State and the Polish Nation constituted by the Agreement of September 28 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., disposing of territories of the Polish Republic to the benefit of the two aggressor States, in the name of the Polish Government I make the most formal and solemn protest against this machination woven between Berlin and Moscow in contempt of all international obligations and all human morality.

[1]A similar protest was presented by all the Polish diplomatic representatives abroad to the respective governments to which they are accredited.

Poland will never recognize this act of violence, and, strong in the justice of her cause, she will not cease to struggle for the day when, her territory liberated from the invaders, her legitimate rights will be established in their entirety.

By the heroic resistance of her army, by the patriotic sacrifice of all her population which has been demonstrated in the heroic defence of the capital city of Warsaw, of Lwow, of Wilno, of Gdynia, of Modlin and of so many other towns, the Polish Nation has clearly proved to the world her steadfast will to live in freedom and independence.

Basing herself on the unanimous sympathy of all the countries which respect liberty and good faith in relations between the peoples, and confiding in the steadfast support which is guaranteed her by her treaties of alliance, Poland will continue the struggle by all means in her power, confident in her future and in the ultimate victory.

No. 181

Soviet-Lithuanian *Agreement*

October 10, 1939.

With a view to furthering the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace of July 12, 1920, between the U.S.S.R. and the Lithuanian Republic, which are based on the mutual recognition of political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the one part and the President of the Lithuanian Republic on the other part:

Being of the opinion that the treaty of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of differences has continued, since it was signed on September 28, 1926, to serve as the foundation of their mutual relations and obligations;

Being convinced moreover that it is in the interests of the two Contracting Parties to define the exact conditions of their guarantee of mutual security and of a just decision as to sovereignty over the city and district of Wilno, which were illegally detached from Lithuania by Poland;

Have deemed it necessary to conclude the present Agreement for the restoration of the city and district of Wilno to the Lithuanian Republic, as well as a pact of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, and for this purpose have appointed their Plenipotentiaries. . . .

Article 1

In order to strengthen the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, the city of Wilno and the district of Wilno are hereby returned to the Republic of Lithuania by the U.S.S.R. to be reunited with the territory of the State of Lithuania. The boundary between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Lithuania is demarcated as shown in the attached map. This boundary line is to be more exactly described in a supplementary Protocol. . . .

No. 182

M. Zaleski *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad*
Paris, October 18, 1939.

With reference to the Soviet-Lithuanian Agreement, please communicate the following Note to the Government to which you are accredited:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Polish Government, having learned of the Pact of Mutual Assistance signed on October 10, 1939, between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, have presented a formal protest to the Lithuanian Government against the acceptance by the said Government of any territory ceded by the U.S.S.R. which does not belong to that Union."

No. 183

M. Zaleski *to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad*
Paris, October 21, 1939.

Please communicate the following statement, in the form of a Note, to the Government to which you are accredited:

"The Polish Government have just learned that on Polish territory temporarily occupied by the U.S.S.R. a plebiscite is to be held to ascertain the will of the population on the question of the transfer of such territory to the U.S.S.R.

"The Polish Government hereby declare that the holding of such a plebiscite in areas under military occupation is contrary to International Law. Therefore they will consider it as null and void, and in no case will they recognize it as having legal force."

No. 184

Final Report, *presented by the former Ambassador in Moscow, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs*
Paris, November 6, 1939.

The act of aggression which the Soviet Union committed against Poland on September 17, 1939, without declaring war, without breaking off diplomatic relations, and without denouncing the pact of non-aggression, is a simple phenomenon regarded from the moral aspect. Considered as a political decision, however, it is much more complex, for it constitutes a consequential step in M. Stalin's policy.

I

I began my mission in Moscow on July 1, 1936. In the absence of M. Litvinov, who was in Geneva, I was received by M. Krestinski.

Our talk was brief, but not without import. M. Krestinski informed me in plain terms that my mission had begun at a most unfortunate time.

"The political relations between us could not be worse. We are working," said M. Krestinski, "to increase the prestige of the League of Nations, and for collective security; we are combating all forms of aggression and all forms of fascism. At the present time we are pursuing an anti-German, anti-Italian, and anti-Japanese policy. Poland is pursuing a diametrically contrary policy, tending to weaken the League of Nations, combating attempts to realize collective security, supporting Italy and sympathizing with Japan. Poland is within the orbit of German policy."

I replied that to define our position as being within the German orbit was an erroneous interpretation, unsupported by any facts whatever. I declared that Poland was pursuing a policy based above all on bilateral agreements, and was working first and foremost for correct and good relations with her neighbours. Not all conceptions of international co-operation carried conviction to our minds. I considered that the differences between our views in this regard should not influence the ordering of our neighbourly relations. The tendency which existed on our side towards good relations with the U.S.S.R. was the best proof that our policy was independent of Germany.

It was in this talk with M. Krestinski that I first noted the fact which afterwards I was continually to come up against: irrespective of Polish policy, the Soviets constantly interpreted it so as to contrapose it to their own policy.

II

I presented my credentials to M. Kalinin on July 4, 1936. On this occasion I had a long conversation with him, M. Krestinski taking part.

M. Kalinin's remarks were in no way aggressive. He talked of the important role which Polish engineers had played in Russian industry in responsible positions. He himself had been a foreman in a factory run by Polish specialists, and admitted that on their departure the enterprise had suffered considerably. He inquired as to my intentions. I told him that I attached major importance to the development of economic relations. In many spheres our industrial and agricultural production could mutually complement each other. M. Kalinin readily took up this theme. He held the view that the tendency to autarchy was absurd, and that the U.S.S.R. possessed a sufficiently large production of gold and a sufficient reserve of gold to develop imports satisfying the population's consumption needs. Poland would be a natural source of such imports, for Polish production had long adapted itself to the needs of the Russian market. M. Krestinski remarked that Polish-Soviet political relations were not propitious to the development of economic relations, but M. Kalinin warmly objected, declaring that it was necessary to *begin* with economic relations. He argued that Germany, which was effecting its political expansion primarily by economic means, set an example

to be followed. Yet, apparently making some concession to M. Krestinski's opinion, he complained that Poland isolated herself from cultural co-operation with the Soviets, and that despite their high level, the Soviet theatre, music and literature were not made sufficiently accessible to the Polish masses.

I answered that the revival of cultural relations was possible only as a final stage, after the achievement of a lasting improvement in the economic and political spheres. I report this conversation at length, since the head of the Soviet State expounded the basic prerequisites of a political programme expressing the Soviets' tendency towards expansion and treating Poland as an object of that expansion.

Events in Europe, however, turned Soviet efforts in another direction. A few months later M. Krestinski returned to this conversation, and felt obliged to tell me that when M. Kalinin was talking of the intention to abandon autarchy, and to improve supplies in the Soviets by resorting to increased exports, he was revealing the actual plans of the Government. However, European events and Germany's policy forced the U.S.S.R. to abandon these plans and to apply all resources to the swiftest possible increase in armaments. More or less about this time Marshal Tukhachevski told me of the progress achieved in the sphere of mechanizing the army.

In my report to Count Szembek on November 4, 1936, I made the following remarks:

". . . Owing to the progress achieved by the Soviets in the development of production and a relative internal stabilization, signs of a growing dynamism are observable. This dynamism will probably take the form not only of expansion but also of aggression. It can be described by the term: doctrinal imperialism, but the choice of the moment at which that aggression will be applied is solely and simply a tactical question.

". . . It is an error to apply the term 'evolution' to the present stage of development of the situation in the Soviets. What is being achieved in the U.S.S.R. to-day is nothing but a revolution from above, and a revolution which is continually advancing. The entire economic and industrial activity of the Soviets is not the result of natural development nor of the needs of the population. It is a realization of doctrinaire plans enforced from above. Soviet industry is wholly directed towards the future war, and is concentrating its efforts on the up-to-date equipment and motorization of the Red Army. The intensive construction of strategic roads is also characteristic. In the direction of the Latvian frontier three parallel roads have been built, of which only one is given over to normal exploitation. In the direction of Poland two motor roads, one from Moscow to Minsk, and a second from Kiev towards Polish Volhynia, are being constructed.

". . . Russian imperialism is still laying down a road for itself by means of the 'Emancipation of the proletariat.' The method by which it works towards this end is by supporting all and every conflict in Europe.

". . . So far as we are concerned, despite their ostensible desire to establish good neighbourly relations, the Soviets are doing their best

to arouse hatred for Poland with the help of propaganda. By its very nature Soviet expansion is directed against us, for we constitute a natural barrier to the realization of their designs."

III

The summers of 1936 and 1937, of little importance in the foreign policy of the Soviets and equally of little importance in the establishment of Polish-Russian relations, were undoubtedly the period of final crystallization of Stalinist Russia.

(*a*) The features of the new Stalinist régime were revealed most of all in the trials, which staggered the whole world. The "purges" which accompanied them engulfed hundreds of thousands of victims, disorganizing the army and the State apparatus. They were a primitive system which had as object the complete subjection of individuals to the needs of the State, which in turn was dependent on the will of one man—Stalin.

(*b*) In the new situation, parallel with the system of terror developed a system of bluff. This latter system was born of the necessity to hide the reality from foreigners, but it led to the wholesale necessity to justify that reality at home. Anyone who has not lived for some length of time in Soviet Russia is not in a position to realize the degree and dimensions of the bluff which prevails in that country.

(*c*) It is not surprising, either, that anyone who has resided in the Soviets outside the charmed circle of "Intourist" cannot resist a continual feeling of living in an atmosphere of universal suffering. Human speech possesses no words or phrases sufficiently striking to express that which is to be read in the eyes of a large proportion of the people one meets. Beyond a certain small group of people intoxicated with authority and momentary success, almost all eyes reveal anxiety as well as suffering, and often an animal terror. For in the Soviets uncertainty as to the morrow is almost as universal as suffering.

Here it has to be borne in mind that in the period under discussion the process of destruction of all the sanctuaries of religious faith had been completed. Almost all the churches were closed. The few remaining Polish priests had been sentenced to imprisonment or exile. Persecutions and purges had affected the clergy and the faithful of all creeds.

With complete disregard the people of the Soviets had been cut off from all contact with foreigners and foreign countries.

Against this general background definite problems were equally abnormal in their development.

In a personal report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Beck, dated April 8, 1938, I wrote:

"In every State and in every period of development the governing authorities have to deal with the opposition of elements of the past and elements of the future, which are active and at work in the given political situation. This is particularly so in the periods of creation of new régimes and new systems. The solution depends customarily on an appropriate estimate of the correlation of forces between the

elements of the past and the elements of the future, and takes the line of a corresponding compromise.

". . . It has to be stated that in the U.S.S.R. the method of compromise was at once rejected and the method of mechanical resolution was applied on the widest scale. The Russian revolution laid down the road to the future by shooting tens of thousands of officers, officials and specialists, priests, and all 'bourgeoisie.' The collective farm system has been built up on the extermination and enforced emigration of millions of peasants. The problem of national minorities and the problem of the 'homeless children' have been resolved in the same way.

"During the Stalin period the technique of government has not changed.

"Stalin has come up against the problem of the influence of elements of the past simply because twenty years of revolution could not but create a certain number of people possessing their own political state of ownership, their own stage of services, and hence the right to regard themselves not only as participators in but masters of the Soviet State. We would be making a mistake if we described them as an opposition in the usual meaning of the word. They were exclusively isolated individuals and small desperate groups. We have no data whatever which would justify the view that they had a common aim and programme. One can only recognize that on very numerous problems they did not agree with the Stalin 'line' and opposed a number of current solutions. In very many cases their 'wrecking' did not arise from political impulses. They were simply a steadily increasing legion of people who in future could not or did not want to march along the Politbureau line. In so far as it is a question of active people psychologically unadapted to the given stage of development of the State, life deals with them more effectively than do the police. But Stalin regards them as a considerable danger, because the discontent to which they give expression of one kind or another is shared by millions.

"Stalin's mechanical method of dealing with these 'opponents' has lasted for almost two years. During the past year changes occurring in the governing positions have been amazing in their number and frequency. There are military regions which in ten months have had five commanders in succession. In the case of the highest authorities in White Russia the average period of authority during the last year has been two months. . . .

"Two very important consequences arise from this:

"The first is the disintegration of the State apparatus owing to the disastrous handling of the personnel problem. Since 1917 there have been numerous experimental attempts to solve this problem. Certain of them had signs of a tendency to be based on the objective criteria of specialized knowledge and patriotism. These criteria have now been replaced by the criterion of absolute and uncritical fidelity to Stalin. . . .

"This has created a decidedly desperate situation in all parts of the State apparatus, but particularly in the army, which in the past

year has lost the majority of its previous higher command. Despite the knowledge that the 'cadres decide everything,' Stalin has not resolved the problem of cadres.

"The next consequence consists of certain anticipations for the future. In the Leninist period the mass executions eliminated the possibility of a monarchist and capitalist restoration. The present mass executions make impossible any restoration of Leninism. . . ."

In the same report I further wrote:

"One of the basic tasks of every administration is the struggle to adapt the psychology of the individual citizen to the needs of the State, the struggle to strike the necessary effort out of the human masses. There are periods when this task is modest and is limited to changing the attitude or certain tendencies of the community.

"The tremendous Soviet effort to create a new psychological type, to 'reforge' the Russian man, is in accordance with the unusual aims they have set themselves. The aims imposed on the State must, however, spring out of reality. In the U.S.S.R. they grow out of a simplicistic doctrine. Conforming to the law that the less internal discipline man possesses, the greater his need of external discipline, Stalin has developed an autocratic system peculiar to the Russians. Nevertheless, the demands he made on the Soviet citizen in the realm of labour and production were inadequately justified by the reality, and it grows more and more clear that these demands are unreal and will be incapable of achievement.

"A system demanding great organizing ability, a pedantic exactitude, prolonged, systematic effort and sacrifice on the part of those who have to apply it is incompatible with the characteristics of the Russian spirit.

"To combat this an enormous propaganda effort has been put into operation in the U.S.S.R. One cannot but recognize both the unusual scale of this effort, and the great success achieved. Propaganda is an effective means only in a strictly defined, and therefore narrow sphere. If Stalin had restricted his propaganda, it would probably have remained effective. But he applied it too extensively. In the Soviets propaganda has become a falsification of reality, and by placing a gulf between the State and reality it is thereby weakening the State. The Soviets live in an incredible condition of propaganda bluff. The new human type which has been thus created has been admitted by the authorities themselves to be a product of the hot-house. And so before our eyes there is occurring a process of insulation of the Soviet citizen from all external influences. Not only foreign consulates, but also the most communistic foreign members of the Comintern are being liquidated. Anyone who has ever had any kind of contact with foreigners or foreign countries is dangerous. . . . The best proof of the deception which has been caused by this almost inhuman propaganda effort is the lasting necessity of continual resort to terror, as the sole stimulus in whose effectiveness the authorities continue to believe. . . ."

I ended this report with the following words:

"From the several features of Soviet administration which I have

outlined, one conclusion results: we have to deal with an extremely primitive system of government. A half-educated governor possesses only one, not always useful quality. Nothing is impossible to him. This is simply because, with his very one-sided and narrow view of reality, the complexity of that reality does not enter his consciousness. In the U.S.S.R. it is considered that to mechanize agriculture it is sufficient to build a certain number of tractors, that to achieve a certain level of professional culture it is sufficient to build the requisite number of schools, that to overcome the supplies difficulties it is sufficient to multiply rabbits to tens of millions, that the political commissars decide the standard of the army, and so on. This is a continual taking the part for the whole. Always fresh factors are revealed which had not been reckoned with in the original account. The struggle to overcome them causes a weakening of effort in regard to factors previously recognized as the most important. Of the themes which have been regarded in the Soviets as the most important during the past two years one could make an encyclopædia. . . ."

This primitive method of government is to be observed in two other spheres also.

Following in the steps of Russian Tsarism, Stalinist autocracy is based entirely and completely on the bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, so far no solution has been found to the organizational problems of administration. In the above-quoted report I said:

"The administrative apparatus is in a state of flux and is the subject of experimentation. . . . There are continual vacillations from individual authority to administration by collective groups, from non-political to political government, from concentration to deconcentration, from centralization to decentralization. . . . The all-powerful bureaucracy does not yet possess an established structure. During the last year there have been numberless examples of reorganization of the administration. . . . Weighed down with the excess of its tasks, the bureaucratic Soviet apparatus cannot achieve equilibrium."

Again in complete analogy with Tsarist Russia, the Stalinist régime stands impotent in face of the problems of national minorities. All that is vociferated in this sphere is a monstrous bluff. As to the practical applications, I informed M. Beck in my report dated March 10, 1939:

"The process of Russification is being continued with complete lack of regard and with the utmost consistency. The most important factors of the policy in regard to minorities are: (*a*) The minority areas are ruthlessly being rendered economically dependent on the Russian areas; (*b*) The minority elements are being dispossessed and the Russian element is being settled in the minority areas; (*c*) The minority Press is gradually being replaced by the Russian Press; (*d*) There is steadily decreasing instruction in the local language and steadily increased emphasis on teaching the Russian language; (*e*) Religious cults which might strengthen the feeling of separate nationality are being destroyed; (*f*) All the most eminent representatives of national minorities are being transferred to the interior of

Russia; (*g*) A terror unflagging in its cruelties is being applied even to the least tendency toward independence. . . ."

Simultaneously it has to be recognized that all these methods, despite their intensification, have not advanced the solution of the minorities problem, but, on the contrary, are causing an underground ferment, which in favourable conditions would lead to an overthrow of the régime.

IV

PHENOMENA and facts met with in the sphere of economic affairs confirm the foregoing observations on political problems in the U.S.S.R.

In its application of a policy of integral State capitalism the Soviet Government has based itself primarily on two factors.

The first of these is the so-called State Plan, which has become a fundamental element of governmental activity in the Soviets.

This plan was intended to be an adaptation of the State production and economy to the needs of the State. Obviously, it is to a considerable extent dependent on the actual possibilities of the State itself. As the existing possibilities are not adequate to meet the satisfaction of all needs, it becomes necessary to establish a strict grading of needs and a rota for their satisfaction. So constructed, the Plan remained an ideal on paper. It is true that the first two Five Year Plans, at the cost of incredible outlay, achieved certain results, but since 1936 we have observed a slowing up and even retrogression in this process.

Little by little the number of needs satisfied is diminishing. The State Plan broke down both in quantitative and in qualitative aspects. On the former count, for instance, a dangerous shortage of coal and oil fuel arose.

The qualitative failure to achieve the plan is the result of a whole series of factors. It arises from the deficit production of many raw materials, which have to be replaced by substitutes, from the failure of the financial plan, from the lack of co-ordination of production, but above all else from the immense exploitation and the poverty of the toiling masses and the irrationally allocated production charges. The system of bureaucratic government burdens the workshops with disproportionate administrative charges. In the chase after financial equilibrium a tendency develops to produce that which pays the best, despite the demands of the plan. The ills of Soviet economic life are creating such a complexity of reasons for the non-fulfilment of the State plan that already to-day nobody is able to foresee what will be the final result of the processes of production and exchange. The plans are ceasing to be plans, and are becoming more and more a source of disorientation. What should be the foundation of the Soviets' economic structure is becoming a necessary evil.

Another overestimated factor in the Soviets is the role which machinery was to play in the reconstruction of economic life.

A lack of faith in man has become the starting-point for the cult of the machine. Certainly with the aid of machinery it was possible

to start new methods of production, and in particular it would have been impossible to imagine collective agricultural production in the form of the collective farms without the mechanization of agriculture.

Yet machinery can play a decisive role only at the beginning of these processes. Life proved that in order to stabilize and further develop these forms of creative activity machinery was not sufficient. For machinery can fulfil various kinds of functions, sometimes very complex, but, unfortunately for Soviet conditions, it is not able to mind itself, or mend itself. This factor proved to be an unusually heavy burden on the development of production in the Soviets. The Soviet tractor or lorry's normal "life," it now appears, is three times shorter than the State plan provided for. The same unusually short life is possessed by machinery, locomotives, railway trucks. . . . The most striking example of the mechanization drive is the Army, which depends on an enormous number of aeroplanes and tanks. All other factors appear to be neglected.

The situation in agriculture seems to be analogical. Mechanization has made tremendous progress, but production is in an increasingly worse state.

In the endeavour to break down the resistance which the most numerous section of the population in the U.S.S.R., the mass of peasantry, has made and is still making to the Stalinist régime, a mechanical system of ruinous exploitation has been created which is leading to smaller and smaller harvests.

So it is not surprising that, while during the period 1909 to 1913 Tsarist Russia exported an average of 104 million quintals of grain, during the period 1929 to 1933 the U.S.S.R. exported an average of 26 millions, after which date a further severe decline in exports set in.

In a report dated March 8, 1938, I wrote:

"The longer I observe the Soviet Government's methods the more I come to the conclusion that their particular feature is an inability to solve the simplest of fundamental problems. Elementary factors which in other systems of production are the basis, the starting-point, in the Soviet system become peak points. The same symptom is observable in all the spheres of State life. In supplies and in education, in heavy industry and in transport, in agriculture and in politics. Administration proceeds more or less satisfactorily only in the higher regions, remote from reality. In contact with the reality 'below' it grows more and more delusive.

"One can assume without fear of error that whether as contracting party, ally or aggressor, the U.S.S.R. must in *any* case reveal the fundamental inefficiency of its structure, an intrinsic weakness instead of an intrinsic strength."

V

Anyone who thinks that the system of government in the Soviets arises only from inefficiency and primitivism would be making a fundamental mistake. In addition to these two psychological factors, the unchanging features of the oriental mentality and Stalin's semi-mystical

attitude to the doctrine of world revolution have no less influence. The very structure of the pseudo-Socialistic State is noteworthy. No other totalitarian system has achieved such complete absolutism.

In Italy the Duce, Benito Mussolini, has united in his person the functions of head of the Government and leader of the party, but the royal dynasty has remained the symbol and expression of the continuity of State sovereignty. In addition to leadership of the party and headship of the Government, Chancellor Hitler has assumed the position of head of the State. Stalin has placed himself a step higher. The head of the State (a collective body) and the Government are only emanations of the Communist Party, and the head of that party, Stalin, stands above the State and can in principle exert unlimited rule in relation to an unlimited number of States, so long as their Governments are exponents of Communism. So one must take account of the fact that the entire Government in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is nothing but a system for the preparation within the Soviets of an instrument for revolution and the conquest of Europe. Only viewed from this angle does the picture become completely intelligible.

Political murders, the enslavement of the soul and the universal bluff, terror and misery, the bureaucratic autocracy, the torture of national minorities, are all crimes arising from a gloomy revolutionary doctrine.

Residing in the U.S.S.R., one cannot resist a feeling of compassion not only for the fettered peoples of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan and White Russia, but also for the Russian people on whom, by a new turn of history, the role of invader, and destroyer of all the achievements of human culture, is once more being imposed.

In relation to such a reality, in relation to the rule of Stalin and his clique, what policy could Poland have pursued?

It is obvious that with such a state of affairs on the side of the Soviet partner certain definite limits were imposed upon Polish policy and upon the possibility of Polish collaboration with the Soviets. To exceed those limits would have been to destroy all that Poland had stood for for centuries in the east of Europe.

Even so, in its persistent striving for correct neighbourly relations, in its respect for basic agreements and the Riga Peace Treaty which had been concluded, Polish policy remained invariably faithful to three principles:

1. Abstention from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R.

2. The persistent attempt to regulate bilateral relations in a spirit of goodwill to the U.S.S.R.

3. Non-participation in any action or in international understandings directed against the U.S.S.R. Most important of all, Poland resolutely rejected numerous German proposals directed against the Soviets.

The course of diplomatic negotiations during the last year of my mission in Moscow was as follows:

(*a*) A turning point rendering possible greater diplomatic activity

in our relations with the Soviets, arrived only with the series of international agreements concluded at Munich. Without consulting the U.S.S.R. and without her participation, the four Western Powers regulated among themselves the question of the Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovakia.

Poland also took no part in these agreements.

Local Polish-Soviet relations were in a state of some exacerbation. M. Potemkin's declaration on September 23, 1938, to our Chargé d'Affaires, and our Government's sharp reply were accompanied by a certain amount of ill-will and hardly friendly demonstrations on the part of the Soviet Government. When the European and local atmosphere had undergone a certain appeasement, I decided during the first ten days of October that the time had come to take the initiative in lessening the political tension, acting on the outline instructions I possessed. I called on M. Potemkin, and by virtue of the custom established between us of from time to time having talks which were not binding (having the character of a personal exchange of views, 'thinking aloud,' as M. Potemkin put it), I had a long conversation with him on the general situation.

I for my part expressed the opinion that, in the European situation now created, in the interests of both parties an improvement in the existing Polish-Soviet relations was desirable.

M. Potemkin did not express any opinion, but told me that he would like to return to this talk.

Some days later M. Litvinov invited me to call on him. He told me that he had before him a note of my talk with M. Potemkin. The conversation had greatly interested him, and he desired to ask me a few questions. Most of all he wished to know whether my initiative was of a personal character, or whether it originated from my Government. I told him: "I think that that depends entirely on your answer. If your answer is positive I have no doubt that the initiative will originate from my Government. But if your answer is negative, then don't you think it would probably be better that we should have to deal with the personal initiative of M. Grzybowski?" M. Litvinov agreed, and wished to know what was the political premiss on which I based my proposal. I answered that it was a very simple premiss. I thought, namely, that good neighbourly Polish-Soviet relations were an adequate factor to ensure peace in this part of Europe.

M. Litvinov's next question was: "What conditions do you regard as most important to achieve this end?" I answered that the reply to this question would probably be better indicated when I knew his Government's attitude.

Two days later M. Litvinov sent for me again, and informed me that his Government willingly took up the initiative of. . . . I said: "The Polish Government." He asked that we should present our views.

I answered that in foreign policy I did not trust to improvizations, and I counted on a permanent lessening of tension and improvement in relations only after the realization of a series of conditions which in my view were fundamental. I regarded the strict observation of existing agreements as a fundamental condition. The Soviet Govern-

ment had a tendency towards their one-sided modification, as in the case of the cancellation of the train running between the Polish frontier and Kiev, the endless procrastination over our admitted claims to property, and finally the frontier regulations, which were slowly becoming a dead letter, while incidents and violations of the regulations were multiplying endlessly.

The second condition, in my view, was an increase in trade turnover, which had fallen to a few millions, and I proposed as a basis of discussion that it should be raised to the sum of a hundred million zlotys on each side.

M. Litvinov answered with some animation that what I called the foundation was, in his view, the roof. In order to make it possible to realize the desiderata I had postulated, it was necessary, first and foremost, to create a corresponding atmosphere by some political step. He would regard a corresponding joint declaration as the most modest form of such a step.

I told him that I personally did not reject the idea of such a declaration, but I could recommend it to my Government only when I knew the Soviet Government's positive attitude to the conditions I had put forward.

Again after some days (about October 25, 1938) M. Litvinov informed me that his Government did take a positive attitude to the realization of the conditions I had put forward, and handed me a draft declaration he had ready. I read it through, and at once made a certain number of reservations and changes which I regarded as indispensable. But I accepted the matter *ad referendum*.

In the last days of October occurred the unfortunate incident of the Soviet Government's destruction of the Polish military cemetery in Kiev.

This affair, together with the necessity to agree certain details of our conditions with the departments of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had a braking effect on the course of negotiations. Only on November 24, 1938, did M. Litvinov finally accept the text of the declaration we had proposed and a memorandum containing the agreed conditions of the understanding. To the list of matters "pending and not settled" was added also the restitution *ad integrum* of the cemetery at Kiev. We agreed that the declaration was to be published on November 26, 1938.[1]

This declaration possesses undoubted political significance for, made as the result of Polish initiative, it is a precise summary of our fundamental position in regard to the Soviets. To our eastern neighbour we guaranteed the complete loyalty of our policy, its sincere striving for improvement in neighbourly relations, and the development of economic relations. In return we required respect for existing agreements and that the Soviet authorities should adapt their conduct to these agreements. At the same time we fully realized that our partner's intentions were rather more complex, that his ambitions went considerably further, and that his aim was not only to worsen relations between Poland and Germany, but also to win us over to his own

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political system. But we had the right to expect that we would be able to protect ourselves against that.

(*b*) The most important of the agreed practical conditions of the declaration concerned trade turnover.

The peculiar economic system of the Soviets had resulted in our never having a full trade treaty with them. Exchange was effected only on the basis of quotas established from year to year.

Only the introduction of foreign exchange regulation in Poland created an equal opportunity for both partners, giving the governmental factors of both States the same possibility of regulating turnover.

In view of the importance of the question we set to work on its realization as early as the middle of December 1938. On the Soviet side the negotiations were conducted by the Vice-Premier M. Mikoyan, and the *pactum de contrahendo* signed by him opened hopeful prospects.

Truly, once more it transpired that, as M. Mikoyan put it, "the Soviets have everything to buy, but really nothing to sell"; but simultaneously with the commercial Treaty we were to have a settlement of the, for us, very important transit agreement; exchange was to be based on the clearing system, assuring equilibrium in the goods balances; and the quotas on the Soviet side were to consist of raw materials of value to us and amounting to a sum of not less than sixty million zlotys. The atmosphere in which the negotiations were conducted could not have been more friendly. The Soviets desired to extend them to the sphere of war industry also, which, however, proved to be impracticable, owing to the fact that their requirements in this direction exceeded our export possibilities.

It must also be noted that immediately after the publication of the declaration the Soviet Government dealt with a number of the desiderata I had advanced. Steps were taken to restore the cemetery in Kiev, an express train began to run regularly between the Polish frontier and Kiev, a certain number of frontier incidents were adjusted. But all the other minor postulates were in practice subjected to the tactic of endless procrastination.

But the definite improvement in the atmosphere of relations with Poland did not last long on the Soviet side. The traditional New Year reception for the diplomatic corps in Berlin brought an unexpected incident. Chancellor Hitler talked with the Soviet Ambassador longer than with anyone else. In Moscow this fact was given quite considerable publicity. M. Potemkin told me about it in detail and with some delight. He also declared that the conversation touched purely on the Ambassador's personal and family affairs. On the other hand, M. Litvinov, in our conversation on January 8, advised me to hasten the trade negotiations, in order "to forestall German intrigues." Soon afterward, information was spread through Moscow of the impending arrival of a German economic delegation with M. Schnurre at its head.

I note as a characteristic fact that this delegation did indeed arrive

—at Warsaw about January 25, ostensibly en route to Moscow, but then it chose the road to the west and returned straight to Berlin.

So one must assume that in this first period of contacts there was quite a considerable vacillation in Berlin as well as in Moscow.

Our trade negotiations were opened on January 19, 1939. After only a couple of meetings between our delegations it was possible to deduce that since the time of the conclusion of the *pactum de contrahendo* a change had occurred in the attitude of the Soviet delegation. Not only did they manifest a disposition to chaffer very ardently over every point of the agreement, but such an important issue for us as the transit question was subjected to postponement.

I must state that our economic representatives attached great importance to the achievement of a trade Treaty with the Soviets, and so, naturally, our attitude was compliant. I can state definitely that after a month of tedious negotiations we achieved a trade Treaty primarily owing to the concessions we made to the Soviets as against the *pactum de contrahendo*. Except for the postponement of the transit question (which the Soviets said was indispensable because of other negotiations on the same issue) these concessions were not considerable, but they expressively emphasized that every signature of the Soviet Government would have only a relative value.

We signed the first Polish-Soviet Trade Treaty on February 19, 1939. So-called branch discussions on the fulfilment of quotas were to begin without delay. In fact they began in March, but they came up against such considerable difficulties on the Soviet side that they were never concluded. In a letter to Count Szembek dated May 23, 1939, I wrote: "At times I have the impression that in our persistent striving for practical things we are overlooking the possibilities of this country. It looks also as if, when making any kind of agreement with this State, we have to consider only the actual fact that it is made, and not the gain which may result from its conclusion."

(*c*) At the beginning of May M. Litvinov himself vanished from the political scene. To-day we realize that the Soviets' imperialistic plans must have been already sufficiently formulated for them to retain a final and decisive understanding with Chancellor Hitler as a trump card in their policy of instigation of war. It is obvious that such an understanding could not be negotiated by M. Litvinov.

For the time being the Soviets' external activity seemed to be turned in another direction. In face of England's and France's widespread diplomatic activity they regarded it as sound to extend their own activities also. Vice-Commissar Potemkin was delegated to Ankara with the object of assuring that the U.S.S.R. would have the strict solidarity of Turkish policy. On this journey M. Potemkin halted at Bucharest and Sofia. On his return journey he made his way to Warsaw and, after previous agreement with M. Beck, halted there to carry on conversations. Both M. Beck and M. Arciszewski received favourable impressions from these conversations. M. Potemkin seemed to understand the reservations which restrained us from direct participation in the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. In the

name of his Government he assured M. Beck of the Soviet Government's decision to adopt a benevolent attitude to Poland. Recapitulating these conversations to me in Moscow, he stressed with satisfaction M. Beck's declaration that in the event of such a conflict we would rely inevitably on the Soviets. In my private letter of May 25 to Count Szembek I stressed that in conversations with the diplomatic corps M. Potemkin laid great emphasis on M. Beck's words.

M. Molotov took over the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on May 5th. On Sunday, the 7th, he invited me to call on him. He began with warm compliments on M. Beck's speech of two days previously, and especially emphasized how much he had been impressed by his words on national honour.[1]

He then talked about the conversations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and France. I answered that I could not precisely state our views on this subject until I had received instructions. But I could already state, I added, that we adopted a pacific and loyal attitude to all our neighbours and that only clearly aggressive acts committed by any one of them could modify this attitude. As to the proposed collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers, we regarded it sympathetically. I also observed that we intended to maintain our alliance with Rumania.

Some days later (more or less at the time of M. Potemkin's stay in Warsaw) I gave M. Molotov a résumé of our attitude.

We could not accept a one-sided Soviet guarantee. Nor could we accept a mutual guarantee, because in the event of a conflict with Germany our forces would be completely engaged, and so we would not be in any position to give help to the Soviets. Also we could not accept collective negotiations, and made our adoption of a definite attitude conditional on the result of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. We rejected all discussion of matters affecting us other than by the bilateral method. Our alliance with Rumania, being purely defensive, could not in any way be regarded as directed against the U.S.S.R.

In addition I indicated our favourable attitude to the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, and once more emphasized our entire loyalty in relation to the Soviets. In the event of conflict we by no means rejected specified forms of Soviet aid, but considered it premature to determine them definitely. We considered it premature to open bilateral negotiations with the Soviets before the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations had achieved a result. M. Molotov made no objection whatever.

(*d*) In June there was a series of offers on the part of the Soviets to supply us with armaments materials. It has to be admitted that they were always accompanied by unacceptable conditions. The Soviet propaganda never ceased to urge us to resist the German demands.

It is true that when we raised the question of accelerating the transit negotiations we met with a refusal, but M. Potemkin assured me that obviously everything would change in the event of a conflict, and that in that case we could count on transit. It has to be borne

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in mind that so long as the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations lasted it was almost impossible for us to go beyond a waiting attitude. We felt no optimism whatever in regard to the result of those negotiations. It was difficult to expect that the Soviets would do anything in the direction of preventing a conflict or even rendering its outbreak difficult. We observed rather that their tactics aimed at the exact opposite.

The German-Soviet Pact of Non-aggression justly made a deep impression.

The fact that two mutually contradictory sets of negotiations had been carried on simultaneously was a true measure of the cynicism of Soviet policy. The conclusion of the pact was beyond all doubt an encouragement to Germany to make war. The scope of the obligations undertaken, the extent of the understanding between the Soviets and Germany remained vague.

The Soviets endeavoured to give it the appearance of a pact assuring them peace, but not effecting any fundamental change in their policy. In this regard M. Molotov even appealed to Poland's example.

The undefined character of the obligations resulting from the pact was emphasized by M. Voroshilov's interview given a few days later. Evidently influenced by news emanating from Berlin and London of the conversations between the British ambassador and Chancellor Hitler, Marshal Voroshilov gave the Soviet Press an interview, in which he stated that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations were only suspended, and that their renewal would not be in contradiction with the Soviet-German pact.

Moreover, Marshal Voroshilov simultaneously stated that the supply of raw material and war material to Poland in the event of a conflict was a 'commercial matter,' equally not in contradiction with the pact.

The warning was understood in Berlin.

(*e*) On Saturday, September 2, I received instructions to give official notification of the German aggression and the ensuing state of war between Poland and Germany. On the 3rd I was received by M. Molotov. He did not question our statement that it was a case of unprovoked aggression committed without previous declaration of war, by a surprise attack during negotiations. He agreed in recognizing Germany as the aggressor. He asked whether we counted on the intervention of Great Britain and France, and whether we expected any time-limit. I told him I had no official information, but I anticipated their declaration of war to follow a day later, on the 4th. M. Molotov smiled sceptically. "Well, we shall see, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur. . . ."

In the meantime the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw had stressed the importance of Marshal Voroshilov's interview, and had inquired at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether steps had already been taken in Moscow with the object of utilizing Marshal Voroshilov's promises in regard to us. As the result of these suggestions, on the 6th I received instructions to investigate the practical possibilities in

this direction. Simultaneously I received a list of required materials, which I was to put forward in the event of M. Molotov's adopting a favourable attitude. I was not afforded the opportunity to negotiate on this list. M. Molotov was difficult to get hold of, and received me only on the 8th. Referring to previous official statements and Marshal Voroshilov's interview, I put to him the question of buying the additional raw materials we needed and the eventual supply of war material.

M. Molotov answered that Marshal Voroshilov's interview had been made public in totally different circumstances. Marshal Voroshilov did not and could not know that Britain and France's intervention would follow. The situation had now radically changed. "Poland," said M. Molotov, "is now synonymous with England, so far as we are concerned." The Soviet Union was compelled to safeguard first and foremost its own interests, and to remain outside the conflict.

On the practical question of supplies, which I had raised, the Soviet Government maintained the position of a strict observance of the existing agreements. The fulfilment of our trade agreement had not been satisfactory, but for their part the Soviet Government were prepared to do all that was necessary for that agreement to function normally. Nevertheless, M. Molotov did not think that the Soviet Government could go beyond the quotas established for the current year, either in regard to quantities or in regard to the categories of goods. To this I replied that given good will the difficulties were not so great after all, because, in the first place, the clearing quotas could always be complemented by quotas of purchases for cash, while, secondly, we could even establish supplementary clearing quotas, for the fourth quarter or for the following year, and anticipate with their supply.

M. Molotov said again that he did not anticipate that his Government could introduce any changes whatever in the existing agreements.

I then passed to the transit question and, referring to former Soviet declarations, I asked what facilities could be granted us in this sphere. M. Molotov answered that he was afraid the transit of military materials would be in contradiction with the Pact of Non-aggression concluded with Germany.

So there was nothing else to be done than to inform him that I would communicate his attitude to my Government. At the end of the conversation M. Molotov stated that all he had said had been said in present conditions, but that circumstances might change. The phrase "in present conditions" was several times repeated in his answers.

Almost simultaneously (September 11) M. Szaronov took a friendly leave of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "in view of his departure for a few days to have contact with his Government." He communicated to Count Szembek that he had just granted visas to our specialists to travel to Moscow to purchase medical supplies, and he did not doubt that the supplies would be swiftly forthcoming.

Next day *Pravda* published a leading article violently attacking the condition of our minorities in the eastern areas. It stressed that

the fate of these minorities could not be a matter of indifference to the Soviet public.

I drew the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' attention to this article, stating that it might be in preparation for eventual decisions.

September 16 was already ended when the telephone rang. I looked at my watch: it was 2.15 a.m. M. Potemkin's secretariat notified me that the Commissar wished to inform me of an important statement by his Government, and asked whether I could come to him at three o'clock. I answered that I would. I ordered a car, and warned Councillor Jankowski that I should need him and Colonel Brzeszczyński as well as the cypher officer for four o'clock. As I drove out of the Embassy the militia-man on duty at the gate saluted with obvious surprise and rushed to the wall-telephone. For the first time in all my term as Ambassador I drove through Moscow without a police escort.

As I went I was prepared for bad news. I thought that under one pretext or another the denunciation of our Pact of Non-aggression was about to follow. That which awaited me was far worse.

M. Potemkin slowly read to me the text of a note signed by M. Molotov. When he had finished I told him at once that I refused to take the contents of the note into cognizance, I refused to communicate it to my Government, and expressed the most categorical protest against its content and form.

I protested against the unilateral abrogation of existing and binding agreements. None of the arguments intended to justify the transformation of those agreements into "scraps of paper" would withstand criticism. According to my information the head of the Polish State and the Government were within the territory of the Republic. The functioning of the Government was by the nature of things restricted by the state of war. "You will not demand that at such a time the Minister for Agriculture should carry out agricultural reforms?" For that matter the question of the Government was not so essential at that moment. The sovereignty of the State existed so long as a single regular soldier was still fighting. "You will not maintain that the Polish soldiers are no longer fighting!"

That which the note said about the position of the minorities within our borders was nonsense. All the minorities, including the Jews, had not only given expression to their loyalty, but were actively proving it by their complete solidarity with Poland in her struggle against Germanism. "More than once in our conversations," I told him, "you have appealed to Slavonic solidarity. At our side at this moment not only Ukrainians and White Russians, but also Czech and Slovak legions are fighting the Germans. Where is your Slavonic solidarity?

"So many times has the U.S.S.R. indignantly condemned and stigmatized the Germans' perfidy. The note which you have read to me would signify that you had taken the same road.

"During the Great War the territories of Serbia and Belgium were occupied, but it entered no one's head to regard their obligations to these States as non-existent on that account. Napoleon was once in

Moscow, but so long as Kutuzov's army existed it was considered that Russia existed."

M. Potemkin tried to explain that my historic responsibility would be very great if I refused to accept a document of such importance. Besides, the Soviet Government no longer possessed any representative in Poland, and were not in a position to communicate their decision to the Polish Government by any other way.

I said: "Monsieur le Commissaire, if I agreed to communicate the contents of the note to my Government it would be not only a proof that I had no respect for my Government, but it would also be a proof that I had lost all respect for the Soviet Government. I understand that I am in duty bound to inform my Government of the aggression probably already committed, but I will do no more than that. But I still hope that your Government will restrain the Red Army from invasion, and will not stab us in the back at the moment of our struggle against the Germans."

M. Potemkin said that evidently I did not take into account the impossibility of our resisting the German onslaught. On the basis of the reports of their military attaché the Soviet Government considered that the German army would inevitably march to the frontiers of the Union.

I told him: "The most pessimistic reports of military attachés have not the power to release from international agreements. The German troops' advance into the heart of Poland may be the source of great difficulties for them. A similar situation occurred in 1812."

M. Potemkin replied that in face of the attitude I had taken up he must discuss the matter with his Government. It was four o'clock. I waited for further developments for half an hour.

Finally, M. Potemkin informed me that he had communicated with the utmost precision all that I had said, but his Government could not alter the decisions taken.

I declared that I also could not change my decision, and would inform my Government only of the fact of the aggression.

I sent my telegram *en claire* at a few minutes past five. It did not reach the Ministry for Foreign Affairs until 11 a.m. The Soviet troops invaded Poland at 6 a.m.

(*f*) On September 18 I received approval of the attitude I had adopted and instructions to demand my passports. At my request the Ambassador of one of the Powers had already obtained the agreement of his Government to take over charge of the Embassy building.

On the 19th I called on M. Potemkin and told him that I regarded my mission as ended. I had only to regulate the transference of the charge of the Embassy to a third Power, and to carry out the evacuation of the outlying posts. I asked that it might be made possible for the personnel of the Consulates to arrive at a definite date, and also for the appointment of a special official to carry out the details of the evacuation in agreement with the Embassy. M. Potemkin answered that, as they did not recognize the existence of the Polish State, they would not be able to agree to a third State taking over the protection

of our property. He also warned me that they would not be able to recognize the diplomatic privileges of my personnel. The rest he promised to settle without delay.

In fact, after some days the Director of "Biurobin" (Bureau for Relations with Foreigners), M. Nazarov, was appointed "plenipotentiary for evacuation," and he opened negotiations with the railway authorities. (For understandable reasons, railway communications at this period were unusually difficult.)

The question of our safety and departure became a subject of lively interest to the entire diplomatic corps. The situation was complicated a little by the fact that the doyen of the corps was the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, while I was the vice-doyen. Owing to events my functions passed to the Italian Ambassador, M. Rosso, and to him, more than anyone else, we owe the handling of our affairs through diplomatic channels. I must stress that although my position prohibited my communicating with the doyen, Count von der Schulenburg effectively intervened on our behalf several times with the Government. In reply to his intervention M. Molotov stated that *les usages diplomatiques* would be observed at our departure, and he also communicated to him that that departure would not take place so long as the staff of the Soviet Embassy, who had voluntarily remained in Warsaw and who, owing to the bombardment of the building, were spending their time in the cellars, did not return from the besieged city safe and sound. Realizing that I for my part was utterly helpless, Count von der Schulenburg caused communication on the question to be opened between the German Command and the Warsaw Command, and on September 25 the staff of the Soviet Embassy, to the unexpected number of sixty-two persons, arrived in Koenigsberg.

On September 26 the Consulate staff in Minsk were allowed to depart, being deprived of half their cases on the pretext of lack of room in the train. Certain officials arrived in Moscow without anything whatever. Despite our protests we did not recover this baggage.

A more dramatic incident occurred in Kiev. At two in the morning of September 30 the Councillor of the Embassy, and acting consul-general, Matusiński, was summoned to the plenipotentiary of the Soviet Foreign Office, ostensibly to agree the final details of his departure. He went at once, with two chauffeurs and accompanied by two police cars. From that moment Councillor Matusiński, the two chauffeurs and the car vanished without trace.

Ambassador Rosso intervened with M. Potemkin in this affair. M. Potemkin stated that he had no information so far from the local authorities, but he must point out that as M. Matusiński had already lost his diplomatic privileges, he could be called to account by the Soviet authorities if it appeared that he had committed some crime against the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Rosso justly replied that he saw no possibility of that, for down to September 18 M. Matusiński had enjoyed full diplomatic privileges, while from that day he had been in fact interned and could commit no crime whatever.

In view of the above-stated position of the affair I asked Ambassador Rosso to communicate to the Soviet Government that I would not leave Moscow so long as M. Matusiński was not set free, and that I demanded formulation of the charge against him.

The intervention with M. Molotov gave a result completely different. M. Molotov informed the doyen of the corps most categorically that the Soviet authorities had no information whatever as to the place of residence and the fate of M. Matusiński. "I assure you," said M. Molotov, "that he is not in our hands. I am myself personally making investigations in order to clear up this affair. To hold up the Ambassador's departure on this account is pointless, and I cannot agree to it."

In view of the Soviet Government's obvious intention to avoid formulating any charge against M. Matusiński there was really nothing to wait for, since one could no longer expect him to be found.

Thanks to the kindness of the Finnish Legation and authorities, the railway difficulties were overcome and our departure took place on the evening of October 10.

The train placed at our disposition by the Soviet authorities had one special feature. It was a sealed train. No one was allowed to alight from it at the stops. The following evening we crossed the Finnish frontier.

I cannot but note that from the Diplomatic Corps and from very numerous colleagues we received a great amount of sympathy and assistance. The cordiality of the leavetaking at the station went far beyond anything known on normal occasions. In addition to Ambassador Rosso special thanks are due to the Ambassador of Great Britain, Sir William Seeds, and the entire personnel of his Embassy.

In conclusion one remark prompts itself. A diplomat accredited to Moscow, cut off from all contacts and all sources of information, can get an orientation on the course of general processes, but knows only facts which come to the surface. Any estimate of the Soviets' foreign policy relies upon very inadequate sources. But there can be no doubt that, equally with their internal policy, it is subversive. Is it at the same time a bad policy? Life would be simpler if the directors of foreign policy could be divided into two definite categories: those who commit only errors and those who render only services. Certain features of Stalin's policy have been marked by great ability. But it must be stated that his policy of invasion of Poland, his entente with Nazi Germany and his tactic of keeping us deceived until the last moment, will bring effects of the most negative kind to Stalin and the U.S.S.R.

One may repeat with Talleyrand: *"C'est pire qu'un crime, c'est une faute."*

CONCLUSIONS

This collection of documents includes the texts of international agreements, diplomatic reports, and other official matter concerned with Polish-German and Polish-Soviet relations over a period when international conditions enabled Poland to pursue a policy of *rapprochement* with both her largest neighbours, Germany and the U.S.S.R.

These documents prove that the Polish Government was guilty of no action that could justify Germany in opening hostilities against Poland on September 1, 1939, or could excuse the Soviets' invasion of Polish territory on September 17, 1939.

For some long time after the Treaty of Versailles come into operation, the Polish Government were unable to enter into normal relations with the German Reich. All their attempts to do so, even in the commercial sphere, failed because of the determination of successive German Governments to isolate Poland in Europe, with a view to preparing the ground for revisionist claims. From 1924 until 1933 there was a general easing of the political situation in the West of Europe. Chancellor Hitler himself continued this policy by joining in the so-called Four Power Pact. Yet from 1922 onward every German Government pursued a policy of encircling Poland from the east, by maintaining the close relations established between Germany and the Soviets at Rapallo. Poland attempted to counteract this threat by forming an alliance with France, by collaborating with the Baltic States and Rumania, and by incessantly endeavouring to reach a neighbourly understanding with Germany and the U.S.S.R. So far as Germany was concerned, these efforts on Poland's part met with no success until the middle of 1933. After the failure of the Four Power Pact, Chancellor Hitler resorted to different political tactics from those employed by previous German Governments. In May 1933 he had a conversation with the Polish Minister in Berlin, M. Wysocki, which for the first time gave Poland an opportunity to improve her relations with Germany.

After the Western Powers had attempted for many years to pursue a policy of *détente* and establishment of normal relations with Germany, even under the Hitler régime, the Polish Government in turn sought to follow this path.

Already in that first conversation between Chancellor Hitler and the Polish Minister, attention was devoted to the Danzig problem, which was regarded as the touchstone of future Polish-German relations. In the talks which followed, the Polish Government always emphasized the fact that Poland's rights in the Free City were a vital interest to her, and one which she could not resign. This point of view was accepted by the German Government. It was in these circumstances that the Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934, was signed. This Declaration was intended to eliminate the use of force in Polish-German relations for a period of at least ten years, i.e., until 1944.

In subsequent diplomatic conversations between Poland and Germany, in which the German spokesman was often Chancellor Hitler himself, the Polish side repeatedly and consistently pointed out the necessity for maintaining the Free City of Danzig, in which Poland's rights were guaranteed, separate from the Reich. Assurances to this effect were given by Germany both in the conversations themselves and in Reichstag pronouncements. The most important of these assurances was contained in a statement made by Chancellor Hitler to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin on November 5, 1937, and later confirmed in his conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister in January 1938, and again in his Reichstag speech at about the same time.

The Polish Government therefore had ample grounds for believing that the question of incorporating Danzig with Germany would not be raised, especially as official representatives of the Reich intimated quite clearly that, in German eyes, the so-called Corridor problem did not exist, and that the Polish-German frontier was recognized and accepted by the Reich.

During the Polish-German conversations not only a strong anti-Soviet but an anti-Russian bias was noticeable on the German side. Russia, and Communist Russia in particular, was regarded as a grave menace to Europe, and above all to Germany. The Rapallo policy was regarded with such horror that Chancellor Hitler himself declared that the former Reich Chancellor, General Schleicher, was rightfully murdered, if only because he had sought to maintain the Rapallo trend. Yet, as early as 1935 Marshal Józef Pilsudski, in discussion with Field-Marshal Goering, firmly rejected any suggestion of a common Polish-German policy against the Soviets. Although Poland was offered the Ukraine in return for such a policy, the Polish Government rejected all such proposals to the very end, as they considered that Poland's role was to act as a steadying element for the peace and equilibrium of Europe, and that therefore she could not march with Germany against Russia, nor with Russia against Germany.

The period of correct Polish-German relations lasted without any serious crises until October 1938.

As soon, however, as other objectives in Chancellor Hitler's aggressive plans had been achieved, he made unexpected demands on Poland. It then became apparent that, just as the previous German Governments had needed a policy of *rapprochement* with the West and the Soviets in order to isolate Poland, so Chancellor Hitler had had a temporary need of ostensibly good relations with Poland, in order first to achieve his other aggressive plans, which were all subordinated to the chief aim: German hegemony over Europe.

Towards the end of October 1938 M. von Ribbentrop, contrary to Chancellor Hitler's previous assurances, put forward demands for the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich, an extra-territorial Motor Road between Germany and East Prussia, and a joint Polish-German policy in the East. The Polish Government would not entertain the idea of a joint policy against the Soviets, but in regard to Danzig

and the Motor Road made all the concessions compatible with the vital interests of the Polish State, and suggested negotiations with a view to finding a reasonable compromise. Instead of negotiating, the German Government reiterated their demands, which they considered had to be accepted in their entirety. Obviously, the German Government knew that the acceptance of these demands would give Germany the economic and strategic control of Poland's access to the sea, and that the situation thus created would soon have compelled Poland to subordinate her policy to that of Germany, and to become an ally of Germany first in her action against the Soviets, and later, doubtless, against Western Europe.

The Polish decision not to subjugate herself to German policy, wholeheartedly backed by all Polish public opinion, led to German action in the direction of forcing Poland to accept the demands. In March 1939 came steps which led to the political and military encirclement of Poland (the Czech-Moravian protectorate, protection over Slovakia and military occupation of Western Slovakia, the annexation of Memel, and the establishment of a naval base there). Then the claim to Danzig was renewed at the end of March, this time in categorical terms. The Polish Government again replied with counter-proposals and a suggestion of negotiation. But the German Government, which was not in the least interested in negotiations and a compromise, and which desired to subdue Poland by imposing their demands as a whole, made no reply to these proposals. The fact that this collection of documents includes none on direct Polish-German conversations during all the last months of the crisis (April to August) is explained simply by the circumstance that no such documents exist, as throughout this period the German Government obstinately avoided all direct contact with the Polish Government.

Disturbed by Germany's final encirclement of Poland, in March 1939 the Polish Government were compelled to strengthen their reinsurances in the West. The Polish-French Alliance was complemented by a Polish-British bilateral guarantee, which had been preceded by a British unilateral guarantee to Poland. This further strengthening of Poland's ties with the West provoked a violent reaction in Berlin. In April 1939 Chancellor Hitler unilaterally denounced both the Polish-German Declaration and the Naval Agreement with Great Britain.

From that moment the Reich, realizing that she could not subdue Poland by threats, resolutely prepared for war. The Polish-German conversations were broken off. Contrary to the Statute of the Free City, Danzig began to be militarized. Next, the Danzig authorities began to sabotage legitimate Polish activities in other spheres—the port, customs, railways, etc. In addition to this provocation in Danzig the Polish minority in Germany was subjected to ruthless persecution, while the German Press was filled with invented and lying descriptions of alleged maltreatment of the German minority in Poland.

The crisis gradually developed until in August 1939 it reached a climax. Poland was subjected to all kinds of provocation in order

to force her to begin war operations. By the second half of August, the process of militarization in Danzig was completed. Polish rights were *de facto* suspended by illegal enactments of the Senate and by common violence, the Polish minority in Germany was handed over to the mercies of the Gestapo, and deliberately organized frontier incidents, including violations of Polish territory by German troops, grew more and more frequent. The German Army, mobilized long before, was concentrated on Poland's frontiers, particularly in Slovakia.

Finally, on August 23, 1939, came the German-Soviet Pact—a fundamental change in Hitler's Eastern policy. Having failed to win Poland over to his anti-Soviet plans, he won over the Soviets to an anti-Polish policy.

Meanwhile, the British Government were attempting to prevent the outbreak of war by urging direct Polish-German negotiations. Despite continual, everyday provocation, the Polish Government remained calm, and agreed to such negotiations. The German Government at once put forward the incredible demands that a Polish plenipotentiary should arrive in Berlin within 24 hours to accept immediately German conditions which had not been handed in writing even to the British Government. The Polish Government were not informed of these demands, learning of their exact conditions only at nine o'clock on the evening of August 31 from the German wireless, a few hours before Germany commenced hostilities. These demands included the annexation of Danzig, while the question of Poland's title to the province of Pomorze was to be subject to revision. In other words, Poland's free access to the sea was questioned, with the necessary consequence that Poland was to be subjected to German hegemony. The Polish plenipotentiary was expected to accept all these demands without the right to object, and, when sending him, the Polish Government would not even have known what the German Government's proposals were. Determined on war, Germany gave Poland a short period in which to make the choice: either immediate invasion or acceptance within twenty-four hours of the German demands in their entirety, without discussion. This would have meant Poland's political capitulation and deliverance to the mercy of Germany.

None the less, the Polish Government refused to be provoked, and as late as August 31 the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, acting on the instructions of his Government, tried to see M. von Ribbentrop with a view to entering into the direct contact which, during those last days of August, the British Government had sought in vain to arrange. On learning that the Polish Ambassador was not empowered to accept their demands without discussion, the German side refused to talk with him.

When, however, at 9 p.m., on August 31, 1939, the Polish Government learned the exact German demands for the first time, simultaneously they learned from the same German wireless broadcast that in the view of the German Government the period during which the demands could be accepted was past, and that at the moment of their

publication they were already regarded as rejected by Poland ("in these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having this time, too, to all intents and purposes, been rejected"). If, therefore, it could be conceived that the Polish Government would wish to accept even these incredible proposals, after becoming acquainted with them, as a basis for direct Polish-German negotiations, even so, such a decision would no longer have restrained the act of aggression, in view of the fact that simultaneously with the publication of their proposals, the German Government hastened to provide them with the commentary that they were rejected, and so no longer existed.

In these circumstances it is obvious that no matter what attitude the Polish Government might have taken up between nine p.m. on August 31 and 4.45 a.m. on September 1, i.e., between the hour when they learned the exact German conditions and the hour when the German aggression began, it would have made no difference to the course of events. For the official German commentary to the sixteen points of the proposals explicitly declared that the German Government already regarded the road to negotiations, in other words the road to peace, as closed.

In the early hours of September 1 came the German aggression, with an attack on all frontiers and bombings all over Polish territory.

During the night of September 1-2, the German Government, on their own initiative, exchanged notes with the Polish Government, through the intermediary of the Dutch Government, on the subject of abstention from bombing the civil population. This German move was probably due to fear lest German towns should be bombed by British and French aircraft. When this fear passed, the German air force began a ruthless bombing of Polish open towns and villages.

Polish-German struggles continued despite the Soviet invasion on September 17. The heroic defence of Warsaw ended at the end of September with the destruction of the city, which surrendered owing to lack of ammunition and provisions. In his speech of October 6 Chancellor Hitler dared to insult even the memory of the defenders of Warsaw.

Following the occupation of Polish territory by German and Soviet troops on September 28, 1939, the invaders signed an agreement which illegally partitioned the territory of Poland between them.

After the termination of war operations on the Eastern Front the German Reich, which in beginning the war against Poland had violated its own international agreements, and subsequently had conducted military operations in a manner contrary to international law, again violated international law by annexing part of the occupied Polish territory. This, although the war on the west was still in progress, and until the end of the struggle with Poland's Allies Germany does not even possess a *"droit de conquête."*

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The Polish-Soviet War ended with a Polish military victory in

1920. Yet Poland did not impose peace terms on Soviet Russia, but made peace after normal negotiations and consideration of both sides' views. Article 2 of the Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, laid down a Polish-Soviet frontier that approximately coincided with Russia's western boundaries in 1793, i.e., after the second partition of Poland. Article 3 of the Treaty proclaimed the Soviets' disinterestedness in the matter of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, the problem of Wilno province. These Polish-Soviet and Polish-Lithuanian frontiers were solemnly recognized by Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in a resolution passed by the Conference of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923.

Despite the Rapallo policy pursued by Germany and the Soviets, the Polish Government aimed to achieve the best of relations with Poland's eastern neighbour. At the same time the Polish Government took care to ensure that parallel with the normalization of Polish-Soviet relations, normal relations would develop between the U.S.S.R. and other European neighbours. Poland never consented to any sacrifice of the interests of these nations for the sake of her own.

After the Treaty of Riga, the first important political event in Polish-Soviet relations was the regional agreement signed by the Soviets, Poland, and several other European States bordering on Russia, on February 9, 1929. This agreement provided for the immediate application of the Kellogg Pact, even before other countries put it into force. Later, on July 25, 1932, a bilateral non-aggression pact was signed between Poland and the Soviets. Attempts on both sides to eliminate the fear of aggression achieved success in the regional agreement of July 3, 1933, signed in London, and containing a clear and simple definition of an aggressor. The agreement embraced Poland, the U.S.S.R., Latvia, Estonia, Rumania, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. On July 22, 1933, Finland also adhered to this agreement. In view of present circumstances, it is worth recalling certain of its provisions.

Article 2

"Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;

Article 3

"No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2 (for example, see Annex).

"THE High Contracting Parties.....

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of this Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

(*a*) The internal condition of a State.

"E.g., its political, economic, or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war."

The satisfactory nature of Polish-Soviet relations was emphasized by the Polish Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow in February 1934. After the Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934, was signed, the Polish Government offered the U.S.S.R. a guarantee that there was no fear of Poland ever consenting to co-operate in the anti-Soviet plans of Nazi Germany. The Moscow visit took place almost immediately after the signing of the Polish-German Declaration, and in May of the same year Poland extended her non-aggression pact with the Soviets to cover the entire duration of her agreement with Germany. The protocol extending the duration of the pact is followed by a final protocol confirming Article 3 of the Riga Peace Treaty, in other words, the U.S.S.R. disavowed all interest in the question of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier.

On the occasion of the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations, the existing mutual political obligations of the two States were reaffirmed on September 10, 1934.

Normal neighbourly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union on the basis of these obligations continued throughout the subsequent years. All German attempts to draw Poland into anti-Soviet action came to nothing, thanks to the Polish Government's resolute refusal. Yet Germany, who continually represented the Polish-German *détente* as involving co-operation against the Soviets, worked hard to complicate and disturb Polish-Soviet relations.

After the temporary misunderstandings of 1938, on November 26 of that year the two Governments, Polish and Soviet, solemnly confirmed their mutual desire to continue the policy of good neighbourly relations. Commercial relations also took a good turn by the signing of a trade agreement in February 1939.

When the crisis in Polish-German relations came to the surface in March 1939, the Soviets did not cease to maintain a friendly attitude towards Poland. For instance, immediately after M. Molotov had become Commissar for Foreign Affairs, his Vice-Commissar, M. Potemkin, stopped at Warsaw on his way through Poland in May 1939, and, in the name of his Government, assured the Polish Foreign Minister that, in the event of a conflict between Germany and Poland, the U.S.S.R. would adopt a benevolent attitude towards Poland.

Although the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations broke down over the sudden manifestation of Soviet imperialism, the Soviet Government maintained an apparently neutral attitude towards the Polish-

German conflict. The signing of the German-Soviet Agreement on August 23 did not appear to influence the attitude of the official Soviet representatives towards Poland. When, having by means of this agreement achieved security in the east, the Reich Government attacked Poland, the Soviet Government, and in particular their Ambassador to Poland, several times during the war repeated their assurances to the Polish Government.

Just as the Polish front, as the result of a shortening of the line, was being strengthened and consolidated, suddenly, in the early morning of September 17, the Soviets launched an unexpected attack in the rear, so determining the issue of the Polish-German campaign. A few hours before the Soviet troops invaded Poland the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Potemkin, sought to present to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow a note unilaterally denouncing the Non-Aggression Pact, and motivating the Soviet invasion by *inter alia* the alleged abandonment of Polish territory by the Polish Government. This allegation was untrue.[1]

The Soviets' action of September 17, 1939, was stigmatized in advance in the text of the Agreement of July 3, 1933, defining an aggressor. This agreement was based almost word for word on the Soviet proposals to the Disarmament Conference.

Until the outbreak of the present war, Poland was sincerely seeking to act as a factor for peace and equilibrium in Eastern Europe. Separating Germany from Soviet Russia, she prevented the realization of any aggressive plans which either of these countries might be harbouring against the other, or against the smaller nations of Eastern Europe. The temporary occupation of Polish territory has eliminated this factor for equilibrium and stabilization from Eastern Europe, and has opened a road for the two imperialisms of Hitler Germany and Soviet Russia. The proofs of this are, unfortunately, already provided by the Soviet protectorate over the Baltic States, the Soviet aggression against Finland, and the Soviet and German menaces hanging over other neutral countries.

[1]It was, in fact, the Soviet invasion which led to the Government's decision to leave Polish territory.